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Preface.
The aim of this essay is to seek out the truth in regard to
one phase of the diplomatic history of the American Revolution, the
whole history of which has been befuddled by the suspicions of Jay and
Adams. To accomplish this, the archives of Washington, London and
paris have been searched; those of Ppain yet remain to be explored.
It is not hoped that this study is the final word on the subject, but
I do believe that it has opened up new leads to truth regarding the
history of the west during those trying times.
This subject was suggested to me by Professor C. W. Alvord'
in the spring of 1909, and the work has been done under his direction.
I am also indebted for many valuable suggestions to Professors E. B.
Greene, 0. S. Ford, W. S. Robertson and to other members of the De-
partment of History of the University of Illinois. Mr. 17, G-. Leland
of the Carnegie Institute gave much assistance in my search for mate-
rials in the archives of Washington and Paris, and for similar help ir
the archives of Pondon my thankc are due to Mr. Hubert Hall of the
' ^ublic Record Office, and to Mr. H. P. Buggar of the Canadian Archives
Commission. I wish also to acknowledge the help given me by Piss Anne
Applegate of the University of Illinois in the translation and inter-
pretation of manuscripts.
Paul C. Phillips.
Urbana, Illinois
I'ay 13, 1911.
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CHAPTER I
.
THE ORIGINS
.
"The humiliation of Britain I" "the prestige of France'."
these were the phrases most often on the tongue of French statesmen
in the decade following the close of the -even Years War. To their
minds the first was the means to the second. To accomplish their pur-
pose they realized that, in addition to the old coalition of France
and Spain, they must raise up a new foe to Great Britain. The shrewd
and owl-eyed Choiseul looked across the Atlantic and saw in the liber
ty loving English colonies of America, the latent power needed to at-
tain his ends. To the unimaginative Vergennes was left the task of
building up this coalition, of guiding its forces against the common
foe, and finally of apportioning the spoils of war between the hungry
maws of his new proteges and the insatiable greed of his old ally.
Both reached out for those territories which had fallen a prey to
Great Britain in the former war and did not, on account of the charac-
ter of their position and population, play a title role in the mighty
drama of the world struggle. Around this question of spoils twined
the intricate negotiations of the American Revolution, and ut)on its
answer depended the success of French diplomacy in forming a triple
alliance against the might of Britain. Here was the problem upon which
Vergennes was to spend many thoughtful years, only to find at last its
solution wrought out by other men, working on principles strange to
him and with forces unknown to his reasoning. The final outcome, how-
ever, satisfied the aims of Vergennes 1 diplomacy. By the independence
of the United States and the division of Pitt's great conquests in the
:.:i3sissipt>i valley the revenge of France was completed.
The peace of 17^ robbed France of all her possessions in
America. Canada and that part of Louisiana east of the Mississippi

passed to the dominion of England, and western Louisiana was handed
over to Spain as an indemnity for the loss of Florida. Among the Eng-
lish colonies all fear of the enemy of so many generations passed a-
way. The terms of this treaty portended the establishment of the Uni-
ted States, for with the fear of French aggressions before them the
colonies would never have dared rebel. That rebellion was to offer
France her opportunity. Even before the conclusion of peace in 1763
she was laying Dlans for a new war against her ancient rival. In 1762
the Duke de Broglie was instructed to draw up plans for the contest.
These were worked out to the minutest details, but when the death of
Louis XV brought in a new government they were laid aside only to be
1
resurrected at a later date.
To Choiseul, the keen and farsighted minister of Louis XV,
America seemed the most natural and easy ground on which Prance could
work out her vengeance. Great Britain was still the undisputed mis-
tress of the seas and he turned to the New TCorld as the battlefield on
which to dispute this supremacy. He realized the strength of the for-
ces with which England had to contend in America and was astonished at
2her blindness when he learned she was provoking war, for through his
agents he was well informed of conditions there. De Kalb had come o-
ver in 17«7 as such an agent, and perhaps Bonvouloir acted in this ca-
3pacity on his journey along the whole Atlantic seaboard. ~ London also
4
furnished him the latest intelligence. In the French archives are
bundles of reports concerning America, gathered from every source.
1. Archives de la Inline, B 4, Vol. 135, pp. 4-fi . This plan, however,
involved as its most important measure a descent on the coast of Eng-
land.. It was the general opinion in France that the monarchy would
never again interfere on the continent of America. Before 1774 Choi-
seul alone seems to have conceived this idea.
2. Tlharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 371, note.
3 • Ibid, I, 417.
4. Ibid, 331.

The Spanish people likewise hated the British nation for
their losses by war. Although they distrusted France the two crowns
were bound together in common interests and purposes, and were partic-
ularly united by the Family Compact, according to the terms of which,
there was a mutual guarantee of their possessions, and a mutual prom-
ise of aid in case of attack. For this their hatred of England and
to red fee »w
desire for vengeance was a pledge. That France war willing hers was
A
evident when in 1774 Spain and Portugal were on the verge, of war over
i 1
the boundaries between Brazil and Uruguay. France took the side of
Spain, Great Britain that of Portugal, and for a time it seemed that
war would result. But the Bourbon powers were not ready for war, and
the conflict was postponed till a more favorable opportunity.
In the midst of these troubles the old king Louis XV died.
His successor, Louis XVI, in the selection of his ministry, passed o-
ver the supple Choiseul and chose for the foreign office Charles Gra-
vier, Comte de Vergennes, at that time ambassador to Sweden. Ver-
gennes had few of the characteristics of the wily Choiseul. Although
jhe had spent his whole life in diplomacy he never displayed that fi-
Inesse which has co^e to be regarded as characteristic of French
statesmen. He was narrow in his views, blunt and direct in speech,
and cold and haughty in manner. Particularly marked was his deficien-
cy in the vivacity and optimism so general among the French people and
his appearance of always laboring under a load of anxiety and respon-
sibility. But he was a man of clear understanding and resolute pur-
pose, who pursued unhesitatingly to the end the policy upon which he
had decided. In his public life as well as in his private relations
he was frank and sincere. His opinions often apnear narrow and unrea-
sonable, and his bluntness in expressing them often exposed him to the
1. Doniol, Transcripts, XVIII, 36.

charge of lack of tact. He sometimes showed a violent temper in deal-
ing with the other ministers and his ambassadors and even towards for-
eign representatives such as the American commissioners. In general,
however, he was patient and courteous. He was not a lovable charac-
ter, but his uprightness and ability gained for him the friendship and
respect of such opposite characters as Franklin, Louis XVI, and Marie
Antoinette.^" Such was the man who at the age of fifty-seven years
took charge of the foreign affairs of Prance. No abler minister could
have been chosen and his honesty and loyalty were beyond suspicion.
Patriotism was his greatest passion, and for the betterment of his
country he gave his life.
At the beginning of his ministry he had one disadvantage.
His whole diplomatic career had been connected with the east and north
and when called to office in 1774 he had little special knowledge of
the problems that confronted him in the relations of France with Spain
and England. His lack of previous acquaintance with the subject made
it difficult for him to work out the details of his foreign policy,
but he set himself resolutely to the task, with a success to be here-
inafter described. Vergennes was in one respect like Choiseul. He
was determined to avenge French defeats at the hands of Great Britain
and to restore French prestige abroad. This was the keynote of his
whole policy, and it was this that led him in 1773 to recognize the
independence of the United States and to make every effort to keep the
alliance and friendship of Spain. J He keenly felt the depths to which
1. This characterization of Vergennes is drawn from his letters and
diplomatic despatches. Franklin paid a tribute to him in 1781, in
speaking of "the sincerity of this upright and able minister, who nev-
er promised me anything which he did not punctually perform." Frank-
lin, '.7orks (Smyth ed.), VIII, 302. At the time of Vergennes' death
Franklin again wrote: "So wise and good a man, taken away from the
station he filled is a great loss, not only to France but to Europe in
general, to America and to mankind." Ibid, IX, 575. For a common i-
dea of Vergennes see John Jay's characterization in Magazine of Ameri-
can History, XIII, 7,1.
2. Doniol, I, 17.

his country had fallen, and recognized that throughout all Europe
French prestige was shattered. "The deplorable peace of 1763", he in-
formed his king, "the partition of Poland, and indeed other causes e-
qually disastrous have struck the greatest blows to the respect for
your Crown." 1 lie complained that this peace had been purchased at the
price of Canada, Louisiana and other valuable possessions. To re-
trieve the fallen glory of France he held it necessary to strike a
blow at England. And here for the first time Vergennes suggested that
encouragenent ,and aid be given the British colonies in their opposi-
tion to their mother country.
From reports of conditions in America Vergennes was sure
that a rupture was near at hand. To make his information still more
exact he sent Bonvouloir on a second visit. In his instructions to
this agent Vergennes recognized the jealousy of the British colonies
of French influence and their fear of French aggression. His agent
was instructed to inform the Americans that France had absolutely no
designs on the conquest of Canada. It is probable that Vergennes was
the more illing to make this promise because like his predecessor,
4
IChoiseul, he disliked colonial establishments, and at no time in his
career did he seek to acquire them but was content with small islands
and commercial ports.
The outbreak of the American Revolution gave the North Amer-
ican continent an international importance greater than it had ever
1. Doniol, I, 13.
2. Ibid, 2.
3. :.Tharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 333.
4. Vergennes never expressed any desire to establish colonies. On the
: contrary he repeatedly declared that France had no designs on American
territory and at the time of the treaty of alliance he willingly a-
:
greed not to occupy any n^rt of the continent. In the "Reflexions" of
1775 Vergennes shows the utmost indifference to a colonial empire, and
at a still later time he declared that France had all the colonies her
population and industry could support. See post, p.

p> _
before possessed. In previous wars these vast regions had been merely
a factor in great European struggles, but now they became the center
of a new conflict fought out on different lines. In former struggles
it was merely a question of whether Great Britain or the Bourbon mon-'
archies should possess these boundless domains, and in every case the
might of the Anglo-Saxon had prevailed. Defeated in every conflict
with a united Britain, the statesmen of France now faced a divided em-
pire and with the help of a powerful member, they hop^^ loowe-r<.ov«* 1
author of the woes of the House of Bourbon. For them it was n6 longer
a contest to decide the ownership of Canada or Louisiana; the recon-
quest of these had passed beyond their dreams; and they looked for tri-
umph over their foe in the destruction of her commerce, in the dismem-
berment of her empire, and above all in forming of her richest prov-
inces, a new nation that would forever be a check on British aggres-
sion .
In a comprehensive scheme like this, and especially in the
establishment of an independent state in America Spain would have no
part. She still cherished the dream of a colonial empire and her pos-
sessions in America, far greater than those of her British rival,
stretched over half of the northern and nearly all the southern conti-
nent. It was true that an independent government in the New World
would always be a threat and a danger to the British possessions, but
it would be equally the same to those of Spain. It would be a con-
stant menace to British dominion in Canada, but it would also be the
relentless foe of Spanish control of Louisiana. This difference of
interest and of policy could not be reconciled by appeal to the Pacte
de Famille and was to produce throughout a lack of unity and harmony
in the councils of the two courts.
Spanish fears of American aggression were not wholly ground-
less. The year 1763 had marked a new era in history of colonial ex-

pari si on. Tith the danger of French encroachment removed the British
colonies entered upon a period of growth and of independence of
thought and action, With the removal of this same danger Great Brit-
ain in an attempt to centralize her empire entered upon a policy of
restriction and coercion, that ultimately led to rebellion. It is not
necessary to discuss here the motives behind this policy; it is suf-
ficient that the policy itself produced the American Revolution, and
thus clayed into the hands of France.
In this oeriod between the treaty of Paris and the outbreak
of the American Revolution there was much discussion of what to do
with the territory conquered from the Bourbons: Florida, Fastern Lou-
isiana and Canada. All this discussion, however, led to but three
acts; the royal proclamation of 176^,"^ the treaty of Fort Stanwix in
1768, and the Quebec Act of 1774. The first of these acts marked out
the two zones of the Floridas, and the Mississippi valley and provided
for the control of each. The Floridas were placed under an arbitrary
government, although some forms of popular control were preserved. In
regard to the Mississippi territories this act forbade any"grant, war-
rant of survey, or pass patents for any lands beyond the heads or
sources of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic ocean from
west or northwest". All this territory was to be held, "for the pres-
ent", for the Indians. It provided, however, for the sale of any of
I
this land by the Indians to the British government."^ In accordance
1
with the terms of this proclamation the Indians ceded at the treaty
of Fort Stanwiz their claim to all land between the Ohio and Tennessee
2
rivers and the way to the settlement of this region was now open.
> 1. Alvord, "Genesis of the Proclamation of 1765" . Michigan Histori-
|
cal Collections, XXXVI, 20.
2. Alvord, British Ministry arid Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Proceedings
of the Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908, p. 24.
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Even before the treaty of Fort Stanwix the British ministry
was confronted by two policies in regard to the unoccupied lands of
the west. One was to throw them open to settlement, the other was to
keep them in wilderness inhabited only by Indians and traders. The
Americans supported the first of these policies and their chief advo-
cate was Franklin. Lord Hillsborough on the other side urged the pro-
hibition of settlements in the back countries, and the reservation of
these lands for the Indians. 1 In the early seventies it seemed that
the ministry favored settlements in the country south of the Ohio, and
that these regions would soon be peopled. Large numbers of frontiers-
men wandered at will through the forests of Kentucky and Tennessee,
and numerous trading poets were built up in Fest Florida and along the
lower Mississippi.
To the north of the Ohio a different law was enforced. Set-
tlements were discouraged and throughout the whole extent of this ter-
ritory the only male inhabitants were Indians and a few hundred
French "habitants" gathered peacefully together in ancient, littli,
drowsy villages. Across the prairies of this country roamed fur trad-
ers of English, French, or Spanish nationality, knowing no control but
their own wills. Although these lands were not open to settlement,
they were regarded as a part of the thirteen colonies, but in 1774
this claim was swept away. The Quebec Act 2 of that year incorporated
jthe country north of the Ohio and west of the Alleghanies with the
province of Quebec and it appeared to the colonists along the Atlantic
.1. In 1772 when the Vandalia scheme providing for an extensive grant
of land west of the Alleghanies was before the Privy Council, Franklin
supported it and Hillsborough opnosed. The Council decided in favor
of the grant and Hillsborough resigned in disgust. Life and Writings
of Franklin (Smyth ed.), V, 466 et seq.; X, 255 et seq.
,2. Coffin, The Province of Quebec and the Early American Revolution.(University of '"isconsin, Bulletins, I, no. ~, 189R ) .

that they were to be always forbidden the use of the vast regions be-
hind them. By this act a half of the back countries was definitely
separated from the influence of the Anglo-Saxon colonies and entrusted
to the arbitrary rule of a military governor under French law. Pro-
tests against this act were unavailing, but its enforcement, together
with other unpopular measures of the royal government, was fast driv-
ing the colonies to rebellion.
Thus the acts and regulations of the British ministry divid-
ed the conquests of the Seven Years T"ar into four districts differing
in character, and each of these districts was to be a distinct issue
in the diplomacy of the Revolution. Canada with its distinctive popu-
lation and institutions, was not in sympathy with the ideals of the
Anglo-Saxon colonies; but its ultimate possession was to the end of tte
struggle a matter of doubt. The Northwest, as yet unpeopled, was
still claimed, under their charters, by the seaboard colonies; ancient
Eastern Louisiana was held under the same title, and with less contra-
diction by Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia. On the south, the
Floridas, like Canada on the north, formed a colony, distinct in popu-
lation and government .
^
Beyond the Mississippi stretched the unexplored domains of
Spanish Louisiana. Only a few years before it had been the pride of
the French colonial empire, but this power, in order to reimburse
Spain for her losses in the Seven Years War, had ceded it to her
southern neighbor. New Orleans was the most important post and con-
trolled the commerce of the 1'ississippi. Other Spanish villages were
scattered up the river as far as St. Louis, which had been established
at the close of the Seven Years War, and had become a refuge for
1
.
West Florida was the more important and the center of Fnglish in-
fluence here was Fensacola. From here the British commanders sought
to control the trade of the Mississippi and to hold the Indians of
western Georgia in subjection. Of scarcely less importance were the
[posts of :..obile and Natchez. The population was mostly French and
Spanish, but there were many British and American traders. Colonial
Mobile
.

!
French inhabitants who desired to escape the rule of the British a-
cross the river. It was now a prosperous center of trade"1" with the
Illinois country and a menace to British power across the river. So
influential were the P'rench in this region that in 1769, the commander
of Fort Chartres in the Illinois country wrote to the secretary of war
complaining that in spite of all the efforts of the English traders,
backed by British soldiers, they carried off all the trade. Further-
more, they influenced the Indians against the British to such an ex-
tent as to threaten a general Indian war.
Although France had surrendered Louisiana to Spain she still
possessed an active interest in it, as shown by the numerous accounts
2
of this province during the years from 1765 to 1 774 . J Almost immedi-
ately after the treaty there appeared a "Memoire que regarde la Louis-
•7
iane", and in 176P there appeared four extensive memoirs on the same
province, describing it in detail, and bewailing its loss to France.
The years following were full of discontent and disturbance among the
French population, and there were many complaints of Spanish cruelty
and tyranny. The French of Louisiana appealed to their countrymen in
: Europe for aid and succeeded in arousing great sympathy ajnong all
classes. In France there was considerable agitation for the retroces-
sion of this province to its former mistress and in support of this
idea there appeared two significant memoirs. mhe first was entitled,
"Memoir de Poterat tendant a mettre la Louisiane sous la protecterat
francais. Of still greater interest was a memoir of the French ad-
1. Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 88, no. 175.
2. Among these is a memoir from a M . Frances dated Oct. 21, 176^ in
which he describes Lord Egremont's plan in regard to "Accadia Canada,
•and the Floridas"
. Arc. Aff. Etr. Angeltette, V, 481, no. 10^. Con-
cerning the L'isr.issipri valley there is a better from a M. de Neyon to
Loftus in which he concedes to the English the permanent possession of
the Illinois. Arc. Col. Louisiane, 44, Di,v. 2, 18 b. It is possible
also that a M . Larnier who was in the Illinois country in the early
seventies was an agent of Choiseul. Arc. Aff. Etr. Angelterre, V, 501,
no. 320.
V*l
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miral D'Estaing, arguing that it was a great injustice to make French-
men sub|dtt to Spanish laws, and proposing the freedom of Louisiana un-
der the protection of France. 1 He described the country as rich and
productive and capable of supporting an immense population which if
given its liberty would form a powerful protection to the Spanish pos-
sessions in Mexico. The example of a free republic, he suggested,
would be a powerful inducement for the English colonies east of the
Mississippi to rebel. By thus promoting domestic war among them could
1 France hope to increase her own power. 1 The plan of D'Estaing if car-
ried out would have led to the establishment of a great nation in the
Mississippi valley and would have meant the detachment from the Brit-
ish dominions of the territory between the Mississippi and the Alle-
ghanies. It was, however, the indication of a policy which the French
government never attempted to carry out
.
After this flurry over Louisiana the French showed no inter-
est in western affairs until the period of the American Revolution.
After the retirement of Choiseul in 1770 and the abandonment of French
activities in the Mississippi valley, there sprung up a strong rivalry
between the Spaniards and English. British traders had finally gained
control of the traffic of the Mississippi valley 2 and the Spaniards
feared the British ministry had designs on New Orleans. There were
many points of dispute between the two nations and it seemed not un-
likely that war would result. Both sides were preparing for hostili-
ties and planning extensive operations in the Mississippi valley.
Hillsborough, the English secretary of state for the colonies, wrote
to General Gage, January 2, 1771, that in the event of war he should
1. Marquey, L'Histoire des Cessions de la Louisiane. Mss. in Biblio-
theque Rationale. Nouvelles Acquisitions, francais, 9709.
12. Gyane, History of Louisiana, III, 106. Further evidence of the ex-
tent of British trade on the Mississippi is shown by the fact that in
one month in 1776 Galvez captured fifteen British trading vessels.
The French archives contain freauent references to merchants who havebeen ruined by English competition.

instantly seize New Orleans and all of Louisiana. Spain in turn pre-
pared to defend her possessions in America and erected a number of
posts along the west bank of the Mississippi. Her activity attracted
the attention of Hillsborough and he instructed Gage to keep a close
2
watch on movements in Louisiana. It was not long, however, before
the excitement in the .ississippi valley died down and military prep-
arations ceased. England continued her trade along the river and
Spaniard and Briton alike were enriched. It has already been shown
that at the outbreak of the Revolution the thirteen colonies formed
but a small extent of the British empire in America. It is true that
they contained the bulk of population of the entire territory but it
was even then recognized that Canada and the rich valleys of the Ohio
and Mississippi contained vast possibilities of development. The Eng-
lish ministry felt that its predecessors had made a mistake in grant-
ing such liberal charters to the older colonies and it was its firm
intention to hold the new ones under careful supervision. The belief
that England was trying to surround the United Colonies by a ring of
despotic governments was a strong factor in the opposition that led to
revolution
.
' ith the outbreak of war the question arose, what is to be-
come of these vast dominions which are not a part of the revolting
provinces? TTill they cast their lot with the Revolution anc3 unite wit:
the great body of English colonists in repudiating the mother country*
They were not strong enough to do this alone and there were many rea-
sons why neither the Floridas nor Canada could unite with the other
colonies to form an independent government. In regard to Canada, the
natives were of a different race and it was against these same English
colonies they had fought twelve years before. The French Canadians,
1. Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 89, no. 1.
2. Ibid. Vol. ?5. no. 277.

long accustomed to a paternal government, had no sympathy with New-
England ideas of liberty. Furthermore, the Americans were Protestants
while the French were Catholic and against the establishment of Ca-
tholicism the former had been mo3t bitter. In the Floridas similar
reasons kept the inhabitants from joining the Revolution. Most of the
Anglo-Saxon settlers were direct from England and therefore loyal. In
addition, the country was strongly held by British troops, sent there
to overawe the Indians and protect the country from Snain.
Although the Revolutionary leaders eagerly desired the con-
quest of both territories, such an undertaking against the British em-
pire while the population was at best indifferent, seemed doomed to
failure when it is remembered that, throughout the war, the colonists
needed all their troops to protect their own borders. It was only
through foreign aid that such conquests could promise success, and to
obtain this aid was one of the diplomatic problems of the Revolution.
As to the Floridas, there was another obstacle to their con-
quest. Spain had not forgotten her former ownership of them, which
she desired to regain. She felt that her possession of New Orleans
was of little value while another power held the gate of the Culf of
Mexico. She was jealously watching events in the New World and ready
to seize these provinces at the first opening.
Only the west then offered opportunities of expansion. In
this direction the colonial population naturally flowed, and although
without legal sanction frontiersmen were spreading over the region
south of the Ohio, and establishing settlements in its rich valleys.
The colonies backed up their claims to these settlements by appealing
to their ancient charters. Against these, however, existed the legal
force of various Indian treaties and the Quebec Act. Furthermore, the
British held a quasi-military control of the Northwest which the colo-
1. Florida Rlanca to Montmorin, 1778. Espagne, 588, no. 29.

nists were not then in a position to dispute. Clearly, if they were
to get possession of this territory it must be by diplomacy or arms.
The country south of the Ohio did not offer such a difficult problem.
Aa has been described already, it was largely settled by American col-
onists and the British had no important posts within its limits.
Spanish cupidity had not yet seized on this territory and its fortunes
seemed linked v/ith those of the seaboard colonies.
As a matter of fact, during the early days of the Revolution
the Continental Congress did not consider the Mississippi valley as of
much importance in the war. It concentrated its armies in the east
and the west was left to shift for itself. In no sense, however, did
the colonies abandon their claims to this valley. The Quebec Act was
one of the grievances that brought on the Revolution and they never
recognized the Northwest Territory as a part of Canada. There were
some spirits among the revolutionary leaders, moreover, who looked to
a union of all British America against the tyranny of England. Among
these may be mentioned Franklin, Tlashington, and Jay. 1 There probably
could be found no one among the patriots who did not regard the back
countries as a part of the colonial territories, and this very unanim-
ity of feeling doubtless forestalled discussion of the matter.
At the beginning of the war, however, the British military
commanders were quick to see the importance of the west as a base of
operations and on September 20, 1775 General Gage wrote to Lord Dart-
mouth from Boston, concerning a plan of operations in this region.
1 . In July of 1775 Franklin drew up a plan of confederation to include
not only the thirteen colonies, Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas,
but also the "7est Indies and Ireland. Works (Smyth ed.), VI, 425.
This plan was presented to Congress but was never acted upon. Ibid,
y, 29]. John Jay was more conservative. In his History of the Span-
ish mission, written about 1780, he declared his early belief that
Congress should abandon Florida and grant Spain the navigation of the
Mississippi below "our territories". Jay, Life of Jay, 1,1 100. The
ideas of Washington are less clearly set forth and may be interpreted
only from his desperate attempts to conquer Canada and his designs on
the Floridas.

He would raise the people of Detroit and other settlers in the interi-
or who, together with the Indians and sone regular troops from the
Illinois country could make a diversion on the frontiers of Pennsylva-
nia and Virginia. It was not, however, until late in the struggle
that the United States made a serious attempt to conquer this territo-
ry.
From the beginning, . the Americans hoped to get the Canadians
to join in asserting their liberties, but the grievances of the French
of Canada had been satisfied by the Quebec Act and they felt no uneas-
iness at the other measures of the British Crown. Their present gov-
ernment was much the sane as that under which they had lived before
1765. French civil law was still maintained and the Roman Catholic
religion was virtually established, while the annexing of the territo-
ry north of the Ohio to the province of Quebec tended to flatter the
pride of the French Canadians 1 and to give them practical monopoly of
the fur trade. The English Canadians, however, were disaffected at
the policy of the ministry and held out strong hopes of joining the
revolt
.
In October, 1774 the First Continental Congress had urged
the Canadians to unite with the other colonies in opposition to the
measures of the British Crown. As early as February, 1775 secret a-
gents of Congress arrived at Montreal to investigate conditions there.
|They learned that Canada was not in condition to resist an attack and
that the majority of the English population was ready for revolt while
2
the French Canadians would likely remain inactive. Sir Guy Carleton,
the governor general of Canada, was well aware of these efforts to in-
duce the Canadians to join in the rebellion and in March he reported
i to Lord Dartmouth news of an address to the Canadians prepared by Cong-
1. Coffin, Quebec Act.
2. Kingsford, Canada, V, 251.
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ress
.
Congress determined next to undertake a military expedition
against Canada, in the hope of inducing it to join them, and Washing-
ton believed that the movement would be valuable from a strategic
standpoint. ' Ke felt that the English Canadians were favorably dis-
posed towards the other colonies and wished to encourage them in every
2
possible way. To this expedition Washington gave much thought and
time, for he felt that it would have a "decisive effect on the public
interests". If this expedition succeeded he felt the ministry's 'Plans
would be bound to fail.' As a further step to secure the adhesion of
the Canadians he suggested that they be invited to send delegates to
4
Congress
.
The efforts of Congress to win over Canada alarmed Governor
Carleton, and in September he wrote that the Americans had been "only
too successful" in debauching the minds of Canadians and Indians. Fv-
en the militia proved disloyal. The people in general seemed "to
think it their interests that these wretches should become masters of
the Country, though the Gentlemen, Clergy, and most of the Bourgeois
5have manifested great zeal and fidelity for the king's service."
1. Washington, Works (Ford ed.), Ill, 76.
2. Ibid, 68.
3. Ibid, 120. The colonial assmeblies had early sent detached expedi-
tions towards Canada and 'Vashington resolved to bring these together
in a systematic invasion. On August 20, 1775 he wrote from Cambridge
| to General Schuyler communicating a plan of attack by way of the Ken-
nebec river to Quebec. He hoped this would form a diversion and pre-
vent General Carleton from defending both Montreal and Quebec, ^orks,
III, 88. He worked out all the details of the plan and carefully ex-
plained them to Montgomery and Arnold. Works, III, 124. He instruct-
ed Arnold to do all in his power to win. the good will of the Canadians
"by just and honorable conduct" and to treat them and also the Indians
as friends and brothers. He himself issued a proclamation urging the
Canadians to join in the revolt. Works, III, 126. Montgomery also
issued a proclamation to the Canadians on Nov. 12, in which he "sug-
i
gested" a provincial convention to maintain the civil and religious
rights of the colonies, ^orks, III, 2^9, note.
4. Washington, Works (Ford ed.), Ill, 238.
L5. Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 92, p. .

At this tir.e the British governor was in despair. He felt that the
1
country was on the eve of being overrun and subdued. Gage was more
sanguine, however, and felt that unless the whole body of Canadians
2
went over to the provincials, the expedition must fail.
News of the fall of Montreal further alarmed the British
commanders. Many of the Canadians went over to the provincial side
and for a time it seemed that the whole province would take the side
of Congress. In the other colonies also great importance was attached
to the expedition and Washington wrote (January 27, 1776) that upon it
would probably depend the issue of the whole war.' The failure of
Montgomery and Arnold was a bitter disappointment to him, and he felt
that the colonies had lost a great chance for a speedy and decisive
4
victory and that the struggle must be long and bloody. For some time
after this, hov:ever, Washington did not give up all hope of affecting
the conquest' but military events in the other colonies became more
serious and at last the American forces were withdrawn and the prov-
ince of Quebec was lost to the cause of the American Revolution.
In the west and southwest Congress was more fortunate and
early got possession of the country. With the exception of a few post!
such as i.:ae£rac and Detroit in the extreme north the British had prac-
tically abandoned all the territory between the Great Lakes and the
frontiers of Florida
To the south of the Ohio were the vast domains claimed by
Virginia and North Carolina. Settlers were oouring in but the out-
1. Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 92, p. 674.
2. Ibid, Vol. 92, no. 38, p. 571.
5. Ford, Washington, Works, III, 381.
4. Ibid, IV, 47, 10?, 108, 174.
5. Ibid, IV, 195, 218.
1 1
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break of war had as yet prevented the organization of an established
government. There were no British posts to disturb the occupation of
this section and the Americans were left in peaceful possession. As
the war progressed the regions of Kentucky and Tennessee became the
base of import art military operations against the Northwest. Still
later '.it Tjpp-c the object of Spanish cupidity and the refusal of Cong-
ress to surrender it played a considerable part in keeping Spain out
of an alliance with the new republic. It is probable that only the
outbreak of the Revolution prevented the establishment of a new colony
in the Ohio valley. After the outbreak of the rebellion the people
west of the Alleghanies still felt they must have some form of organ-
ized government. As a result there was established the Watauga Asso-
ciation which was merged into North Carolina in 1776 and the Transyl-
vania scheme of 1775. By an act of the Virginia Assembly in 177^ the
greater part of this territory was organized as the County of Kentucky
Projects against the Floridas were destined to prove abor-
tive. There were many Americans who urged their conouest, but in gen-
eral they served only as a pawn to tempt the greed of Spain.
Thus conditions Dreceding the outbreak of war, and events
connected with the organization of the rebellion, limited the acknowl-
edged area of the revolting provinces, and threw the conquests of the
Seven Years War again into the jack pot of world diplomacy. The poli-
cy of the British ministry before 1775 had divided these conquests in-
to four distinct zones and these were to play important parts in the
ambitions of the United States and Spain, and still more important
were they to be in the desperate efforts of Vergennes to illumine from
the dark humiliation of Britain the prestige of his beloved Prance.
1. For discussion of the organization of the western governments see
lAlden, New Governments West of Alleghanies before 1780; and Turner,
Western State Making during the Revolution, in American Historical Re-
view, I, 20 et seq; 70 et seq
.

CHAPTER II.
THE DIVERGENCE OP THE POLICIES OF FRANCF AMD SPAIN.
The outbreak of open war in America formed a crisis in the
diplomacy of France. The moment had come for which Choiseul had wait-
ed in vain and towards which Vergennes had pointed his policy. The
report of the battle on the commons of Lexington warned hira that the
time for action was near. It was clear that France must aid the re-
volt, but many questions occurred to the mind of Vergennes. Would the
colonies proclaim their independence? If they did proclaim it, would
they fight firmly to maintain it? What should be the character of
French aid? .Vould Spain join in a war to free the colonies? What
recompense should France expect for her assistance 9 With these ques-
tions in mind Vergennes began to formulate a definite policy.
In two memorials written at this time for the consideration
of the cabinet may be read the fundamentals of his decision, to which
he clung throughout the succeeding years. Such was the tenacity of
1. There is another memorial entitled "Memoire Historique et Politique
' sur la Louisiane", par H. de Vergennes, ministre de Louis XVI, pub-
lished in naris in 1302, which urges a course of action far different
from that outlined in the two memorials described above, but there are
reasons to regard it as a forgery. This memoir urges the conquest of
Canada and Fast Louisiana, and the retrocession of West Louisiana from
Spain. From internal evidence it appears that this document was writ-
ten about 1777, before France took part in the war. It has acquired
prominence from the fact that Turner uses it in his "Policy of France
toward the Lis'sissippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams"
(Am. Hist. Rev., X, 249). Turner asserts that "the subsequent actions
of Vergennes are entirely consistent with the view that he was the au-
thor," and supports this idea by reference to Oswald's letter to Shel-
burne of Sept. 17, 1732 on Rayneval 1 s mission to London, and Godoy '
s
declaration that Vergennes tried "to induce Spain.... to give to France
her ancient colony". The publication of Rayneval ' s report
,
(Doniol
,
V,
133), shows that his mission had nothing to do with the western terri-
tories, and it is impossible for Godoy to have known anything about
French and Spanish negotiations during the Revolution, for he did not
assume office before 1792. As will be shown in the course of this
narrative, Vergennes made no attempt during the Revolution to acquire
territory in America and often disclaimed any desire to do so. His
letters and despatches throughout are opposed to such a policy.
Internal evidence points to the belief that Vergennes could
.nnt hagg hppn t.hp. a'lt.vinr of this memorial. The style is not his.

his character, that having once determined upon a line of action, he
followed it unswervingly to the end. 1 In order to interpret, there
-
fore, the later action of the French minister, it is essential that
the substance of these two memorials be known. The first of these was
prepared in the fall of 1^75 at the instance of Vergennes by his sec-
retary, Gerard de Rayneval , and is entitled, "Reflexions sur la sit-
uation actuelle des colonies anglaises et sur la conduite qu'il con-
2
vient a la France de tenir a leur egard." The second was worked out,
probably in a large measure by Vergennes himself, in the spring of
1776, and bears the heading, "Considerations sur leisaffaires des colo-
3
nies anglaises de 1 ' Amerique
.
n The "Reflexions" discuss in broad
generalizations the conditions in America, and the interests of France
in the struggle then going on. The "Considerations" was prepared af-
ter the receipt of Bonvouloir's report on the progress of the Revolu-
and describes a more definite policy.
Page after page of narrative is taken up by historical and geographi-
cal details, and there is no part that bears the earmarks of a state
paper. The memorial also shows an ignorance of political and geo-
graphical conditions during the Revolution, of which Vergennes was not
guilty. One example of such will suffice. page 26 it is states
i that the English will likely soon get possession of Louisiana and that
then "Florida will fall of itself". Vergennes frequently discussed
the Florida question, but he never made the mistake of supposing it
Spanish. On no ground can this memoir be accented as genuine.
1. "Whether the policy which he (Vergennes) pursued was the boldest
which he could have adopted no man now possesses the means of judging.
Eut having adopted it it is but justice to this minister to ad-
nit that he pursued it with singular equanimity, firmness and temper."
.Review of Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence of American Revolution,
1831. North American Review, ?3, 471. Wharton attributes this review
to Edward Everett. Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 331.
2. Full text is given in Doniol, Histoire, I, 243 et seq.
3. Text in Doniol, I, 27^ et seq. This memoir was sent to the princi-
pal officers of state and several copies are preserved. Doniol men-
tions one in Etats-Unis, l.Iemoires et Documents, de 1765 a 1779, no. 8.
! Also in Archives Nationales, Carton K, t 64, no. 3. Affaires Etran-
genes Espagne, 579, no. 109, p. 295.
WBrm
It had now become the belefcf of Vergennes that the colonies
would declare their independence and attempt, to set up a republic.
He regarded it as doubtful, however, that they could maintain them-
selves, unaided, against the British government. And even if the Bri-
tish crown should be compelled to concede them an independent ex-
istence, he held, that it would still keep its supremacy on the conti-
nent, through its control of the principal sea ports. Furthermore,
Vergennes regarded the outcome of this war as dangerous to the colo-
nies of France and Spain. As long as the struggle continued there
was nothing to fear from either of the combattants, but the moment it
ceased the two crowns must expect an attack on their American posses-
sions. In case of victory, argued Vergennes, Great Britain will un-
doubtedly attack the Bourbon colonies in America in order to indemnify
herself for the expense of the war. In case of defeat, she must a-
tone for her shame by following the same course of action, or her very
government will fall a prey to popular revolution.
After setting forth the dangers of a neutral policy, Vergen-
nes described the advantages of intervention.
1. The power of England would be diminished and that of France
proportionally increased.
2. England's commerce would suffer an irreparable loss while that
of France would gain in importance.
3. France could probably regain a part of her possessions in Am-
erica such as "the' land fisheries} those of the Gulf of St. Lawrence,
o
Royal Isle etc.", Vergennes did not however include Canada."
1. Vergennes writes, "pe~she de terre" . ;
3. This^ sentence is vague. The French is "On ne parle pas du Canada".
L take it to mean that Vergennes wishes to except Canada from the con-
quests France wished to recover. This interpretation would be in ac-
cord with his later policy. Doniol, Histoire I, 244.
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Spain, he argued, would gain the same advantages as France
in the humiliation of England and would have nothing to fear from the
success of the revolution. In the first place, he argued, the war
would so enfeeble the colonies that for many years they would not be
able to undertake a war of conquest, and in the second place it was
quite probable that the new government would be republican, and "it-
is generally believed, from experience that republics rarely have the
spirit of conquest". In this case too the colonies were likely to
break up into several republics, devoted to industry and commerce,
and consequently to peace. Even if they should seize some Spanish
possessions, he continued, "this is nothing to show that this revolu-
tion will be injurious to France".
After thus pointing out the certainty of war, and discussing;
the advantages it would bring to his country, Vergennes next passes tc
a consideration of the policy to follow. He felt that the time was
not yet ripe for active intervention, but there was always danger that
the critical moment would slip by unnoticed, for there was always the
possibility of conciliation or the collapse of the revolt. If the
struggle should unseasonably end he foresaw great dangers to both
France and Spain, and again reminded the cabinet that Great Britain
would surely seek indemnity for her losses in their possessions. On
the other hand the continuation of the struggle without intervention
would exhaust both combatants and leave France relatively stronger.
The best policy for France then was to avoid for a time any action
that would provoke trouble but to be always ready to resist an attack
France, he thought, should remain neutral for at least a year and
"the degree of fury and exhaustion of the two parties, shall deter-
mine the instant of striking the decisive blow which shall reduce En-
gland to a second rate power, which shall take from her the empire
which she claims with as much arrogance as injustice to hold in the

four quarters of the world, and which shall deliver the universe from
a greedy tyrant". In the meantime the Americans should be sustained
by "secret favors and vague hopes", whlie Prance must maintain a bold
front for England "respects only those who are able to make her fear".
At no tine did Vergennes stoop to seek a pretext for war.
It was enough that Britain was dangerous, and must be reduced in
power. She was the natural enemy of France, "ambitious, covetous, un-
just, and faithless", whose policy had always aimed at the humiliation
and ruin of his beloved country. Should not Prance then seize this
opportunity and take every means to enfeeble her rival? Such was the
policy of Vergennes. The "humiliation of England; the prestige of
France". He would not seek to build up the old Prance, overloaded
with colonies to drain the life blood of the nation. That could be
left for the worn out empire of Spain, and the tottering power of
Britain. But he would call into being a nation, which would be the
friend and ally of the Bourbon throne, and a constant menace to the
proud mistress of the seas.
Vergennes submitted the second of these memorials to Maure-
pas, Turgot, and St. Germain, members of the king's cabinet, on March
1
12, 1776, and asked for their opinion. St. Germain responded three
lays later and advised getting ready for war. Turgot ' s answer was not
ready for nearly a month. His paper of April 6, was a careful state-
ment of the finances of France. He pointed out the immense public
debt of the monarchy and the miserable state of her exchequer and ar-
gued that a war would make impossible for a long time to come certain
necessary reforms. The reply of Maurepas is not known definitely but
:Doniol attributes to him a concise memoir, a copy of which is found
2
In the foreign office.
1. Doniol Histoire, I, 279. ~~ "
2. Doniol, I, Ktats-Unis, II, No. 14.
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This memoir agrees with the policy of Vergennes but insists that the
project must "be subordinated to the state of the finances.
These opinions did not affect the plans of Vergennes. He
was not only seeking to lead the French king and ministry to the re-
cognition of the independence of the United States and war with Eng-
land but was also preparing Spain to enter the contest.
As has been stated, Spain and Great Britain had been on the
verge of war the year before on account of the support furnished by
the latter power to Portugal in the dispute over the boundaries be-
tween Brazil and Uruguay. France moreover had strongly supported
Spain and the Family Compact was given new force and meaning. Ver-
gennes gave to the Spanish ministry hopes of active assistance but
was always careful to suggest that the best way of striking England
was through her American possessions. 1
Vergennes had an able assistant at the Spanish court in the
person of the French ambassador, the Marquis d'Ossun who did all in
lis power to prevent an amicable understanding and fanned the embers
.of Spanish suspicion and hatred. Even when Portugal seemed inclined
to settlement he sought to arouse Spanish distrust and suggested that
England was planning to surprise Spain by a sudden attack during the
conduct of peaceful negotiation. Ossun was greatly disconcerted when
in October, 1775 Gfimaldi received a frank communication from Pombal
I
the Portuguese prime minister declaring the peaceful intentions of his
country and asking for an amicable settlement of all difficulties. 2
Spain also was much surprised by the offer but was eager for peace
and Ossun' s efforts appeared entirely futile. The negotiations be-
H Ossun to Vergennes. Oct. 2?, 1775: Ossun actually"* 'drew up a plan
Pf at^ack on Portugal and suggested various ways of checkmating Great
Britain. Esp. 573, No. 57.
,2. Ossun to Vergennes, Oct. 23, 1775. Espagne, 578, No. 57, 78.

tween Spain and Portugal continued rapidly, and before the end of the
year the two powers had cone to an understanding and agreed to suspend
all warlike preparations during the course of the negotiations."1
There were other forces, however, working favorably for Ver-
gennes' plans. While Spain was laboring for peace, the action of
Great Britain in strengthening her forces in America was a source of
anxiety. The danger of British aggression long urged by him was al-
ways present in the minds of the Spanish king and ministry, for their
possessions in the New V7orld were unprotected from attack and they
feared that Great Britain would seek the first opportunity to turn her
arms against them, especially against Louisiana. As early as April,
1775 Grimaldi, the minister of Charles Mr, declared to the British gov-
ernment that the "nearness of the, English colonies in America to the
possessions of Spain in that part of the world does not permit us to
see without disquietude, such large forces by land and sea as are gath
ered there." 2 He further demanded a guarantee that the armaments of
England "should not remain in America for a longer time than was nec-
essary to quell the revolt. At the same time he gave assurances of
i
Spain* s pacific intentions and called attention to the fact that in
spite of the immense increase of the British forces in America she had
sent tnere neither troops nor ships of war.
This policy of demanding guaranties of Great Britain did not
Tieet the approval of Vergennes. He maintained that if Prance and
Spain accepted such assurances they would be bound to remain defence-
less, trusting only to the good faith of a treacherous enemy.' The
two crowns must prepare for war, he wrote; let them increase their
1. Ossun to Vergennes, Dec. 25, 1775. Espagne 578, no. 74, p. 460,
; In these negotiations Spain succeeded in detaching Portugal from the
British alliance and thus removed a foe of the two crowns. Espagne,
573, no. 64.
2. Ossun to Vergennes, Apr. 25, 1775. Espagne, 575, no. 231.
I?.
Vergennes to Aranda, Kay 9, 1775. Espagne, 576, no. 20.

fleets and armies and be ready for any attack. 1 His boldness encour-
aged his timid ally, who promised to assist in any attack as soon as
she could provide for the defence of her important colonies around the
Gulf of Lexico."^
England soon became suspicious of the designs of her old
foes and prepared to check them. She was anxious for peace but ready
for war. The admiralty detached a fleet to hang upon the flanks of
2
the Spanish navy and another to guard Gibraltar." This belligerent
attitude alarmed Spain and her fear of the superiority of the English
fleet increased.' Torn by conflicting fears, she decided in favor of
a neutral course, and yet planned to increase her forces in proportion
4
to the additions to the British armament. Grimaldi believed with Ver-
gennes that as soon as the British crown settled its contest with its
colonies it would turn its strength on the possessions of the two
crowns. "Tttiatever the turn of affairs in the English colonies", he
declared to Ossun, "the British ministry will determine to profit by
her superior forces, to form some considerable enterprise against the
Spanish or French colonies." France though, he believed, would be
the first to suffer from this attack. The necessity of meeting this
threatened aggression, entered into all the plans of G/'maldi and led
him to seek a closer understanding with the French court
.
While Grimaldi and his king were seeking to keep Spain at
I peace, the Count d' Aranda, Spanish minister at Paris, was seeking to
involve her in war. In February, 1776 Aranda asked for further in-
1. Llontmorin to Vergennes. Espagne, 577, no. 126. Florida Blanca
particularly mentioned Havana, Porto Rico, Vera Cruz, Carthagena, and
Caracas
.
;2. Fscagne, 577, no. 126.
I 3. Ossun to Vergennes. Fspagne, 578, no. 50, p. 129.
4. Ossun to Vergennes. Espagne, 578, no. 62, p. 179.
5. Grimaldi to Aranda, Feb. 26, 1776. Espagne, 579, no. 73, p. 185.

ctructions as to the policy of his court towards America, 1 and soon
after brought to Vergennes two letters containing G rimaldi ' s reply.
These letters expressed fear that the English armaments would be
turned against the possessions of the two crowns, "but furthermore de-
clared that Spain was preparing her fleet for hostilities. Soon after
this Aranda submitted a memoir to his court in which he pointed out
again the dangers of English aggression and urged the ministry to
2
seize the opportunity and intervene in the ensuing war. The plead-
ings of Aranda fell on deaf ears and the only result was that he was
no longer entrusted with information on the policy of Spain.
By the first of March, 1776 Vergennes felt that the time had
come to give more active aid to the colonies. He had proceeded cau-
y* 3tiously and believed that English suspicions were asleep. He felt
too that he could count on the sympathy and aid of the Spanish court
which he constantly reminded of the danger to its possessions from the
4
aggressions of England and assured of his support and assistance. In
a letter to Cssun on April 1, 1776 he reiterated and summarized the
policy set forth in his previous memoirs to the king, and applied the
same principles to the interests of Spain. Again he pointed that the
A
interests of the two crowns demanded the prolongation of the war until
both sides were enfeebled. He urged also that they should aid the
colonies in every way possible though he agreed with Spain that it
would not be according to their dignity to ally themselves with insur-
5
gents
.
1. Espagne, 579, no. 74, pp. 189-191; Doniol, I, 135.
2. Espagne, 579, no. 81, p. 230.
3. So innocent did the British ministry apnear of French designs that
it was asking the aid of Vergennes to quell the rebellion in America.
Doniol, I, 232, 395.
4. Espagne, 579, fol. 11, no. 116, p. 310.
5. Ibid, p. 311.

To this policy Grimaldi agreed and for a short time the war I
talk ceased. France was constantly aiding the Americans by sunplies
of money and munitions of war through the agency of Beaumarchais
.
Early in 1776 England succeeded in blockading many American ports and
Vergennes decided to seek new means of aiding the colonists. In a
letter of i.Iarch 15, he suggested that Louisiana be made the base from
which supplies could be carried to the provincials. Spain could for-
tify Hew Orleans, he argued, and could carry there what supplies she
would and thence transport them to the Continental army. 1 Grimaldi
saw the practicability of this suggestion and offered to give the
2French permission to use Louisiana for this purpose, but declared
that he could not strengthen New Orleans without arousing English sus-
picion and hostility. He refused also to furnish arms to the insur-
gents, for all those in the National Arsenals bore the royal stamp;
but he promised to bear a Dart of the expenses of an undertaking if
3
France would lead it.
Vergennes replied that if Spain did not dare use her own pos
sessions as a base to aid the colonies, France could hardly use them
in safety. Ke again urged that Spain had abundant justification to
fortify New Orleans because of the nearness of the war to her own
A
frontiers. This, however, Grimaldi obstinately regused to do and the
5
matter was allowed to drop.
By the middle of 1776 Vergennes had become convinced that
war was necessary and impending. He did not wish to begin it, howev-
er, until he could be sure Spain would join in the struggle, and he
1. Espagne, 579, fol. 11, no. 166, p. 310.
2. Ibid, fol. 24, no. 14?.
3. Ibid, 580, fol. 25, no. 2.
4. Ibid, fol. 1^-17, no. 29 and 46.
5. Ibid, fol. 35, no. 76, p. 191.

urged his views through both Aranda and Ossun. Aranda lent willing
ear to the words of the French minister and to his court disnlayed the
picture of the loss of all its American possessions unless a deter-
mined effort was made to save them. He urged the danger of an English
attack, particularly upon Louisiana and the "Jest Indies* Ossun like-
wise at Madrid constantly urged war to save the Spanish possessions
from English aggression. During the remainder of 1776 there was con-
stant discussion of war. All were agreed that there was great danger
to the possessions of France and Spain in America, and that this dan-
ger arose from the immense forces of England in America, and all were
agreed that another general war was inevitable. 2
To these arguments Grimaldi gave no objection but he could
not make up his mind in favor of war. He wished to ado^t only a de-
fensive policy and leave England to fight out her conflict undisturbed
Kis reasons against Spain's taking part in the war may be summarized
as follows:- Spain has not enough resources to carry on a war. Her
coasts and harbors are unfortified and will fall an easy prey to the
©nemy. The colonies of Spain were much more extensive than those of
France, and in case of war Spain would risk infinitely more than her
ally.- Grimaldi further declared that if Spain should enter into a
war with England, her plans would in no wise concern themselves with
the American conflict. Her purposes would be first of all to conquer
Portugal, or at least a part of her dependencies, to destroy English
commerce in the Mediterranean, and to reconquer Minorca and Jamaica.
4
1. Espagne, 530, fol. 31, no. 57, p. 146.
2. This discussion may be found in Aff. Etr. Esp., 581, fol. 76 et seq
no. 97, and Vol. 592, no. 21-193.
3. Esp., 582, no. P9, p. ip\ . Grimaldi was especially worried about
:he island of St. Domingo which was unfortified. He begged Vergennes
to send troops in its defence. Ossun to Vergennes. Fspgume, 581, no
57, p. 5.
4. Espagne, no. 69, p. 161.

Vergennes, however, insisted that any attack on England
should be made in conjunction with the colonies, while Spain was bent
on an independent course of conquest. Vergennes had no desire to add
to his king's possessions but confined his ambition to the humiliation
and defeat of England. To accomplish this he wished to raise up a new
nation as a friend and dependant of France, and a perpetual barrier to
English aggression in the New World. Even then he realized that the
jealousy which would not allow France to regain a foothold in the New
World would no more willingly permit England to increase her power
there
.
"hile Vergennes was carefully watching events in America and
planning to aid the insurgents, the Continental Congress was discuss-
ing projects for obtaining foreign aid. On November 29, 1775 it ap-
pointed a committee of secret correspondence consisting of five mem-
bers: Harrison, Franklin, Johnson, Dickinson, and Jay, to correspond
with friends in all parts of the world. During the first year of its
existence the committee did very little but after the Declaration of
Independence the project of obtaining foreign aid came at once to the
front. On September 17, 1776 Congress resolved on a plan of treaty tc
be proposed to the king of France, Article IX of which provided that
"the most christian king" shall never invade nor under any pretence
attempt to possess himself of Labrador, New Britain, Nova Scotia, Aca-
dia, Canada, Florida, nor any of the countries, cities, or towns on
the continent of North America nor of the island of New Foundland, or
of any other island lying near the coast of North "merica. Congress
further declared its intention to annex these territories to the Uni-
2
ted States, but assured Soain that it had no designs on her possess-
gions and would in no case molest them.
.
1. Secret Journals, II, 5.
2. Ibid, II, 11.
5. Ibid, II, 70.

At the same tine Congress elected Benjamin Franlrlin, sfTal '
Deane and Arthur Lee as American Commissioners to France^ and ap-
pointed a committee to draft instructions for them. This committee
reported on December 30 that if France should aid the United States in
reducing Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Cape Breton, the French neo^le
should be allowed equal rights of fishing there. with the Americans to
the exclusion of all others. The commissioners were also to offer
France half of the island of Newfoundland provided that the province
of Nova Scotia, the island of Cape Breton and the remainder of New-
foundland should be annexed to the United States. 2 If this offer was
not sufficient to induce France to declare war against Fngland and the
commissioners were convinced that they could not get the aid of France
in any other way, the committee urged that they be empowered to assure
"his most christian majesty that such of the British ^est India is-
lands as, in the course of the war shall be reduced by the united for-
ces of France and the United States shall be yielded in absolute prop-
erty to his most, christian majesty." This committee also suggested
that it would be advisable to get Spain into the alliance, and that in
I
return for her aid the United States would assist her in the reduction
of Fensacola, provided further that the people of the United States
: should have "the free and uninterrupted navigation of the ''ississippi
2
and the use of the harbor of Pensacola."" These instructions were ap-
proved and Congress thus declared its policy with regard to territo-
ries not included in the limits of the colonies. Tt was determined to
hold on to the I-ississippi valley and to as much of Canada as it could
get
.
Of these commissioners sent to France only Franklin was of
first rate ability. Lee represented Congress in both France and Spain
1. Secret Journals, II, 5}
.
2. Ibid, 39, 40.

but never accomplished anything. He was chiefly instrumental in stir-
ring up trouble and in arousing contentions with his colleagues. Si-
las Deane was "in no sense a statesman but he showed great ability In
obtaining supplies and in handling accounts. his arrival at Paris
Franklin took charge of political affairs while Deane managed the fi-
nances .
Franklin was undoubtedly the great statesman of the Revolu-
tion. He had accomplished much for his country before becoming com-
missioner to France but it was in Paris that he was to accomplish the
great work of his life. A man of broad experience and wide attain-
ments, he soon made himself master of the situation. His versatility
and his genial sympathy made him fit easily into the distinctive char-
acteristics of French life. The best known of all Americans, not only
in politics but in philosophy and science, from the moment of his ar-
rival he was a person to venerate and respect.
Franklin had long thought of the problems relating to the
territories beyond the limits of the thirteen states, and the experi-
ence and projects of years were there to reinforce his ideas. As ear-
I ly as 1754 shortly after the Albany convention he had drawn up a plan
for the settlement of the western colonies with reasons why this plan
1
! should be carried out. Again in 1760, during the struggles of the
last French war he had urged the importance of this section. "I have
j long been of the opinion", he wrote, "that the foundations of the fu-
ture grandeur and stability of the British empire lie in America; and
although, like other foundations they are low and are little seen they
are, nevertheless, broad and strong enough to support the greatest po-
j litical structure human wisdom ever has created. I am therefore by no
means for restoring Canada. If we keep it, all the country from the
St. Lawrence to the Mississippi will, in another century, be filled
Smyth, Franklin, "Torks, II T, 358.

with British people."" Thus as early as 17B0 Franklin had a more en-
lightened view of the west than did the leaders of the nation thirty
years later. With a breadth of vision, greater than any other man of
his day Franklin judged the grandeur of the west. In the same year he
prepared a paper on the "Interest of Great Britain" in which he as-
serted that "while our strength at sea continues, the banks of the
Ohio, in point of ease and expeditious conveyance of troops, are near-
er to London, than the remore parts of France and Spain to their re-
spective capitals; and much nearer than Connaught and Ulster were in
2
the days of Queen Elizabeth."
To Franklin's appreciation of the west and its resources,
and to his foresight and watchfulness during the years of his resi-
dence in France, is due, more than to any other cause, the preserva-
tion of our influence in the Mississippi valley.
Franklin arrived at Paris the middle of December, 1776 and
on the 2^rd he with Deane and Arthur Lee addressed a note to Vergenr.es
informing him of their mission and requesting an audience. This audi-
ence was granted, the commissioners were courteously received, and
they submitted to Vergennes a sketch of a proposed treaty. This was
! the sketch agreed to in Congress the September preceding and provided
: that France should not make any conquests on the mainland of North
\
America, but approved conquests made in the West Indies/ In a letter
|
of the commissioners to vergennes on January 5, they urged France and
Spain to unite with the United States and deprive Great Britain of her
'"est India possessions. They also offered to guarantee the possess-
ions of France in the West Indies and such other conauests as she
A
could make there.
1. Smyth, Franklin, Worke, IV, 4.
2. Ibid, 72.
3. VTharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 239, 244. Secret Journals,
• ..h art. on. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 24^.

1'i'o tnese proposals Vergennes returned no official answer an?
there is no record to show that he even discussed them with the Ameri-
cans. He was, however, delighted at the moderation of their demands.
At the suggestion of the commissioners, however, he conceived a new
advantage that Prance could hope to gain through intervention. This
advantage was a favorable commercial- treaty by which France would get
the trade that had hitherto flowed into English ports, ^o Vergennes
the only advantage of colonies was commercial and if he could obtain
for his country the trade of a vast territory without the expense of
controlling it, he regarded this as of the greatest advantage. The
commerce of the United States, he held, was great enough to justify
France in renouncing all idea of the conquest of her former possess-
1
ions in North America. Under these circumstances Vergennes was per-
fectly willing to renounce all conquests on the continent of North
America if the United States would guarantee the possessions of France
in the Uest Indies. He did not, however, put much faith in the guar-
antee for he was assured of the faithlessness of republics in general^
In the meantime Ossun had been urging action on the part of
Spain. So favorably were his overtures received that he was convinced
that Grinaldi was ready to enter into an offensive and defensive alli-
ance against England.' Vergennes suggested that it would be enough to
ask the United States for a favorable commercial treaty and for a guar-
antee of French possessions in America and he thought that Spain ought
to be willing to accept the same terms. To this also Grimaldi agreed,
and Vergennes felt that his plans were successful.
To this policy of war Vergennes added another condition. It
should not be a war of conquest, and such material advantages as were
gained should be merely incidental. In a conversation with Aranda on
1. Vergennes to Ossun. FsDagne, 585, fol . 2, p. 15
2. Vergennes to Ossun. Ibid, fol. 5, no. 20, p. 40.
sun to Vergennes. Ibid, fol . 6, no. 11, p. lie.

March 11 he declared that both France and Spain were satisfied with
their vast possessions and were not ambitious of new acquisitions.
The great end to be gained by war, he maintained, was the enfeeblement
of England. 1 Soon after this Beane came to him with the proposal that
the two powers should together attempt the conquest of Canada, Flori
da and all the British possessions in North America and the West In-
dies. In case of success France should have the right of fishing on
the banks of Newfoundland, and full possession of the British West In-
dies, while to the United States should go the other conquests. 2 Ver-
gennes -ade no reply to this proposition but took occasion to declare
to his associates that France would not attempt the cnnouest of any
new territories.' Thus early in 1777 Vergennes had formulated his
policy. The United States were to be recognized with their limits as
laid down before the Revolution while Great Britain was to be left in
possession of all her other dominions.
In February, 1777 the timid and dilatory Grimaldi was suc-
ceeded as minister of foreign affairs by the energetic and ambitious
Florida Blanca. Florida Blanca was intensely devoted to Charles III
and to Spain, and was determined to follow a Spanish policy without
regard to the interests of France. Intensely jealous of French influ-
ence, he laid out a policy that would make France a suppliant to Spain
No longer did. the Spanish court promise to back up Vergennes in what-
ever policy he should pursue, but Spanish aid was henceforth to com-
mand its price anri a price increasinglt exorbitant. An intense royal-
ist, he hated the new republic across the Atlantic and refused to have
anything to do with the plan of Vergennes for a triple alliance. A
strong imperialist, he sought only to recover the ancient dominions of
1. Vergennes to Cssun. Fspagne, 5S?>, no. 155, p. 388.
2. Ftats-Unis, II.
' e to "ssun. ' •gi
,
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Spain. His imperial and his royalist principles combined made him o
pose the recognition of the United States and led him to seek in eve
way to restrain the limits of the western republic. Such was his die-
like of the new nation that he refused to receive its representatives
as long as possible and when he did receive then it was with coldness
and reserve. This nan was one of the most skillful diplomats of his
day. In every point he overreached Vergennes and throughout the war
and during the negotiations of peace he was the most skillful and de
termined enemy of the American cause. No longer was Vergennes able
to discuss fully and openly with Franklin the prospects of the new
republic. He must always consider the enmity and distrust of the
Spanish minister.
Florida Elanca at first gave promise of being friendly to
the policy of France: 1 His first opposition arose against the idea
of Vergennes that the two nations should not seek any conquests, but
should be content with a gaurantee of the territories then in their
possession, and with a favorable commercial treaty. Spain was not a
commercial nation and a treaty such as proposed by the Americans did
A
not appeal to her. She was still land hungry and desired to recover
her ancient dominions.
At the very beginning of his ministry Florida Elanca wrote
to Arnnda that "the two monarchies will not surrender any of their
principles of moderation if they seek to profit by some happy oppor-
tunity to recuperate by means of negotiation some of the territories
which legitimately belong to them or which have been usurped from
2them by violence" . She desired to enfeeble England but she dreaded
the growing power of the young nation in America. Already she re-
garded it as a rival for the possession of Florida and soon to be-
1 . Ossun to Vergennes. Espagne, 582, fol . 101, no. 112, p. 248.
2. Copy in Affaires Etrange^s Espagne, 584, no. 4, p. 115.

come a contender for the vast territories west of the Mississippi
The policy of Florida Blanca was directly opposed to the interests
of the United States, and such was his temper that there could be no
compromise
.
This policy of Florida Blanca differed from that of Vergen-
nes in two vital points. First he was determined on peace and second
ly he expected to gain territory in the new world. Furthermore there
is no mention of recognition of the United States, which was the key-
stone of Vergennes' policy. The ideas announced by the Spanish min-
ister throughout were to form a stumbling block to all the plans of
the French Minister. The policy of the first was devoted to conquest
that of the latter opposed all acquisitions. Against Vergennes idea
of war Florida Blanca set uP the plan of peaceful negotiations.
Later developments were to show how he was to conduct his negotiation
They were to lead first to offers of mediation in which Spain was to
be the dupe of England but finally, as Vergennes had prophesied, to
war.
Against the ideas of Florida Blanca that the two nations
should seek to recover their ancient dominions, Vergennes protested
vigorously. "The French king does not recognize", he declared,
"either in Canada or Europe any objects tempting enough for acquisi-
tion, to compensate, in his eyes, for the dangers, the calamities,
and the exhaustion resulting from war". 1 He further declared that
France had as many colonies as were necessary for her population and
industry, and that more colonies would simply be a hindersome charge.
n If the loss of Canada", he asserted, "had been painful to her
(France), she ought to regret it less, since the forced abandonment
of it has become the signal of revolt for the English provinces on
the continent"
.
" He went on to state, however, that France was much
}- Vergennes to Aranda. Espagne, 564, no. 4, p. 115.
2. Vergennes to "rand a. Ibid.
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interested in the Newfoundland fisheries and desired concessions
there. This decision of Vergennes was a serious blow to the ambitions
of Spain. She cared nothing for the Newfoundland fisheries or for the
commerce of the United States. Her' greatest desire was to recover her
ancient possessions, and for this she had been steadily preparing for
war, and had increased her fleet in America.
1
If Vergennes had sup-
ported these ambitions of Spain, it is probable that Florida Blanca
would have joined France at the very beginning of the war.
In spite of this disagreement between the two courts, they
continued their weimrat ions for war1 . The departments of marine of
the two countries had formed in 177F projects for patrolling the west
Atlantic. Commanders of ships were ordered to watch carefully the
movements of English vessels, especially those trying to enter the
Gulf of
: exico or the waters of the West Indies." The Spanish were to
guard particularly the Gulf of Mexico and the approaches to New Orle-
ans, while the French were to watch 'the West Indies/ The instruct-
ions further ordered that the commanders of both nations were to aid
each other and to guard equally the interests of both crowns. Besides
these naval preparations the Soanish court provided for the military
defence of its colonies. An army corps was sent to St. Domingo and
additional tmops were despatched to Havana, Vera Cruz, and Porto Ri
4
co. Special attention was paid to Louisiana, on account of its prox-
imity to the British possessions. Many loyalists were fleeing from
the Atlantic provinces and settling on the east bank of the Mississip-
pi. Ir. a remoir Prepared by one of the Spanish officials of Louisiana
1. In 177^ Charles III ordered that the Spanish fleet in America be
increased as that of England was increased. Ossun to Vergennes. Fs
Ipagne, 531, fol . 76, no. 97, p. 252.
2. Archives dc la Larine, B 4, 128, p. 194.
Ibid, p. 195.
4. Espagne, 535, fol
. 24, no. 127, p. 401; fol. 33, no. 168, p. 401.

in iyyf it was recommended that the colony be placed in a state of de-
fence against the English, who could easily come from Pensacola or Mo-
bile, or even from Canada by way of the Ohio and Mississippi
.
* In re-
sponse to these advices Spain determined to adopt a more vigorous pol-
icy and to provide for a stronger government. Parly in 1777, Bernar-
do de Galvez was sent over as governor of Louisiana and preparations
were made to begin the struggle along the Mississippi.
Galvez proved to be an able governor and a determined foe of
the English. He was a young man and related to one of the noblest anc
most influential families of Spain. His father was viceroy of Mexico,
and his uncle, Don Jose de Galvez, was president of the council of the
Indies. Galvez entered with vigor on his administration. For several
years the English had controlled the trade of the Mississippi but this
soon ended. He seized all the British vessels in the river and all
that dared to enter the port. In one day soon after his arrival elev-
en Fnglish vessels, laden with rich cargoes, were captured and con-
demned by his orders.
At the beginning of 1777 the war party in Spain gained the
5
ascendancy. The two most strenuous advocates of war were Galvez,
president of the council for the Indies, and Aranda, minister to
France. Galvez was very bitter towards Great Britain and it was
doubtless by his direction that the governor of Louisiana had de-
stroyed British trade in the Mississippi. Aranda was even more hos-
tile. He urged war continually and his earnest pleadings did not fail
4
to produce an impression on the Catholic king. Florida Blanca him-
1. Fortier, History of Louisiana, II, 25-^ r
2. Ibid, 56, 57.
3. Gssun to Vergennes. Espagne, no. 163, p. 364.
4. Esragne, 587, fol . 7, no. 39, p. 88.

self seemed almost won over and ordered large reinforcements for Sp«
ish America, and increased preparations for war.
1
The belligerent attitude of France and Spain alarmed the
British court. Stermount at Versailles and Grantham at 1 adrid demand-
ed an explanation of the immense military and naval demonstrations in
America. The English ministry declared its intentions were peaceful
p
and offered to guarantee the Spanish possessions in North America.
Vergennes asserted that it was necessary to guard Spanish interests in
America. Florida Blanca gave the same answer to Fnglish representa-
tions and declared that there was danger that the Spanish possessions
would he seduced by the example of the English colonies.'
While Vergennes was bending every effort to bring Spain to
the side of war the American commissioners were also seeking her alli-
ance. Congress had hoped for Spanish aid and was prepared to offer
liberal terms to get it. Soon after Franklin's arrival in Paris the
commissioners decided to send Arthur Lee to Spain. He set out at once
and arrived at Madrid early in March. According to his account he re-
ceived some encouragement and was told that war probably would be be-
4
gun within a year. These negotiations, however, were with Grimaldi
who had already given up the direction of foreign affairs. Lee inti-
mated that he had opened negotiations with Florida Blanca himself, but
the truth of the statement may well be doubted. Lee prepared a memo-
rial to submit to Florida Blanca, but there is no evidence that the
Spanish minister ever received it. Lee, however, did enter into commu-
nication with others in authority and to them he submitted his propos-
als. From Lee's own accounts and from information furnished by Ossun
__
1. Espagne, »fol. 24, no. 127; fol. 33, no. 168. Ibid, 584, fol. 30,
no. 48. n
2. Espagne, 584, fol. 30, no. 48, p. 138.
3. Ossun to Vergennes. Espagne, 584, fol. 60, no. 80, p. 207.
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to the French minister, it is apparent that he was willing to offers
in return for Spanish aid, assistance from Congress in the conquest of
Florida, and full recognition of the rights of Prain to that province}
Ifcile Spain was anxious to get Florida, she would not enter
into any negotiations with the Americans until their independence was
2
assured. The king himself informed Ossun that the propositions sub-
mitted by Lee were premature. Spain was willing to aid the Americans
secretly, but would not recognize their independence/
Franklin then took a hand in the negotiations and wrote di-
rectly to Florida Blanca to ask the alliance of Spain. He promised
that the United States would assist Spain to capture Pensacola, pro-
vided that the Americans should have the use of the harbor and the
4
free navigation of the Mississippi. He further offered American aid
in the conquest of any of the English sugar isles. It is probable
that Franklin wrote this letter at the . suggestion of Vergennes. At
any rate the French minister made quick use of it as an argument for
Spain to enter the war. Previously he had asserted that neither
France nor Spain had any use for new conquests. But now he began to
dangle before the hungry eyes of the Spaniards, the conquest of the
rich sugar isles of the Antilles. At the same time he repeated his
former declaration that France did not wish any new territories
.
Vergennes sought also to alarm the Spanish court by the suggestion
that there was danger of a reconciliation between England and her col-
onies. If such should take place, he declared, the whole colonial era-
1. Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 290. Espagne, 583, fol
39, no. 184, p. 434.
2. Ossun to Vergennes. Ibid, p. 438.
3. Ossun to Vergennes. Ibid, 584, fol. 47, no. 12, p. 74.
4. '.Tharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 704.
5. Vergennes to I ontmorin. Espagne, 584
,
no. 21, p. r^7.

pire of Prance and Spain would be endangered by English ambition.-'
The representations of the British court were not without
effect and it became apparent that the drift of war was away from war.
Spain desired to keep things as they were. She feared the example of
a new power in America would prove an evil example for her own colo-
nies. The promises of the English crown backed up by her own powerful
armaments in the West Indies were sufficient guarantees that Spanish
America would not fall a prey to English conquest. The position of
Vergennes had convinced Florida Blanca that France would make no seri-
ous effort to aid Spain in the reconquest of her former possessions
and he declared to Ossun Spain had everything to lose and nothing to
2
gain by war.
The defection of Spain did not discourage or hinder the plan
of Vergennes. He still favored an alliance with the Americans and
still showed no desire to make any conquests from the British. On Ju-
ly 22 he presented a memoir to the king on French interests in the ex-
isting war. Here for the first time he takes a stand in regard to the
disposition of British territory not in revolt. In answer to the ar-
gument that the new republic would soon forget its dependence on
;
France and become dangerous to the possessions of the two crowns, he
declared: "Canada in the hands of the English will be a disquietude
to the north which will never be perfectly tranquil from fear of their
-neighbors, and will be a security that they (United States) will not
break entirely with the two powers who shall have aided them." By
~anada Vergennes doubtless meant it according to the French geography
which included all the territory north of the Ohio and between the
Mississippi and Alleghanies, except the region of Illinois, and upon
1. Espagne, 584, no. 22, p. F>5
.
2. Cssun to Vergennes. Ibid, fol . 58, no. 75, p. 195.
5, Vergennes to Ossun. Ibid, 585, no. 56, p. 95.

this geography was to base many of his ideas of American rights.
From the despatches and memoirs of Vergennes before this
time it is easy to rerceive his policy towards America. It was to
make the revolted colonics an independent nation, as a barrier to
British aggressions. Beyond this he would go no further. It was of
no interest to France to make the United States a great and extensive
republic to extend whose boundaries would cost much blood and money.
To the mind of Vergennes it would be well to hold the new nation in de
pendence on France and in antagonism to England. He looked only to
maintaining the balance of power in America and to its reestablishment
in Europe
.
Vergennes s^on renewed his efforts to form an offensive and
defensive alliance with Spain against Great Britain. He reiterated
the old arguments 1 and agreed that Spain should have compensation in
territory. Great Britain had not maintained her attitude of cordial-
ity and the Spanish court was again becoming anxious to raise its
prestige by conquests from its powerful and ancient rival. To the rep
resentations of Ossun Florida Blanca insinuated that Spain would soon
be ready for war, and promised to maintain the defensive alliance to
aid France if Great Britain should attack her? Vergennes now be-
lieved that his diplomacy had won and prepared for war. He was soon
to learn, however, that his ally was not satisfied. TJer greed for
land was only made keener by this slight concession, and its increas-
ing demands were long to be a care on the mind of the French minister.
1. Vergennes to Ossun. Espagne, 586, fol . 62, no. 104, p. 181.
2. Ibid, 58*, fol. 10^, no. 33, p. 50.

CHAPTER III.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.
In the policy of Vergennes America was but a club for the
humiliation of England. The ambitions, the hopes, and the plans of
the colonists beyond the desire for independence, were unknown to him,
or at best discerned but vaguely. It was his policy to build up a na-
tion in America, which would be a check on the aggrandizement of Brit-
ain, and yet not strong enough to threaten the possessions of Spain or
endanger the balance of power. In America the forces of the disinte-
gration of Britain were going and there remained for him the task of
calling Spain into action. The powers of colonial hatred were at his
service; could he also command the strength of Spanish jealousy and
desire for revenge?
In the development of his policy after the assurance of a
declaration of independence Vergennes showed little interest and less
knowledge of the conditions and purposes of the revolted 3tates.
j
Since the mission of Bonvouloir until the news was at hand of the sur-
render of Burgoyne, neither France nor Spain had any representatives
: in America. Both countries had felt the need of better knowledge of
conditions there, but neither had regarded the matter as important
enough to command immediate action.
In July, 1777 Vergennes had suggested to Spain that each
country should have some one in America, "wise, sensible, and discreet
who without character, or ostensible mission" should investigate con-
1
: ditions there. For the duties of this position he thought a merchant
'would be best fitted. S In November Florida Blanca informed Cssun that
jl. Vergennes to Ossun, July 21, 1777. ^snagne,585, 45, no. 53, p. 91.
2. Vergennes to Ossun, Aug. 25, 1777. Ibid, 51, no. 1^7, p. 291.
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he already had an agent in America. Thin nan whom he called "Fdouard'
had been in the colonies before on matters of business and was regard,
ed as possessing the qualities of orudence and skill necessary for a
difficult mission. Vergennes, however, still delayed. He gave as
his reason the difficulty of finding a suitable agent. In November,
however, he declared that he had in mind one whc he thought, would be
admirable and who should go at once by way of St Domingo
.
2
At the
same time he asked the Spanish government to transmit, to him any in-
formation it might receive, for he had seen vague inklings of great
events in America.
For this mission Vergennes' final choice was Holker, though
it is probable that his original selection was Beaumarchais 7 Holk-
er' s instructions were given verbally but there is a minute of them in
the French foreign office, dated November 25, .1777.
4
in this document
there is no intimation that Vergennes knew the desires of Congress.
Holker was to learn all he could of the situation of affairs and re-
port them at once, lie was further to represent to the Americans their
need for some power to protect them from the resentment and covetous-
ness of Great Britain who, it was assumed would always have the means
of disturbing them from her position in Canada and the Floridas. Be-
fore Holker could take his departure, news came of the surrender of
Burgoyne and he was given permission to concert with Congress a plan
1. Ossun to Vergennes, Nov. 8, 1777. Espagne, 586, no. 159. Doniol,
II, 578-579. There is no mention of Edouard in the later negotiations
of Spain. 'Then Gerard, the French minister, landed at Philadelphia in
1778, he found Spain represented by Miralles. Gerard to Vergennes,
July 16, 1778. Etats-Unis, IV, 97-102, no. 2?.
2. Vergennes to "ssun, Nov., 1777. Esnagne, 587, no. 17. Doniol,
Histoire, II, 580.
?. Doniol, Histoire, II, 615.
4. Etats-Unis, II, fol. 26^-2^7, no. 144. Vergennes probably received
some information through the Due de Broglie who heard often from his
protege, De Kalb. There is no evidence to support the idea that De
Balme, sent over by Deane in 177P, was a French agent. His movements
received no consideration from the French government and there are no
reports from him in its archives. Doniol, Histoire, II, 615.

.of repelling the common enemy. " "
.It is important also to bear in mind that the Frenchman's
idea of boundaries in America never coincided with those of the Ameri-
can^. It was over boundaries that the French and Indian wars were
fought, and although the Frenchman was beaten in war and was compelled
to' give Up all his territory in America, still he could not be made to
rewrite his geographies. To him Canada still included the land north
of the Ohio and between the Mississippi and Alleghanies
,
1
while the
country south of the Ohio was still eastern Louisiana. The English,
also, in the Q.uebec Act had followed more closely French ideas of ge-
ography than those of their colonies. Thus it was that in 1778 a
French officer describes the thirteen colonies as bounded on the north
by Canada and on the west still by Canada and the Indian nations as
2far as the Mississippi river. It is probable that he included within
the borders of the Indian nations all that territory south of the Ohio
and east of the Mississippi for he does not regard the thirteen colo-
nies as anywhere touching Spanish Louisiana or the Mississippi. Ver-
gennes' idea of Canada has already been shown in his memoir to the
king, in which he declared that Canada in the hands of the English
would be a guarantee of the fidelity of the United States.
During the years 1770-77 France had naid little attention to
Louisiana. The English had gained control of its commerce and there
was nothing there to attract her. Vergennes had suggested in 177*
that Spain should use this province as a depot to furnish the Ameri-
cans with supplies but had refused to use it for the French. The only
other interest that France showed in this territory was purely commer-
l
cial. In the foreign office there are some memoirs on the tobacco of
1. Vith the exception of Illinois, but this exception was not general-
ly considered. C. W. Alvord.
2. Archives de la V.arine, B 4, 144, no. 2^.
J
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Louisiana, and "ssun recommended in January, 1777 that it should take
the place of the Virginia tobacco which could be hardly obtained. 1
There is no evidence that Vergennes had ever considered the
question of the navigation of the Mississippi until called upon to de-
fend the seizure of English vessels in the Mississippi by Galvez in
February, 1777. Vergennes learned of this action of the Spanish gov-
ernor through the newspapers about the first of October. At that tine
he did not know that the English would complain, but he declared that
any protest could not be founded on the common law of America where
each nation reserved to itself its exclusive navigation and its own
corj-.erce. He held that the English had no more right to carry on com-
merce on the right bank of the Mississippi than the French had to
trade along the coasts of North America where all French ships were
arrested and seized.' It is clear from this that Vergennes had not
come +o the Spanish view of the exclusive navigation of the Mississip-
pi for he described the Soanish rights to the right bank of the Miss-
issippi by an argument which clearly infers that the English had an
equal claim to control the commerce of the left bank.
Spain did not in any way commit herself on the subject of
;the navigation of the Mississippi until, as previously noticed, the
,
governor of Louisiana seized the English ships in the river. Just
what instructions the ministry had given the governor is not certain
but it has already been shown that his act was in accord with the pol-
,icy of Galvez, the president of the council for the Indies. In Octo-
. ber, 1?77 Ossun wrote to Vergennes that Spain held to the opinion that
England did not have the right to navigate the Mississippi or to de-
cs
posit merchandise at its mouth." Spain maintained that England had
Ossun to Vergennes. Espagne, 58^ , no. 52, p. 140
.
Vergennes to ^ssun, Oct. 7, 1777. Ibid, 586, fol. 65, no. 105, p. 185
• Ossun to Vergennes
. Ibid, fol. 118, no. 138, p. 273.

not done this without opposition and the silence with which she re-
ceived the news of the seizure of her ships in the river gave grounds
for Spain to hold that England acquiesced in her position.
Congress had formed no fixed nolicy in regard to the terri-
tories but it was anxious to extend the boundaries of the United
States as far as possible. The instructions to the commissioners in
Paris had reauired them to seek French aid to conquer Canada, and
there were various projects to occupy Florida and the Mississippi val-
ley. Congress really felt secure in the belief that the Mississippi
valley was an integral part of the thirteen united colonies and did
not regard it as a subject for negotiation. It was clearly perceived,
however, among the Americans that Spain desired to control the Mis-
sissippi river. This subject was first broached by Franklin in his
negotiations with Florida Blanca in 1777 when before the Spanish min-
ister could declare his intentions, Franklin demanded that Snain
should recognize the right of his countrymen to navigate the Mississ-
ippi. These questions, however, had no influence on Vergennes' polin
of war. He had no interest in the navigation of the Mississippi or in
the disposition of the western territories. He was going to war to
effect the humiliation of Fngland, to raise the prestige of France.
| The whole administration had foreseen the outbreak of hostilities and
;was prepared to face any contingency. The French people had come to
recognize that the war in America was a revolution and accented with
2
enthusiasm the fact of the birth of a new nation. It was felt also
that Great Britain desired war to secure indemnity for her losses, and
: France was willing to meet it.
i The Archives of the Marine contain numerous plans of naval
1. Franklin, "ri tings (Smyth ed.), VII, 40.
2. Archives de la Marine, B A, 172,
5. Ibid, 25.

and military operations against the English. In 177P there was drawn
up a series of instructions corresponding to those of Spain for the
fleets of observation to be stationed in the Windward islands and St.
Rl i
Domingo. Throughout the year 1777 there were collected volumes of
o
information on the condition of the Fnglish fleet . ' In the same year
the naval department prepared a plan of war to be undertaken in con-
cert with Spain. The naval heads recognized the extreme weakness of
both France and Spain in the test Indies and feared the loss of their
possessions there. They believed, however, that the Americans would
soon be in position to attack Canada and Florida, in which case, it
was asserted, Great Britain would lose entire possession of those ter-
ritories. There was, however, no suggestion that France should at-
tempt to seize them. In fact it was the Dlan of the naval department
to make the war largely defensive: to protect the coasts of France and
Spain and to hold the colonies. Their principal points of attack were
to be Gibraltar, Jamaica, Granada and Mahon and if possible they hoped
4
to make a descent on Fngland and Ireland.
The great task of Vergennes was to secure the alliance of
Qpain. Grimaldi had long since declared his willingness for war and
had even Drepared a memoir in which he proposed that the two powers
should begin the struggle in 1778'"', and asked only that the contest be
postponed until the Spanish treasure ships should come in. They had
6
long since arrived with all their store of wealth but still Spain
hesitated. To the urgings of the French minister the Spanish govern-
1. Archives de la Marine, B 4, 123.
2. Ibid, 129-131.
3. Ibid, 175.
4. Ibid, 135, pp. 30-41.
5. Ossun to Vergennes. Fspagne, 535, no. 100
B. Ibid, no. 106, p. 211.

ment renlied that it was not yet ready. anwfiile Hontmorin
had succeeded n ssun as French minister at Madrid and upan him fell the
task of drawing Spain into the war. It had been annarent to Vergenne*
for some time that Spain was anxious for peace and so, almost immedi-
ately after receiving the news of Furgoyne's surrender, he wrote to
llontmorin urging ne- reasons why she should join the alliance. He re-
minded the Spanish government that the American commissioners had re-
newed their offer to guarantee the possessions of the two crowns in
the New World and had given assurance that their government would nev-
er raise any difficulty on the question of boundaries. "It is easy to
see the great advantage to Spain of the absolute separation of old and
new England", he argued, "and the security and tranquillity which it
will give her." He suggested also that "perhaps Spain still regrets
the loss of Florida which gives to the English an easy access to the
Gulf of Mexico". He probably knew that Arthur Lee had already offered
Florida to the Spaniards, but he cautiously continued, "I do not know
what the Americans think in regard to this but it is natural to
suppose that they would not hold very strongly to a thing that they do
not yet nossess, and which, it seems to me is not of much importance
to them. They are still too young to have ambitious views to open up
an interloping commerce".
1
Vergennes had not yet seen the importance
of the territorial question in the war. He was bidding high for the
help of Snain, but it did not occur to him to offer more of the main-
land of North America than the Floridas.
These suggestions of Vergennes were submitted by Hontmorin
to Florida Blanca, Grimaldi 1 s successor, but the Spanish minister in-
terposed many objections. He claimed that the Spanish fleet was not
m shape for war. " He argued that the Americans were simply playing
1. Vergennes to Montmorin. Fspagne, 587, no. 10^, p. 19?
• ontmori-- to •- -
. , [bid, no. 125, p.

a 5ame and throughout showed the greatest repugnance to treating wit*
them. Even after his first rebuff VTontmorin did not give up hope.
Again and again he urged Florida Blanca to enter the alliance. 1 Fi-
nally on January A the Spanish minister answered him brusquely, "Your
court wants to treat with the Americans, "far will result and there is
neither object in beginning it nor plan to conduct it." 2
In England the news of Purgoyne ' s surrender produced a feel-
ing of despair. Conciliatory bills were introduced into Parliament
with the consent of Lord North and a commission was appointed to at-
tempt conciliation. The British had also been watching attentively
the situation in France and were hourly expecting war. They were,
however, anxiously hoping for peace and prepared to make every effort
to maintain it
.
In January Mr. Hut ton, chief of the Moravian brothers in
England and America, came from London to ^aris. He was a friend of
the king and queen of England and also of Dr. Franklin. Before leav-
ing London he held a long conversation with the king in which he was
told to j*rant the Americans anything but independence. The visit of'
Hutton created quite a stir in naris and there was considerable fear
4
| that he would succeed in effecting a reconciliation. Franklin, how-
lever, was found uncompromising in his desire for independence,
Button's request that he make propositions of oeace and reconcilia-
tion, Franklin replied that the first offers must core from England,
lit was in thi3 negotiation that Franklin first suggested the plan that
was later employed so skillfully by him of annealing to the magnanimi-
il. Espagne-, 587, no. MO.
2. Ibid, 538, no. 1.
5. Doniol, II, 70S.
k. Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), VII, 100."
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ty and good ;vin of the r.riti^h nation-. "You should not onT/
-rant
'"
such as the necessity of your affairs may evidently oblige you to
grant, but such additional ones as may show your generosity and may
thereby demonstrate your good will. For instance, perhaps you might,
by your Treaty retain all Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas. But
if you would have a real friendly, perhaps able ally in America, and
avoid all occasions of future discord, which will otherwise be contin-
ually arising on your American frontiers, you should throw in those
Countries. And you may call it if you niease, an Indemnification for
the needless and cruel burning of their Towns, which Indemnification
will otherwise be sometime or other demanded." 1
The debates in ^arliarent on the American question were Ions
and bitter. Shelburne contended that if the rebellious colonies were
to secure their independence they would not stay at that, ^e ex-
Pressed his high opinion of the moderation of the American people but
declared that Congress looked further and were likely to inspire them
pith hopes of conciuest and extent of dominion. "Should this be the
case',' he declared, "the remainder of America must fall". He spoke of
the demands of the American commissioners and asserted that they would
ultimately lead to the loss of the T ' rest Indies and even Treland. 2 It.
was clear that England was not yet ready to grant independence to the
revolted colonies so the negotiations in regard to giving up her
claims to other territory were premature.
Hews of the surrender of Burgoyne reached Paris December 7*
1777. On the next day the American commissioners presented their re-
quest for a treaty of amity and commerce and offered to join France
•7.
and Spain in a war on England. This time Vergennes gave immediate
1. Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), VII, 100.
2. Parliamentary Register, X, ^30. See also Ben.j
. Vaughn to Franklin,
April 23, 1773. Franklin, Works (Smyth ed . ) , VII, 151.
3. Vergennes to ::ontmorin. Espagne, 537, fol . 92.

consideration to their demands. Both to the commissioner- and his as-
sociates in the government he declared that he would ask nothing that
would embarrass Congress. All he wished was the guarantee of French
possessions in America.
1
The reluctance of Spain to enter into a new
war did not orevent Vergennes from continuing his plans. On January
7, 1773 a meeting of the cabinet was held at the home of Maurepas who
was ill and the whole political situation was gone over. Vergennes
read to the king a long memoir on the state of affairs in America. He
pointed out that England would probably try to make an armistice with
the colonies and would then be in a position to attack French and
Spanish possessions in the 'Test Indies. England needs only to keep
New York, he argued, to serve as a base of attack against our possess-
ions. "The exclusive navigation of the Mississippi", he continued,
"which will make the possessions of Mexico precarious will be in it-
self a powerful bait for the colonies." And he believed that unless
France won their friendship they would ultimately unite with England
against the possessions of the two monarchies
.
J
If England should
recognize the independence of the colonies at once, Vergennes declared,
she could not attack the French and Spanish possessions with impunity.
This memoir was approved by the king and may be taken as the expres-
sion of the policy of the ministry at the beginning of the war. In it
again there is no mention of French conquests but only of the necessi-
ty of going to war to protect what France already held.
In spite of the urgent demands of the French, Florida Blanca
still hesitated. The Spanish '7est Indies were poorly protected and
there were many places open to attack. He declared to Aranda that
ranee could hope to gain many advantages from a war with England
while there was nothing for Spain." France could look to the conquest
1. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, 1777. Fspagne, 587, fol.99, p. 131.
2. Vergennes to Montmorin. Espagne, 533, fol . 15, no. 10.
*. Florida "lanca to Aranda. Espagne, 5 33, no. 21, p. P9.

of English islands and of the fisheries of Newfoundland; conquests
which she could hold by the strength of her naval power. 1 As for
Spain, she could have no purpose in going to war unless it was to re-
cover some of the places which England had so shamefully usurped. He
mentioned in Particular Gibraltar and Minorca.
2
But he desired also
to drive the English from the Gulf of Mexico, the Bay of Honduras and
the coast of CamDeche. Although he did not mention Florida, his plan
to drive the English from the Gulf of Mexico would necessarily include
the conquest of that province.
There is no doubt but that the enmity of Spain to England
was genuine and deep. The whole Spanish policy had been hostile to
the British court. Spain had complained vigorously against the great
armaments which England was establishing in America and had correspond
Ingly increased her own. England had recognized the danger and had
sought to divert it. But it was not her diplomacy that kept Spain
from going to war. The reasons for Spain's inertia go back to several
conditions. Spain was mortally afraid of losing her possessions be-
fore the overwhelming power of the British navy. She knew that her
finances were not in condition for war and that they would be further
crippled by the cutting off of the supply of precious metal from her
American possessions. And then, as Florida Blanca declared, "between
England and America there is a sort of equality of enmity that It
makes it difficult to desire that either of them would win." He did
declare, however, that there were just two things that would induce
Spain to enter any arrangement with the Americans. These were Florida
and an establishment in Newfoundland. The Spanish desired Florida
because it was the key to the Gulf of Mexico which they wished to make
1. Montmorin to Vergennes, . Esoagne, 588, no. 58, p. 139
2. kontmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1778. Ibid, no. 21, p. «4
.
. Montmorin to Vergennes. Ibid, fol . 11, no. 80, p. 219.

a Spanish lake. rt w s a source of great annoyance to them that, their
ships could not get from New Orleans into the ocean without almost
touching the coasts of an English province. As to Newfoundland, it
was recognized that a colony there could be gained only after consid-
erable difficulty, for the jealousy of the Americans was constantly or
guard to see that no Latin power should build up near then.
That it was impossible for Spain to obtain any territory
contiguous to the boundaries of the United States without the consent
of Congress was recognized by the ministers of both the Bourbon king-
doms. Florida Blanca implied as much when he declared that only the
hope of obtaining Florida and a part of Newfoundland could induce him
to enter into negotiations with Congress. Vergennes declared the same
thing in his instructions to Gerard on his departure for America. 1
Vergennes throughout maintained moderation in his expecta-
tions for both Prance and Spain. He repeatedly declared that France
wnated no conquests and that her sole desire was to enfeeble England
and raise France once more to the rank of a first class power. Neith-
er the expulsion of the English commissioners from Dunkirk, nor a fur-
ther limitation of the rights of fishing in Newfoundland, nor even the
recovery of the islands of St. Domingo or Grenada would be objects sa-
lient enough to invite war. He declared his willingness, however, if
Srain would aid in the war, to help her recapture the important places
of Gibraltar and Mahon and to expel the English from the Gulf of Mexi-
co, the Bay of Honduras and the coast of Campeche.' Nothing however
could induce Florida Blanca to enter into a treaty. To the urgings of
Llontmorin he replied, "You regard the actual circumstances as most
happy for the two crowns: I regard them as most fatal for Spain." 4
1. Vergennes to Gerard. Etats-Unis, III, fol. 159-1P4, no. 77.
2. Vergennes to Montmorin. Espagne, 5SS, no. «0.
3. Vergennes to Montmorin. Ibid, fol. 24, no. 150, p. 700.
4- Ibid, no. 33.

In spite of the declared intention of Spain to remain at reaoe France
continued her ^reparations for war. ^he minister of marine drew up an
elaborate plan of war which provided for attacks on Fnglish Dossess-
ions throughout the world/ French forces were to he sent into the
far Fast, against the British islands in the Atlantic and in the An-
tilles. France was ready for war and was holding back only in the
hope that Spain would join her.
Great Britain realized the seriousness of affairs. Lord
Stormount, her ambassador at Faris, who had previously been so insist
ent on the maintenance of French neutrality, at the beginning of the
year relapsed into silence. Gamier, the French ambassador, wrote
from London that Fngland regarded herself as already at war with
France and on February 2 Sartines asked for an embargo on Fnglish
g
ships in French ports; on the 4th arrived despatches from Madrid that
Spain would not take part in the war, and on the evening of the Fth
the ministers of Louis XVI and the American commissioners signed the
treaties which Congress had so long awaited.
In the treaty of alliance the second article declared it?
purpose to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty and independ
ence of the United States. This treaty provided for mutual aid in
making conquests and declared that all conquests made on the continent
of North America or the Bermudas should belong to the United States,
and France finally renounced any claim to any part of the mainland of
North America which belonged to Great Britain. France was to have all
connuests made in or around the Gulf of Mexico. This treaty also con-
tained a mutual guarantee of all the possessions of either power in
North America and the terms of the alliance.^
1. Archives de la Marine, B 4, 155, pp. 80-100.
2. Doniol, Histoire, IT, 747.
.
Treaties and Conventions, pp. 242-24:*.

The provisions in regard to the territories were in accord
with the instructions of the commissioners of Congress and did not at
any point antagonize the policy of Vergennes. He still insisted that
all France desired was the separation of the colonies from the mother
country and the consequent enfeeblement of England. 1 The American
commissioners were likewise satisfied with their treaty and wrote to
Congress that the terms were such as they might readily have agreed tc
if the United States were in a condition of full prosperity and estah-
2 n
lished power.
This treaty of alliance meant war. On March 10 Vergennes
wrote to the French embassy at London enclosing a copy of the arti-
cles. The messenger arrived at his destination on the 17th and on the
7,
17th England declared war. At the time when Vergennes signed the
treaty of alliance with the United States he had good reason to hone
that Spain would soon accede to it. The historic kinship and union of
the two Bourbon crowns, their common hatred of England and their com-
mon interest in humiliating her all induced Vergennes to expect a uni-
ted front against her. Furthermore, Spain had promised to aid France
if England attacked her and had intimated that war would soon begin.
Although during the few months preceding the treaty between France and
the United States, Spain had looked coldly on the suggestion of war,
still Vergennes had no doubt but that she would join France as soon a
hostilities began. Snain has more to gain than France, he argued.
Both nations are eaually interested in reducing the prestige of Great
Britain, but while France neither expects nor desires any aggrandize-
ment, Spain will have many opportunities to make rich and valuable
conquests
.
1. Espagne, 538, fol . 25, no. 155, p. 700.
°. Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, TI, 490.
. Doniol, Ilistoire, II, 822.

The instructions which Vergennes gave to Gerard, the first
—
French minister to the United States, look to the Spanish alliance.
He made it one of the most important points of these instructions to
look after the interests of Spain and he urged his minister to use ev-
ery effort to get Florida for a Spanish colony. These instructions
also are in accord with the whole policy of Vergennes. As has been
shown already, the central aim of his statecraft was to weaken Fngland
and to lower her orestige, by this means relatively increasing the im-
portance and influence of France. In recognizing the United States of
America he believed he was erecting a powerful bulwark against the
dominance of the British Empire, while at the same time weakening it
by cutting it in two. He early recognized the impossibility of ob-
taining territories on the continent of North America on account of
the jealousy of the Americans. He felt too that France had no use for
any colonies to bus tain -vhich would drain the mother country of her
resources. 1 ore than once he declared that France had already all the
colonies her population and industry could support. He looked abroad
only for advantages that could be reaped by the French people while
; still claiming their residence at home. He showed eagerness only for
j such things as fishing posts, sugar producing islands or ports where
' FreVich ships could trade to advantage. Vergennes felt that extensive
territories were a source of weakness, entailing heavy expense, and of
less value from a commercial standpoint than small colonies.
Although Vergennes did not wish any conquests in North Amer-
ica, he was unwilling to turn over the whole continent to the United
; States. He had given recognition to the new republic as a step in the
j downfall of Brit -in and in order to insure the permanency of his work
he felt that the United States must be kept in dependence on France.
In the light of this policy he issued his instructions to Gerard. In
regard to the propositions of the American commissioners that France
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should aid in the conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia and Florida, Ver-
gennes declared that the king considered "the possession of these
three countries or at least of Canada, by England would be a useful
cause of disquietude and vigilance for the Americans which will make
them see all the more the need which they have of the friendship and
alliance of the king and which it is not to his interest to destroy'.' 1
He was not, however, wedded to the idea of limiting the boundaries of
the United states. Gerard was left much discretion in regard to this
matter, and by all means, he was to keep the good will of Congress.
If Congress proposed any conquests he was to assure it of the friend-
ship of the king but was not to enter into any formal engagement to
effect its desires. If Congress should become too pressing Gerard was
not to refuse to cooperate but he was to make it understood that the
retention of such conquest need not be a condition of the next pence!
In no case was he bound by hard and fast rules but was to use his dis-
cretion. That he did so is amply proved by the history of his career
in America.
When Gerard arrived in Philadelphia he found that Spain al-
ready had an agent there. Don Juan de Muralles had arrived from ^ava-
jna several months before but he was not accredited to Congress. His
I powers were merely those of a secret agent. He had spent the month of
January at Charleston, South Carolina and had been very active among
I the revolutionists. Prom Charleston he had gone to Philadelphia and
'had established an acquaintance with various members of Congress, and
2a^carently had secured their confidence. Gerard and Kuralles soon
[became firm and confidential friends. :.:uralles, however, did not show
jhis instructions to Gerard but soon made evident the attitude of Spain
;in regard to the territories. He exerted himself to show the advanta-
1. Vergennes to Gerard. Etatc-Unis, III, fol . 159-1B4, no. 77.
g- Vergennes to Gerard. Ibid, IV, fol . 142-147, no. 41.

ges that would result if France would undertake the conquest of nana-"
da, and give to Spain all other territory acquired by the English in
the treaty of 1763 and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi.
The suggestion that France should conquer Canada made no impression 01
Gerard who understood that the policy of Vergennes was not to make
conquests on the American continent. He, however, transmitted the
suggestions of Muralles to the French court in his despatch of Julv
1
25, 1778. He decided in the meanwhile to obey his instructions and
held out no particular intimation to Muralles that France would con-
quer Canada or interfere with its conquest by the Americans.
To Congress the treaty of alliance and the promise of French
aid brought renewed hopes of the conquest of Canada. Washington had
always been eager to get the British cossessions along the St. Law-
rence and the failure of the early expeditions had not discouraged
him. Gerard had been instructed to promise the Americans both milita-
ry and naval aid and this was counted on to help in the expedition.
D'Estaing had left Toulon soon after the outbreak of hostilities with
a powerful fleet and had arrived in America in July. Shortly after-
wards he wrote to Gerard concerning his operations, was evidently
informed of the ambition of France to get a share of the Newfoundland
fisheries. :1f instructions had named St. Johns as a promising point
of attack, but he understood that Vergennes preferred Newfoundland as
2the home of the fisheries. ' D'Estaing further expressed the opinion
that as St. Johns was but a little island Spain would not be satisfied
with it. The Spanish monarchy, he wrote, was "possessed of a territo-
rial mania and always felt itself ill used unless the compass of its
territory was as large as the map." He suggested that the easiest so-
lution would be to turn over St. Johns and Newfoundland to the Ameri-
1. Vergennes to Gerard. Etats-Unis, IV, fol . 142-147, no. 41
2- Gerard to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, IV, fpi
,
95T96, no. 22.

cans and seek compensation elsewhere. Gerard considered the whole
proposition as worthy of serious consideration, and submitted it to
Vergennes
.
Long before the Project of invading Canada was formally con-
sidered Gerard was aware that it was likely to come up, and even fore-
told the time and manner. On July 16 he wrote to Vergennes of the
whole affair and gave the arguments of the Americans.
2
These were in
brief the danger to the United States of Great Britain were allowed to
keep both Canada and Florida. At this time, however, Gerard did not
believe that the Americans would demand the assistance of French
troops for the conquest of either. In September, 1778 Washington sub-
mitted a plan of invading Canada subject only to the condition that
the British could be driven out of certain posts in the north. He
considered such an expedition of prime importance, but was not very
sanguine of results.
In the meantime Lafayette had conceived a plan of his own to
invade Canada. He hoped to get five thousand troops from France and
with twelve thousand continentals to make a descent on this province
from Detroit, Niagara, and the Connecticut river, while the French
fleet was to sail up the St. Lawrence. On September 3 he wrote to
[Washington suggesting that the next move should be the occupation of
4
j Canada. A week later he wrote to his friend D'Estaing whom he ex-
Ipected to meet at Boston, "I can think of nothing but the happiness of
Ibeing united with you, of Halifax surrendering, of St. Augustine ta-
iken, of the British islands on fire, and all confessing that nothing
can withstand the French. This was but an outburst of patriotic en-
;1. Gerard to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, IV, fol. 90, no. 20.
2. Gerard to Vergennes. Ibid, fol. 97-102, no. 23.
3. Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), VII, 192-198.
4. wieraoires, Correspo^dance et Manuscrits des-- Lafayette, I, 208.
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Lafayette, II, 14.

thusiasm and was entirely opposed to the plans of Vergennes who war,
"
expected to aid the expedition. Lafayette succeeded, however, in a-
rousing the interest of D'Estaing and of several members of Congress.
Early in October Lafayette made a visit to Washington where
it is probable he again suggested the expedition to his chief. From
there he proceeded to Philadelphia where he at once presented his plar
to Congress. Such was his eloquence and enthusiasm that he received a
favorable report on it, and the clan was ordered transmitted to Frank-
lin for submission to the minister of foreign affairs.
1
Congress re-
garded the conquest of Halifax and Quebec as objects of the greatest
importance to both powers. To France it would give the fisheries of
Newfoundland and a share in the fur trade and commerce of the country,
and to the Americans it would give peace on the frontiers and add two
new states to the union. In answer to its queries Lafayette expressed
the belief that his court would be glad to cooperate in the enterprise
2
and would send a body of troops to aid it."
Morris sought to sound Gerard as to his views of the expedi-
tion. He declared that without the conquest of Canada France could
not hope to get control of the fisheries, and expressed his willing
-
2
ness to see Newfoundland in the hands of the French. Morris argued
that with Canada in the hands of England, the United States must be-
come friends to her on account of their common interests. Furthermore
he argued that the possession of Canada was necessary to the develoD-
ment of the west if S^ain succeeded in closing the Mississippi. To
all these arguments Gerard replied vaguely that he was sure the king,
his master, had the greatest g^od will for the interests of the Ameri-
can people. To Vergennes, however, he expressed the belief that the
1. Secret Journals, II, 114.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, Oct. 20, 1773. Etats-Unis, V, fol . PS-84,no.
35.
!' j^aB4. t0 Ve^ennes > Q°t. 20, 1778. Ibid, foi. 68, no. 53; fol
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expedition would not be undertaken, for he knew that Washington could
not spare any troops unless the British evacuated Hew York.
D'Estaing knew that Prance did not desire the conquest of
Canada. Nevertheless he issued a proclamation to the Canadians urging
them to arise against the common enemy and assuring them of the great
benefits of a union with their neighbors to the south.
1
This procla-
mation did create a feeling of uneasiness among the Canadians but it
gave a bad impression of French motives to Washington and Congress. 2
On November 11 Washington wrote to Congress disapproving the scheme.
He expressed himself as anxious for the annexation of Canada but de-
clared that the army was not in condition to undertake it.'*
There were, however, other than military reasons why Wash-
ington opposed an attack on Canada. In a personal letter to Henry
Laurens, dated November 14, he gave as an insurmountable objection the
"introduction of a large body of French troops into Canada, and put-
ting them into possession of the capital of that province, attached to
them by all the ties of blood, habits, manners, religion, and former
connexion of government. I fear this would be too great a temptation','
he wrote, "to be resisted by any power actuated by the common maxims
of national policy. Let us realize for a moment, the striking advan-
tages France would derive from the possession of Canada; the acquisi-
tion of an extensive territory, abounding in supplies for the use of
her Islands; the opening a vast source of the most beneficial commerce
with the Indian nations, which she might then monopolize; the having
ports of her own on this continent independent of the precarious good
will of an ally; the engrossing of the whole trade of Newfoundland,
whenever she pleased, the finest nursery of seamen in the world; the
1. Archives de la Marine, B 4, 220.
2. Kingsford, History of Canada, VI, ?7>0
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security afforded to her Islands, and finally, the facility of awing
and controlling these states, the natural and most formidable rival of
|
every maratime power of Europe." Washington feared' that 'France in
possession of Canada would become the most powerful maritime power of
'Europe and joined with Spain in the possession of New frleans would
become the dictator of all America. He believed that France, once in
possession of Canada could find excuses for keeping it in spite of any
pledges she might make to the contrary. In conjunction with Spain he
felt she could drive Great Britain from the seas and the English
speaking world would become her subiects. 1
I
The opposition of Washington gave a death blow to the proj-
!
ect of invading Canada. On November 10 Congress voted the expedition
|
impractical and wrote to Lafayette that the project was abandoned on
2
account of the difficulties in the way.
On the question of Canada Washington and Vergennes expressed
almost identical views. Both understood that if France once got pos-
;
session of the country it would be difficult for her to give it up.
' Both saw the injustice of asking the French king to act in a conquest
i to add to the dominions of the new republic without offering him ade-
quate compensation. Both realized the power which the possession of
; Canada would give to France and both knew that with the French estab-
lished on their northern border the United States would inevitably re-
turn to the protection of England.
Washington, secure in his knowledge of the great advantages
Prance could obtain from peaceful occupation of Canada, did not know
that Vergennes had come to understand and appreciate the American
point of view. The suggestion of Lafayette further aroused his sus-
picions, and even aroused doubts in his mind of the sincerity of the
1. Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), VII, 261-264.
2. Secret Journals, II, 125-129.

young Frenchman and he fancied that he read in the faces of others
more than the disinterested zeal of allies. Many of the French sol-
diers in the American army favored the expedition. De Kalb urged the
French to help conquer Canada for the United States. If it is left ir
the possession of England, he argued, the revolted colonies will soon
return to the British yoke.°
Vergennes regarded this proposed expedition against Canada
as devoid of political significance. It may be of value as a military
demonstration, he admitted, but France can not lend her weight to the
annexation of Canada by the United States. To Gerard, he wrote, de-
claring that the French court still maintained the policy toward Cana-
da that he had indicated in his first instructions. He still pre-
ferred that England should keep Canada and Nova Scotia, but if the 11-
nited States still insisted on some acquisition it was better to give
4
them Nova Scotia. He recognized the American desire for Canada and
the difficulty of getting Congress to give it up but felt that the de-
sire to conquer it should not be an excuse for continuing the war.
" ~e think that peace ought not depend on secondary matters'", he wrote,
"and that the only point important to the United States is the recog-
nition of their Independence. We do not hesitate to stipulate in fa-
vor of Great Britain for the preservation of her actual possessions in
North America." As to the proposal of Miralles, the Spanish agent,
that France should seize Canada Vergennes replied decidedly in the
negative. Such a course, he argued, would arouse distrust in America
of the Durposes of France, and bring about insensibly a rapprochement
7ith Great Britain and such an understanding he declared would make
1. '.'.'ashington, Writings (Ford ed.), VII, 264.
2. De Kalo to Broglie, Nov. 7, 1773. Etats-Unis, V, fol.146, 147, no. 6^
. Vergennes to Gerard, Nov. 13, 1.773. Ibid, fol . 179-135, no. 35.
*
.
. to Gerard, Oct. :• r , 1773. Ibid, fol . 105-112. no <L_^_L

futile the whole war.
—
"
'
Vergennes knew the jealousy of Spain for the United States,
and her fear of seeing them in possession of Canada, and he did not
.wish to take any stand that would incur her displeasure. In February,
11779, he wrote to Gerard declaring that the question of Canada could
not then be determined, but in the meantime he was to "urge the Amer-
icans to make every effort in their power against the common enemy.
I It does not matter in what point but let them do all the harm they
|
can. If they succeed in taking Quebec and Halifax, well and good, for
if this becomes a condition of peace we can at least find other meas-
p
ures to reassure the court of Vadrid."
Although Canada was not sought after by either Prance or
Spain, the Floridas were, from the first, an object of cupidity.
Spain had never forgotten her ancient dominions there and had never
forgiven Great Britain for taking them from her. This fact was known
,
to both France and the United States and was used as a lever to gain
| her help. In December, 177^ Congress had decided to offer the assist-
! ance of the United States in the conquest of Florida for Spain in re-
.
j turn for her assistance; and the next summer Arthur Lee had journeyed
•to L.adrid to make a treaty to this effect.' His efforts were unavail-
I
ing, but the French minister at the court of Spain had, during the ne-
i
gotiations leading up to the alliance between France and the United
i States renewed the offer, again without success. Spain acknowledged
I her desire to get possession of the nrovince and Vergennes had contin-
lually held it as a prize dangling before her eyes. It was tacitly un-
! derstood that at any time if Spain chose to join the alliance against
Great Britain she could have this as a reward for her services. Aside
1. Vergennes to Gerard, Oct. 2fi, 1778. Ftats-Unis, V, fol. 105-112,
no. 43.
2. Vergennes to Gerard. Ftats-Unis, VII, fol . 250-259, no. 101.
5. Secret Journals, II, 40.

from a sentimental interest in keeping all her ancient empire Spain
had certain permanent interests in the Floridas. They commanded the
entrance to the Gulf of Mexico which she wished to make a Spanish lake
and as long as England held them she could threaten New Orleans, Vera
Cruz and Havana. Through her right to navigate the Mississippi Eng-
land had made Fensacola an important emporium f trade and thus seri-
ously cut into the commercial importance of New Orleans.
Tt is not clear just how fully Vergennes was acquainted with
pain's ambitions to recover the Floridas before he signed the alli-
ance with the Americans, but he understood the Spanish enough to know
that they had not forgotten their ancient loss and he also recognized
the economic importance of these Drovinces to the laniards. Gerard'
instructions, however, when he started to the United States covered
fully the question of the Floridas. He was instructed to get as much
for Spain as was in his power but if he could not get all he was told
to use his best endeavors to obtain at least Pensacola and that Dart
of the coast which would be regarded as of most "convenience" for the
1
court of "adrid. Gerard however was to avoid speaking in the name of
Spain and was only to sound Congress in regard to the matter.
VThen Gerard arrived in America he found that Congress had
already decided to conquer the Floridas for Spain as a reward for her
2
assistance. For several months Miralles had been active among the
Americans and had already formed a project with Governor Henry of Vir-
ginia for a combined expedition of Spaniards and Americans against the
west. Spain had carefully prepared the way for the work of her agent
by favorable treatment of the Americans and by furnishing them with
supplies, and with the beginning of the administration of Galvez as
1. Vergennes to Gerard, ?. Tarch 29, 1778. Ftats-Unis, ITT, fol .159, no .77
2. Gerard to Vergennes, Ibid, fol. 97-102, no. 23.
Gerard to Vergennes, July 33, 1778. T,tats .Unis> fol. 142-147,

governor of Louisiana Pev; Orleans had becore a depot" for supplies for
the American troops. Oliver Pollock was allowed to carry on opera-
tions entirely unchecked and was offered aid for the conquest of Pen-
1
sacola. ^hese favors on the part of Spain had led Congress to expect
an early recognition from the Catholic king and the insinuations of
gMiralles had doubtless fed this hope.
Liralles did not show his instructions to Gerard but he soon
suggested to the French minister what he thought would be a just set-
tlement of the american territorial question. T.et France conquer Can-
ada, he argued, and give Spain all other territory acquired by England
in 1767. Spain ought also to have, he suggested, the exclusive navi-
gation of the Mississippi river.' Ml this he. would gain without any
resort to arms.
Although Gerard had been instructed to look after Spanish
interests, and in accord with the spirit of these instructions struck
up an intimacy with Miralles, still he was by no means prepared to
meet this proposition in regard to Canada and Pastern Louisiana, and
the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi. He insisted to the Span
ish representative that Congress never would consent to renounce the
navigation of this river, for he thoroughly appreciate! the American
idea that it was necessary for the development of the back lands
claimed by the various states, and was even then an important outlet,
for the products of the settlements along the Ohio/ In regard to
1. '.Tinsor, V/estward Movement.
2. Etats-Unis, IV, fol . 142-147, no. 41. The aid afforded by Galvez
to the Americans was not unknown to the English ministry. In the Pub-
lic Record Office are numerous accounts of favors shown by the Span-
iards to the American cause. According to these the Americans were
given a public guardhouse in New Orleans, and were permitted to sell
openly, plunder taken from the British. They were allowed to fit out
armaments and Spanish ships were furnished to take supplies up the
Mississippi . Memorials of Alexander Graydon, Robert Ross, John Camp-
bell. Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 11?.
3. Gerard to Vergennes, July 25, 1773. Etats-Unis, IV, fol. 142-147,
no. 41. It is doubtful if Miralles had authority to demand so much.
Years were to pass before Florida Blanca himself presumed to make any
proposition approaching it in boldness. Florida Blanca informed Ossur
that his agent was only to investigate conditions in America, and had
no authority to treat With Congress.

Canada, Gerard declared merely that Prance desired no conquests. As
to the Floridas, the Americans had already organized an expedition un-
der Major 'Tilling to attack Pensacola and hand it over to the Span-
iards, and if Spain wished to get them independent of the United
'States she must conquer them at once.
The scheme of Miralles was based on the idea of restricting
j
the territory of the United States and thus making them dependent on
the good will of the two crowns. He thought that the Americans were
as dangerous as the British and would become hostile at the first op-
1
portunity, while Gerard assured his friend of their good disposition.
In order to reassure Spain, however, he suggested that Congress pass a
resolution declaring an enemy of the Confederation any state that
sought to extend its borders beyond "certain limits", to which proponi-
2
I tion many Americans readily agreed. Gerard informed Morris that
j
Spain was afraid of the great numbers of English who had established
(
themselves at Natchez and all along the Mississippi, and of the Tn-
; dians who had been driven westward by the Americans. These establish-
iments, he declared, were a menace to the Spanish frontier and a cause
J
of constant jealousy, ' while the designs of Congress against St. Au-
.
jgustine, Pensacola, and Mobile had aroused in the Spanish court great
anxiety and alarm. To al^r this cause of hostility Gerard proposed to
.
Morris that Congress should give to Spain some guarantee and should
j renounce in her favor St. Augustine, Pensacola, and Mobile, together
'with the navigation of the Mississippi. To the ideas of Miralles and
'Gerard Morris- fully subscribed. He was by nature and education an
^aristocrat and was in no sense a sympathizer with the spirit of Ameri-
can democracy. He had no conception of the greatness of the new re-
1. Gerard to Vergennes, July 23, 1779. Etats-Unis, IV, fol . 142-147
,
no 41
.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, Sept . 11, 1773. Ibid, fol . 511-316, no. 114.
?. Gerard to Vergennes, Oct. 20, 1778. Ibid, V, fol . 68-84, no. 33.

public and thus early In his career showed a jealousy of the west and
a desire to strangle it, which although hidden from the eyes of most
of his colleagues, was later to break out in the debate on the consti
tution and which, in his old age was to make him a eulogist of the
Hartford convention. Morris agreed that the anxiety of Spain was
founded on reason, as far as some sections of the country were con-
cerned, but asserted that there were no grounds for fear from the
whole Confederation. He confided in Gerard that he and several of hi
colleagues were impressed with the necessity of establishing a law of
"concendo imperio" which would prevent the provinces already in the
Confederation from increasing. He furthermore expressed the opinion
that it was to the interest of the Confederation for Spain to have the
exclusive navigation of the Mississippi below the mouth of the Ohio,
as this was the only means of holding in subjection the immense popu-
lation which would form in the Mississippi valley and along the Great
fakes.
1
If this population should have control of the Mississippi and
the St. Lawrence it would soon dominate both the United States and
Spain. Gerard reminded Morris that there was a body of Americans who
insisted on the right of navigating the Mississippi, but Morris re-
plied that the subject had never been discussed fully and that no def-
1
mite decision had been reached. He believed, however, that in gen-
eral Congress sav/ the danger of the aggrandizement of the south and
would be in favor of ceding the Floridas to Spain for a compensation
in money. As to the navigation of the Mississippi, he held that those
who wished it were influenced by their financial interests, but that
if the matter were presented to Congress in a true point of view he
could hope for much. In this whole affair the French minister had
more strenuously upheld the claims of the United States than had the
American secretary. Gerard did not even suggest to Morris that Spain
I. Gerard to Vergennerj
, Oct .20, 1773. ^tats-Unis, V, fol.^8-84, no. 7 ".

should be given eastern Louisiana. If he had there is little doubt
as to the answer of the secretary, for his attitude towards the south
and west in general was one of hostility. He was anxious to get Cana-
da to serve the ambition of the eastern states and to accomplish this
he was willing to barter away all the interests of the south and west,
and even declared his desire to cripnle them. Gerard did not inform
girallee of the American position, but he regarded the whole matter as
settled. He would save for the United States the lower Mississippi
valley, and with the consent of Congress Spain should have the Flori-
das and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi. 1
On the question of the navigation of the Mississippi, Ver-
gennes at first took no decided stand but he thought that from the
settlements which the Americans were making on the Ohio, they would
insist on the right to navigate the river and declared that he would
be astonished if Spain should refuse this Privilege. He instructed
Gerard to find out the sentiments of both the United States and Spain
on this subject. If it appeared to him that Spain could justly claim
the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi Gerard was to prepare the
Americans to accent the decision, but if on the other hand, the Ameri-
cans appeared to have a right to navigate the river he should urge
their case on the Spanish court. Gerard's conduct of the negotia-
tions concerning Canada, the Mississippi valley and Florida met the an
proval of Vergennes. He believed that the United States never should
and never would undertake any conquests and he urged his minister to
try to convince Congress that it was not to the interest of the repub-
lic to extend its possessions. Any aggression, he contended, would
arouse local jealousies and would forfeit the protection of the powers
1. Gerard to Vergennes, Oct. 20, 1778. Etats-Unis, v, fol . *3-34, no.
2. Vergennes to Jerard, Oct. 36; 1773. Ibid, fol. 105-1] 2, no. 4?.

1 who alone could guarantee to them their political existence.'
In December, 1 778 Gerard held a conference with a deputation
of Congress, in which they discussed the claims and pretensions of the
Snanish court. The Americans informed Gerard that they had decided to
|
give Florida to Scain in case they conquered it, provided that country
'would furnish money to help them pay their debts. Gerard replied that
he had no right to treat in the interests of Spain, but he earnestly
I
urged them to limit their ambition and to be content with the territo-
2
ry they already possessed.
Later in the same month Gerard and Miralles held an inter-
view with another committee composed of the president of Congress and
I a delegate from New York and one from Virginia. Gerard argued for a
j
permanent line of separation between the United States and Spanish
possessions. He declared that all Europe was suspicious of the new
: nation and it was good policy for Congress to make clear its pacific
; intentions. The president of Congress and the delegate from Virgin-
I ia agreed that the dominions of the United states were already too
large to be well governed, and that they had no thought of further
I
conquests
.
Gerard's conduct of the question of the Floridas also re-
j ceived Vergennes' approbation and he expressed his satisfaction with
4
j the American position. The French minister had no vital interest in
Florida and to him it was only a prize with which to reward Spain for
her participation in the war. He believed that if Congress would turn
I over the Floridas to Spain, it w-uld go far to relieve her fears of
1. Vergennes to Gerard, Nov. 18, 1778. "tats-Unis, V, fol . 179-185,
no. 79.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, Dec. 12, 1778. Ibid, fol. 70l- rzl6.
?. Gerard to Vergennes, Dec. 19, 1778. Tbid, fol. 349-358, no. 47.
4. Vergennes to Gerard, Etats-Unis, VII, fol. 250-259, no. 101.

the new republic. At this time (February, 1779) he had also cone to
recognize the great interest which Spain had in obtaining the exclu-
sive navigation of the I ississippi and he suggested to Gerard that he
keep Congress favorable to this measure. 1 He admitted however that
Spain could hope to claim this only by the fortunes of war.
While Prance and Spain were discussing the disposition of
the territories not included in the thirteen colonies the Americans
were striving to extend their possessions by force of arms. Their
most important move was towards the Mississippi valley and already
they had established settlements in Kentucky and Tennessee. The Brit-
ish were not strong in this region and held only a few posts along the
Great Lakes and a few of the rivers. 2 The chief British commander in
this section was Henry Hamilton who directed raid after raid against
the American settlements beyond the Ohio. The American commander of
the western frontier was General Edward Hand who devoted his efforts
to protecting the Americans from the Indian raids directed by Hamilton
Galvez had from the first been a friend to the American
cause and an enemy to England. He allowed Captain Willing of Phila-
delphia to establish military headquarters in New Orleans, with a pub-
lic guardhouse, sentries and patrols. He permitted him to fit out ex-
peditions, to recruit men and to issue seditious proclamations to the
English settlers in Florida and along the Mississippi. He openly fur
nished ships to carry supplies up the Mississippi, and aided all sorts
4
of plans against the British in the west. New Orleans soon became
the entrepot of the United States, and by the permission of Galvez
1. Vergenr.es to Gerard. Etats-Unis, VII, fol. 250-259, no. 101
.
2. Van Tyne, American Revolution, 280.
3. Winsor, Westward Movement, 112.
4. See memorials in Public Record Office. Colonial Office, 5, Vol.
117 for descriptions of the acts of Galvez.
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goods were. shipped from there to any part of the country. 1 m 1773
when Tilling was planning an expedition against the English at Mobile
Galvez allowed hin to use New Orleans! as his base of supplies and ev-
en furnished him with a large sum of money.
2
The expedition of Major filling aroused great interest amon^
Spaniards and French alike. Galvez wrote to his ministry giving glow-
ing accounts of the bravery and success of the Americans.
2
Gerard re
ported the undertaking less favorably, describing it as by "a young
fool, who in a commercial expedition has drawn the English from a
great part of the IMississippi . Spain had all along maintained the
policy of granting secret aid to the Americans, and Galvez was doubt-
less acting in accord with his instructions. He was in close connect-
ion with the highest ministers of state and there is no evidence that
his policy met with disapproval.
The most important movement in the west was the expedition
of George Rogers Clark in 1773-79. By this expedition he occupied
without opposition a number of posts and gave the United States a real
basis on which to claim the Mississippi valley. The operations of the
L 4Americans were supported by Galvez and aroused great interest both in
France and Spain/ It was reported in Europe that a great body of
Americans had invaded the country of the Illinois and that the English
ere driven out. 6 On December 19 Gerard wrote Vergennes that the "sue-7.
1. Fortier, II, 57.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes. Espagne, 533, fol. 30, no. 98, p. 248.
?. Gerard to Vergennes, July 1£, 1778. Etats-Unis, IV, fol. 97-102,
no. 2?.
4. Gerard to Vergennes, July 25, 1778. Ibid, fol. 142-147, no. 41.
5. Archives Nationales, C. 13, Colonies, 30, Correspondence General,
no. 14.
5. Ibid, no. l r .
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cess of Colonel 'Querk' in the country. of the Illinois presents the
1Americans with a new bait", and that they believed that 'the Fnglish
had been totally driven from the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. 2
It was this success that gave the United States a claim to
the county of Illinois. The British still held Detroit and the Great
Lakes, but the region south of here was clear and beyond the Ohio the
frontiersmen of Kentucky and Tennessee defied all intruders. But the
Ploridas were still in the hands of the' British and the Spaniards
looked on with hungry eyes.
1. The French word is "anas".
2. Gerard to Vergenr.es, Dec. 19, 1778. Etats-Unis, V. fol. 349-358
no. 47. ' ' '
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CHAPTER IV.
FLORIDA BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE.
France alone was unequal to a struggle with Great Britain.
For generations these powers had been at war and in every contest the
final result had been victory for the island kingdom. And now, with
the puny aid of a few revolted provinces, it was inconceivable that
the Bourbon throne could free itself from the defeats and humiliations
of the past and triumph over its ancient rival. As Vergennes signed
the treaty that called into life a new nation, the memory of 1763
directed his mind and the spirit of revenge guided his hand. 1 His
rashness was self evident. France was exhausted by a century of mis-
rule at home and defeat abroad. Her finances were in wretched condi-
tion. Reform was urgent. Turgot declared that peace alone could work
a cure. 2 Her navy, ruined in the Seven Years War, had never recovered
its prestige and could not hope to fight the Britons on equal terms:
and this was to be a naval war, a struggle on many seas.
Alliance with Spain was the hope of France. Their united
fleets could well match that of Great Britain, and their combined re-
sources were not inferior to those of the enemy. Yet without the as-
surance of Spanish aid Vergennes had signed a treaty which meant war.
The year before , Florida Blanca had declared his readiness for the con-
- i no -test and had promised to back France if hostilities should begi .
1. "If we reflect on the present war there are two circumstances in
ifhich France and Scain are interested. Is it a matter of indifference
to the two crowns whether the rebellious provinces return under the
foke of Great Britain or not? T,rould it be well to help an enemy when
fie have the power to enfeeble her? England is the riv^l and natural
Wiemy of the house of Bourbon in both France and Spain." Trergennes.
Semoire au Roi, July 23, 1777. Approved by king. Fspagne, 585, no.
56, p. 95.
2. Turgot to Vergennes, April 6, 1776* Doniol, Histoire, I, 295.
•
Ossun to Vergennes, Sent. 8, 1770. Espagne, 586, io? t no. 7? .

Trusting Spanish fidelity Vergennes had pushed his war policy.
Spain had other aims to accomplish. She understood full
well the advantage of her position. Peace or war, each promised great
rewards. Peace, and Great Britain would give her handsome gratuities;
war, and France would assure her magnificent conquests. Prom either
she could exact her pound of flesh. Conscious of her position, she
determined to remain neutral while friend and foe were exhausting
themselves. It was Britain's game to keep her tranquil while Prance
frantically sought her assistance. The friendship of Prance and Spain
dated back to the reign of Louis XIV, when the Grand Monarque placed
his grandson on the throne of the Hapsburgs and this friendship had
been cemented by treaties and family compacts. Together they had
borne the humiliations and losses of the Seven Years war, and SDain
could never forget her former possessions while her rival's guns
watched over the gates to the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Mexico.
Against these sentimental motives of friendship and hatred
there stood the solid advantages and rosy expectations of peace. In
war Spain was open to attack on all sides. Her extended colonies were
a ready prey to the powerful navy of England, which in the preceding
struggle had made prizes of the rich city of Havana and of far off Ma-
nilla. The loss of her colonial possessions was a fear ever present
ith Spain and she was determined to take no action that would endan-
ger them.
1
\e Florida Blanca expressed to Montmorin, "Spain has a
vast empire unprotected by sea, which will be in great danger from
English aggression." To Spanish statesmen there appeared another dan-
ger in fighting in the cause of rebellious colonies. Even recently
ier own possessions had been subject to rebellion. nnly a few years
I
before Louisiana just across the river fro* the Americans had been a-
Jlaze with revolutionary ideas and had broken forth in open revolt.
L. Florida Blanca to Aranda, Jan. 13, 1778. Fspagne, 5^ q , no. 21.
' ontmorin to Vergennes, Jan. 23, 177Q. Ibid, 9, no. 5Q

This rebellion had been sternly repressed, but what effect would the
success of English revolutionists have on the restless inhabitants of
Spanish America" mhis was a question which the Spanish ministry real-
;
ly asked and Florida Blanca informed Montmorin that his king feared
the recognition of a new republic would set a dangerous example to his
1
own possessions. A still more serious question was whether the Amer-
: ican states would be more peaceful neighbors as dependencies of the
British empire or as an independent nation. Florida Blanca feared
that if they gained their independence they would be animated bv a
spirit of conquest and aggression, and between Great Britain and the
United States he declared there was "a sort of equality of enmity
which makes it difficult to prefer either of them." If the colonies
should succeed in their efforts, he declared his desire that they be
placed in dependence on the Bourbon crown and kept in a state of an-
archy such as Germany.' It was in vain that Vergennes pointed out the
danger of an accretion of British strength in the New World; it was
useless to plead that such was the constitution of the new republic
that it would more likely be a prey to internal quarrels than a danger
I
to its neighbors. Bv Vergennes' arguments that there was a placid
f
inertia in all constitutional democracies that inhibited conquests,
i Florida Blanca still remained unconvinced.
In SDite of these objections of Florida Blanca Vergennes
felt sure that Spain would soon take part in the struggle, and his as-
surance seemed justified when, on the arrival of the Mexican fleet in
April, 1773, the Spanish ministry became belligerent in speech.
1. Montmorin to Vergennes, March ?0, 1779* Espagne, 593, 25, no. 63,
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Feb. 2, 1778. Fspagne, 588, 11, no. 80.
3. Montmorin to Vergennes, larch 20, 1778. Ibid, 19, no. 157.
4. Vergennes to Montmorin, Anril 3, 1778. ^spagne, 539, 27, no. 4.
5. Montmorin to Vergennes. Fspagne, 587, fol. 50.

!
In spite of Montmorin's high hopes, Florida Blanca still hung back 1
and resisted every effort to push him into war. 1 This rebuff did not
discourage Vergennes and he prepared to offer liberal inducements to
effect his purpose. Florida Blanca became more obstinate at every
overture and to Montmorin's insinuations declared that France acted
not from motives of nrudence in forming the alliance with Congress,
gbut solely from motives of hate. Vergennes did not despair. Knowing
Spain's cupidity he believed that an offer of valuable acquisitions
would decide the issue in his favor. Strong in this belief he wrote
that while Louis did not desire any territory for himself, His Majesty
was still disposed to contribute everything possible to the advantages
of Spain, and suggested that Jamaica, the Floridas, and the right of
fishing on the coast of Newfoundland might appear valuable in her
eyes. Still he was careful to state that France could make no offer
of Florida, for this was a matter in which Congress was vitally inter-
ested, and the province could not be disposed of without its consent.
Spain, however, he declared, was the true judge of her own interests
and could decide how best to attain her ends.
Further evidence of the good intentions of Vergennes to helD
Spain obtain Florida and a fishing station in the St. 7,awrence, is
shown in his instructions to Gerard,- the first French minister to A-
merica. The question of Jamaica and of a fishing post in Canada he
olaced in the field of European diplomacy, but the disposition of Flor-
ida he regarded as different. Knowing that the Americans were plan-
ning for its conquest, and fearing they would hesitate to surrender
1. Florida Blanca curtly refused an offer of ten vessels to protect
her commerce. Montraorin to Vergennes. Esnagne, 588, no. 15?; "bar-
ton, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 491.
2. Doniol, Histoire, II, 795.
Vergennes to I ontmorin, March 17, 1779. Fsnagne, 588, f ol . 25, no.
150 .

it, he instructed Gerard to procure at least Pensacola and that part
of the coast that would be regarded as most "convenient" by Spain.
These offers did not tempt Spain for Florida Blanca hated America as
bitterly as he did Great Britain and the only motive that could in-
duce him to 30 to war was the assurance of immense profits. He no
longer limited his ambition to Florida and Jamaica but began plotting
for the recovery of Gibraltar and placed that as an essential condi-
tion for Spain's participation in the war.
Vergennes employed every effort to win over the Spanish
court. He reminded it of the British ambition to get control of New
Orleans and other Spanish possessions in America, and pointed out the
dangers to her colonies if England should strengthen her own nower in
the New fforldj but if the United States, he argued, are free they will
remain quiet with the inertia which is characteristic of all constitu-
tional democracies. The new nation is more likely to be a subject of
internal quarrels than to be dangerous to her neighbors. He was also
prepared to offer still further inducements and again instructed Mont-
morin to sound Florida Blanca in regard to the conquests Spain would
4
exact as the price of war. To this query likewise Spain refused to
give any satisfactory answer. Vergennes had still another recourse by
which he hoped to force Spain into war. At the outbreak of hostilities
D'Estaing was sent with a fleet to aid the Americans and he was in-
structed that if he could form an agreement with Congress by which he
could seize some English island in the north as a French fishing es-
4
tablishment he should try to secure one also for Spain. Florida
1. Etats-Unis, III, fol. 159-164, no. 77.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Feb. 17, 1778. Espagne, 588, fol. 21, no.
175, p. 441.
. Vergennes to Lontmorin, April 10, 1773. Espagne, 539, 29, no. 15.
4. Espagne, 533, fol. 2^, no. 177, p. 4'7 1
.

Blanca war, inforned of these orders to D'Estaing and was^aleo told
that if he wished to send any expedition to Jamaica, Pensacola, or to
iany of the Enp^ish poaaeaeiona in the Gulf of Mexico, French shios and
troops were ready to aid in the undertaking.
Tn regard to a fishing island near Newfoundland, Florida
Blanca answered curtly that by the treaty of 176* Spain had renounced
her pretensions to that region, and that she would not consider then
I again. /hen he was told of Gerard's instructions to look after the
interests of Spain in America and to obtain as favorable concessions
for her as possihle, he replied that Spain had nothing to contest with
the Americans and that the limits between the Spanish possessions and
the English colonies were marked by the Miaaiaaippi which was a defi-
nite enough frontier. Kontmorin then suggested that if Spain wanted
Florida she should make a convention with the United States, to which
Florida Blanca answered that the United States had offered Florida to
the Catholic king two years before. In a word, as Montmorin said,
: Florida Blanca objected to everything France had done and disdained
1
! every offer that France could make.
Although the Spanish court under the control of Florida
'Blanca was determined to keep peace, the Spanish ambassador at Paris,
: the Count d'Aranda, was equally bent on war. On the l?th of April he
I
sent a communication to the Spanish court, which ably discussed the
whole question of the territories as far as they concerned Spain and
France. In regard to the Floridas he declared that the Americans
would conquer them and make them a part of their domains and Canada
would also be annexed, as the Canadians, while most inclined to return
2
to France, preferred liberty to Engliah rule. He did not, however,
1. kontmorin to Vergennea, April 10, 1773. Espagne, 589, fol . 2?, no.
15, p. 57.
2. Aranda to Florida Blanca. Ibid, no. 24, do. 88-89.

hint that France had any designs on Canada, but declared quite frank-
ly that Lafayette was to be sent there by the Americans because it wad
thought that the Canadians would accept a Frenchman more readily as a
conqueror
.
Vergennes was bitterly disappointed at Spain's inactivity
and offered still greater concessions to secure her aid. By June he
had added to Florida and the fisheries Jamaica and Gibraltar 1 and
hinted that in the conquest of Florida the United States would aid.
He feared, however, that the occupation of the Floridas might be com-
plicated me act on the part of Congress, and to avoid this he
"ft
recommended SpainA nake a treaty with the Americans guaranteeing her
2the possession of these provinces.
By the end of June Florida Blanca had declared against war.
He felt there were too many difficulties in the way of covering Gi-
braltar, while as to the Floridas, although he felt that Spain should
have them to keep the English out of the Gulf of Mexico, still he
would be content with the possession of Mobile and Pensacola. These
ports and even all the coast of Florida, he said, should be granted
his master without war.
It was the earnest desire of Charles III to keep his country
in peace, and yet he felt keenly the dangers to which his old time al-
ly was exposed in her war with the British empire. While France was
urging Spain to war, Spain was striving to lead France back to peace.
In these efforts Florida Blanca was encouraged by the British crown,
which wanted to keep the Soanish forces neutral as long as possible,
and it is by no means improbable that the first advances for mediation
4
came from London. It was not long until Montmorin discovered the
1. Vergennes to Montmorin. Fspagne, 539, no. 127, p. 313.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes. Ibid, fol . 318.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, June 22, 1778. Ibid, fol.34, no. 155, p. 335
4. Doniol, Histoire, III, 47^.

bent of Spanish diplomacy and in order to keep the court of Madrid
favorable Vergennes felt it necessary to encourage these negotiations.
With both belligerents indicating their willingness for mediation
Florida Planca made in July his first suggestions for a settlement on
the basis of independence for the United states and some minor conces-
sions to France. 1 So certain was Charles ITT that these conditions
would be accented by Great Britain that he suggested that the French
fleet remain in shelter until a truce should be declared,
2
but it was
not long until news arrived of fresh English enterprises and aggres-
sions on Spanish commerce, and the Catholic king felt that his efforts
were futile. ~
V
i
-Vergennes had foreseen the result of Spanish mediation and
was- prepared to" take advantage of its failure. At the first intima-
tion of British trifling Montraorin came forward with a demand for ac-
tion, guaranteed by the terms of the Pacte de Famille, and intimated
that an unfavorable response would mean the dissolution of this alli-
4
ance to the great injury of both nations. Charles ITT deeply woundec
by the failure of his negotiations and severely disappointed at not
receiving the Floridas, which he regarded as his due, listened favora-
bly to the ^leadings of the French ambassador. Montmorin felt exult-
ant at his success and on August l? wrote Vergennes that if France
5would guarantee Gibraltar and the Floridas, the alliance was secure.
Lord Grantham, the British minister at Madrid, quickly dis-
cerned the drift of Spanish inclinations and in alarm at once renewed
1. Montmorin to Vergennes, July 1, 1778. Fspagne, 590, 38, no. 20.
2. Doniol, Histoire, III, 472.
. Ibid, 509.
4. Vergennes to Montmorin, July 1778. Espagne, 590, 49, no. 51
J
Ibid, 59, no. 72.
5. Ibid, fol. 49, no. 89.

the Idea of radiation. 1 This time Charles war, wary and replied that
he would not again offer his good offices unless Great Britain formal-
ly requested him to do so. Grantham this time appeared in earnest,
and in September Weymouth, the Pritish secretary of state for the
Southern department, requested Charles ITT for his mediation. 13 In
spite of Eontmorin's objections, Charles decided to accept. The
French ambassador had written that Grantham at Madrid and Maraefield at
London were seeking only to amuse Snain,^ and now he felt that their
efforts were entirely successful. Vergennes, however, agreed at once
for he saw that if France maintained her position of disinterestedness
she must welcome every suggestion of peace. Montmorin soon learned
that the Spanish inclinations decidedly favored the detlr-ns of his
court, for Spain was as much interested as France in cripnling the an-
cient enemy, and assured him that it would not consent to leave the
British in possession of any important stronghold near the American
4possessions of the two crowns. With this assurance the minister of
Louis XVI was satisfied, and Spain entered upon her mediation.
Charles decided to ask France for two sorts of propositions,
the one general to be submitted to the British, and the other giving
5
definitely the absolute conditions of the French court. In accord-
ance with this request Vergennes drew up two nrojects of peace. He
declared that the one thing that Louis should insist on was the recog-
nition of the absolute independence of the United States, and in this
recognition should be included such parts of the United States as were
jthen in possession of the British, as !Tew York, Long Island, Rhode Is-
land. Furthermore France would not ask any possessions on the main-
1. Espagne, 590, 49, no. 191, p. ?08.
S. Doniol, Histoire, III, 513.
. Ibid, 48"".
4. Montmorin to Vergennes, Sept. 29, 1778. Espagne, 590, no. 188, p. 458.
p' Doniol, Histoire, III, 514
.

land of North America as- she had formally renounced them in her trea-
ty with the United
-States. Although Vergennes would not make peace
if England were left, in possession of any part of the thirteen states,
he nevertheless saw no objection to leaving in British hands Canada
and Nova Scotia, hut Florida he thought should he given to Spain.
On October 17 Florida Blanca submitted to Montmorin a draunhl.
of the proposed terms of peace. Their principal provision war for the
absolute independence of the United States, though without giving any
definition of boundaries, while other terms were moderate and of minor
importance. Two days later Florida Blanca explained fully to Montmo
rin his ideas of the settlement. They provided for the independence
of the United States with' the exception of some part of the west coart
fhich should go to Spain.' On the question of Canada Kontr&or in c on -
tended that if the English were left in possession of Halifax they
would be in a position to interrupt the commerce between* the United
States and Spain as well as to threaten the possessions of the two
crowns in the Antilles. To this Florida Blanca replied that the Eng-
lish would be so enfeebled by the war that they would no longer be
v.
dangerous to the peace or prosperity of the two crowns, while their
possession of Canada would be a constant source of jealousy on the
part of the United States and keep them loyal to France and Spain.
Florida Blanca had not yet formed an opinion as to leaving the British
in possession of the posts they still held in the United States but
was inclined to agree with the position of France that they should be
given up. '
(
\
On these propositions of Spain Vergennes expressed himself
1. Vergennes to Montmorin. Fspagne, 591, fol. 62, pp.
2. Doniol, III, b?'7 .
. Montmorin to Vergennes. Fspagne, 591, fol. 60, no. 22, p. 54.
*. Montmorin to Vergennes, Oct. 1, 1778. Ibid, fox. 61, no. 35.

clearly to Montmorin. "All my correspondence for several months" he
wrote, "has proven to Florida Blanca that we do not differ from him
in principles.... re ask only independence for the thirteen states of
j America, without including any of the English possessions which have
I not taken part in the rebellion. T7e do not desire that a new republic
shall arise which shall become the exclusive mistress of this immense
continent." If such' were the case he feared it would become a hard
taskmaster for the other nations of the world. "The dominant spirit
in this republic", he continued, "is that of trade, and it is not bad
;
that it exists for it will be less dangerous to the republic's neigh-
bors." Although he believed that centuries must elapse before the
I United States could play an important role, yet he felt it necessary
jto keep the British in possession of Canada to "fix the jealousy of
this people", and "to make them perceive the necessity of assuring
themselves of guarantors, allies and protectors." 1 On the question of
j the Floridas too Vergennes agreed that they should go to Spain, 1 for
i he regarded them as distinct from the United States and in no sense
! connected with the other provinces.
Fere the likeness ends. With Spain independence was to be
i subordinated to her own ambition, with France it was the prime condi-
tion of war. Spain regarded the new republic as a rival and enemy to
ibe restricted in its boundaries and subjected to the restraints of her
ambition/' Vergennes regarded the United States as a friend and ally
1 to be treated generously and to be given limits that would, permit a
1. Vergennes to Montmorin, Oct. ?0, 1778. Fspagne, 691, 67, no. 43.
;" '.'e can not think of letting any of the states ... .remain in dependence
! on Great Britain -without contradicting our first principles." Ver-
gennes to Montmorin, Nov. 2, 1778. Fspagne, 591, no. B8, p. 118.
2. "It is only too apparent that Spain regards the United States as
before long to become an enemy, and that in consequence, far from suf-
fering them to approach its possessions it will omit nothing to keep
them away, and particularly from the banks of the Mississippi." Mont-
morin to Vergennes, Nov. 12, 1778. Fspagne, 591, no. 70, p. 169.

healthy development. While he agreed that Canada should rerain with
Great Britain, he did not do so from any spirit of hostility to the
United States but because he felt that such an addition to their
bounds was neither a just nor reasonable exaction from the British em-
pire and not warranted by the military events of the war. Fe stead-
fastly refused, however, to admit Spain's demand to guarantee Canada
for Great Britain, 1 but insisted rather that the northern boundaries
of the United States should be pushed far enough north to insure their
safety. A further difference of opinion came to the surface in regard
to the territories held by the British array within the bounds of the
thirteen states. Vergennes had insisted that they came within the
guarantee of independence. Florida Blanca hesitated to oppose this
view but refused to accent it. On this question, however, the French
minister at once made himself clear. " T"e can not think", he wrote,
3f letting any of the states, either New York or Rhode Island, remaii
in dependence on Great Britain, without contradicting our first prin-
3 '
ciples .
"
1. "It will be difficult to guarantee to England Canada and Nova Sco-
tia. Vergennes to Montmorin, Nov. 2, 1773. Espagne, 591, no. 68, p.
118.
2. "This morning Florida Blanca told me plainly that he thought that
the two crowns ought to guarantee to England, the possession of Canad?
and Nova Scotia.... I represented that perhaps it would not be with-
out inconvenience to leave to the English such a port as Halifax where
they could annoy our commerce with the United States and threaten the
possessions of the two crowns in the Antilles and the Gulf of Mexico.
I added that it perhaps would be difficult to get the Americans to
consent to these conditions. Florida Blanca replied to the first that
the English would be so enfeebled by the loss of the greater part of
their possessions that they would cease to be an object of fear....
As to the difficulty of getting the colonies to consent that England
should keep Canada and Nova Scotia he merely replied that they had
need of peace and must consent to the wishes of France and Spain."
pontmorin to Vergennes, Oct. 1, 1779. Fsnagne, 591, no. ^1, p. 34.
5. Vergennes to Montmorin, Nov. 2, 1778. Espagne, 591, no. 68 j p. 118.
Again Vergennes wrote, "It is necessary to renounce peace if the Eng-
lish make a condition of keeping New York or any place or territory
dependent on the thirteen united provinces." Vergennes to Montmorin,
Oct. 17, 1778. Ibid, 63, no. 25.

This difference of opinion was not detained to agreement
.
But other causes were forcing Spain into war. Great Britain had asked
Charles III for his mediation, but to his proposals she returned no
j answer. This second show of disrespect aroused anger in the mind of
I the Spanish monarch. He had come to realize, too, that Great Britain
I
would never willingly surrender to him the Floridas, and her possession
of Gibraltar, where hung ever increasing fleets, was
. assurance of ag-
gravation. New reports arrived of British usurpations in America. Tn
the Gulf of Honduras and the Bay of Campeche they were daily becoming
1
i more insolent, and it was believed that they were laboring to bring
2
about an uprising in Louisiana.
In the meantime the condition of France was becoming desner-
ate. News had arrived on October 2^ of the ill success of D'Estaing
and the French exchequer could with difficulty withstand the expenses
of the war. Under these conditions Vergennes felt he must have Span-
j
ish aid if he was to continue the war. He ridiculed the idea that the
!
United States would ever become dangerous as neighbors of Spain and
declared that the Spanish monarchy had much more to fear from the ag-
|
gressions of Great Britain.
While Spain was hesitating France was weakening. The Eng-
j
lish were gaining consistently at sea and news had arrived of the A-
j merican reverses in Rhode Island. The failure of D'Estaing had still
i
further clouded French prospects. Under the circumstances Vergennes
A
resolved to offer still greater inducements to Spain. To the Amen-
;
can commissioners at Paris he said nothing of the demands of Spain,
but to Gerard he wrote that he was willing to leave England in pos-
1. l.ontmorin to Vergennes, Dec . 24, 1778. Espagne, 591 , BO, no. 154.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Nov. 4, 1778. Ibid, 67, no. 54.
5. Doniol, Histoire, III, 561-564; Fspagne, 591, no. 96.
4. Doniol, Histoire, III, 592.

session of Canada and if necessary Nova Scotia. Flor-ida, or at, leant
Pensacola, he wished to go to Spain, but he expressed astonishment
that Florida Blanca should wish to keen the United States from the
free navigation of the 1 ississipni river/
Florida Blanca was now convinced that war was inevitable
though his king plead for one more effort in behalf of peace. T7ith
visions of conquest Spain's ambitions increased. Late in November he
definitely formulated his demands. They included the conquest of Ja-
maica, of Florida, of Honduras and of Gibraltar. Besides this the
Spanish minister expressed the desire to drive the British and the A-
I
|
mericans from both banks of the Mississippi . In no case however he
declared would Spain consent to enter into any treaty with the United
rz.
States
.
Vergennes declared to the king that the demands of Spain
were "gigantesaue" , but such was the condition of French resources
4
j
that he must agree to them. On December PA he made his reply to
|
these demands, in which he agrees to the Sranish pretensions to recov-
i er Gibraltar, I inorca, Jamaica, and the Floridas, a,nd also agreed to
|
help drive out the ^nglish who had established themselves in the Gulf
i 5
of Honduras and the Bay of Campeche. It is noteworthy however that
j
he made no reference to Spanish pretensions on the Mississippi and
I boldly asserted that the engagements of France to secure the independ-
ence of the United States should be placed above every other consider-
tion.
On the next day Vergennes wrote to Gerard in America inform-
1. Vergennes to Gerard. Ftats-Unis, V, no. 43
.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Nov. 20, 1778. Fspagne, 591, no. 72, p. 215.
3. Montmorin to Vergennes, Nov. 20, 1778. Ibid, fol. K7-7P
.
4. Doniol, Histoire, III, 589.
5. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 24, 1778. Fspagne, 591, no. 154, p.42P.

ing him of the state of negotiations between France and Spain, The
position of Florida had been decided in favor of Spain, and the Brit-
ish were to be left in possession of Canada and Nova Scotia. The out-
come of the proposed invasion of Canada was not yet known but he ap-
proved the efforts of Gerard to prevent it. As for Newfoundland he
was still undecided what action to take, but was willing to leave it
disposition to circumstances and the fortunes of war.
1
At the beginning of 1779 it was apparent that the attempt at
mediation had fallen through and that Spain would soon be in alliance
with France. In America she was vitally interested in the recovery of
Pensacola and Mobile with as much of the coast of Florida as she could
get, while in Europe her great ambition was the capture of Gibraltar.
The guarantee of these she held was an essential condition of her go-
ing to war. Pensacola and Mobile she regarded as necessary in ord^r
to control the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico and to protect her own
possessions in this region. No less necessary to Spanish safety was
the possession of Gibraltar, the citadel of Spain, while other desir-
able acquisitions, though not essential, were Jamaica and Minorca.^
Montmorin however expressed the belief that Spain would demand nothing
contrary to the alliance between France and the United States.'
Although it was understood what Spain desired, this power
would not submit a plan of convention and to the importunities of
Montmorin, Florida Blanca merely replied that the king had not yet
consented to war. Spain was hesitating until she could be sure that
her demands would be granted. Vergennes had, in the meantime, drawn
up a project for a convention and submitted it to Spain. This plan
granted the demands of Spain, but the fourth article provided that the
1. Doniol, Histoire, III, 61^.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Jan. 4, 1777. Fsoagne, 592, fol . 1, no. 2,
n . 5
.
Montmorin to Vergennes, Jan. 1?, 1779. Ibid, fol.s, no.2P, p.P4.

war should continue until the independence of the United States was
secured.
1
To this Srain objected as out of place and useless: out of
place because Spain could make her arrangements with the United State:
and useless because the independence of this country was the first and
g
only cause of the war.
The discussion of a convention between the two countries
dragged on for another month. Florida Blanca, in rejecting the one
submitted by Vergennes, promised to draw up one himself but had offer-
ed excuse after excuse for delay. He complained that the Americans
were not aggressive enough in conducting the war. He feared that they
would seek to annex Canada and it was desirable that this province
should remain in English hands. To all these objections Vergennes re-
turned the strongest assurances of his willingness to meet the desires
of Spain and declared that his minister in Congress would labor to de
ter the Americans from an invasion of Canada and would urge them to a
more vigorous policy against Great Britain. Montmorin communicated
to the Spanish court the instructions to Gerard relative to Florida
and showed him copies of despatches from America explaining how these
instructions had been carried out. These assurances on the part of
France did not satisfy Florida Blanca. He objected that France was
less anxious for the advantages of Spain than for the independence of
the United States. Vergennes had declared that this independence was
the prime object of the war but in order to satisfy Spain he offered
to express the two clauses in the same terms. ^ Spain still dallied
1. Espagne, 592, no. 105; Doniol, Histoire, III, P4Q .
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Feb. 28, 1779. Espagne, 592, fol. 14, no.
140, p. 320.
3. Vergennes to Florida Blanca, March IS, 1779. Espagne, 595, no. 35,
p. 81
.
4. Montmorin to Vergennes, Feb. 28, 1779. Espagne, 592, fol. 15, no.
141, p. 324.
5. Doniol, Histoire, III, 654.
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with the terras of the convention and the attitude of Vergennes became
daily more importunate. He wrote letter after letter to Montmorin ex-
plaining the pressing needs of France and the necessity of immediate
1
: aid from. Spain.
To the offer of Vergennes to express in the same terras the
articles on the advantage* to be given Spain and that on the independ-
t
—
ence of the United States Spain interposed another objection. Florida
|
Blanca declared that Spain never would recognize the independence of
j
the American republic until England had done so. He gave as his rea-
^
son the fear that such recognition would set a bad example to the
|
Spanish colonies in America. He expressed his willingness, however,
l 2
I to continue giving secret aid to Congress. ^ To this argument Moritmo-
|
rin replied that the recognition of independence would not be as bad
an example as the giving of secret aid. The manoeuvres of Spain a-
roused in the mind of Vergennes the greatest indignation and he wrote
j
bitterly of a "minister who most often puts caprice in place of rea-
:
son." He likewise denounced the objections of Spain to recognize the
1 independence of the United States. "Nothing is gratuitous on the part.
! of Spain", he wrote. "We know that she wants concessions from the A-
merioans, as well as from us." He did not oppose this but he regarded
i
it as absurd that France should guarantee possessions to a nation as
j
powerful as Spain. He vigorously declared that France would not lower
1 her honor or dignity by entering into a convention nullifying the
treaty of February, 1778 and that if Spain joined France she must d<-
3
; with thatunderstanding
.
Spain had exhausted her objections to the alliance and fi-
nally in April began to formulate her demands. Her first proposition
II. Doniol, Histoire, III, 634.
2. Kontmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1779. T7 Spagne, 59^, fol. 25, no.
68, p. 157.
7. F.spagne, F9 7
,
r.o . ^ 1 . Doniol, Histoire, III, P7T
.

was that the two powers should agree not to lay" clown arms until the
English had surrendered Gibraltar. All other conquests, however, were
to be subject to the fortunes of war. This project did not definitely
recognize the independence of the United States but made it a subject
of negotiation (Art. 4). Article five granted the same advantages to
Prance as had the convention previously submitted by Vergennes. It
provided for the abolition of the articles of the peace of Utrecht,
restricting Frarfce from fortifying Dunkirk and such other places as
she wished to fortify; the expulsion of the English from Newfoundland,
the possession of St. Domingo, and Senegal, besides various commercial
advantages. Article seven proposed for Spain the recovery of Gibral-
tar, the possession of Mobile and the restitution of Pensacola and the
coast of Florida along the "Bahama Canal" so that no foreign power
could get any foothold there, the expulsion of the English from Hondu-
ras and Campeche, and the restitution of the isle of Minorca.
1
In the discussion of this convention Montmorin expressed his
surprise at Spain's demand for the restitution of Minorca, for before
this she had apparently attached little importance to it. Florida
Blanca replied to his objections that this acquisition would be of litj
tie importance if the others were granted. To the extent of the coast
of Florida desired by Spain Montmorin also objected. Before this Flor
ida Blanca had asked only for Mobile and Pensacola, but now he desired
all the shore around the south end of the peninsula and some distance
up the east coast. The Spanish minister however insisted that all
2
this was essential to assure the navigation of the Gulf of Mexico.
From the negotiations preceding this convention Montmorin decided that
1. Montmorin to Vergennes, March 70, 1779. Espagne, 59!*, fol . 25, no
68, p. 157. Text of this convention in Doniol, Transcripts, Nouvelles
Acquisitions francaises, 189. Doniol, Histoire, III, SO?.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, April 17, 1779. Espagne, 59?, fol. 51, no
112, p. 255.

it did not seriously sacrifice the intererts of France and accepted
Florida Blanca's suggestion that they sign at -once. '
The articles relating to America did not contradict the pre
vious understanding as to the settlement of affairs in the New World.
Congress had expressed its willingness for Spain to have all the Flor
idas and could make no objection to this article. There was nothing
in the convention to imply Spanish control over the Mississippi river
and valley and no limitations on the boundaries of the United States.
The provision that France should not^ lay down arms until the restitu-
tion of Gibraltar whs secured has been the most criticised by American
'
, . 1historians, on- the ground that it bound the United States to continue
a war in the interests of Spain. This criticism seems unjust. The
treaty between France and the United States provided that neither pow-
er should make peace until independence was secured. No treaty, how-
ever, .should be signed without the consent of both nations. This pro-
vision was Inserted merely for the protection of both powers, and
there is no evidence that France ever considered it as a means to fur-
ther her own or Spain's ambitions, and never held the United States
bound to help regain Gibraltar. Not only is the idea that the United
States was bound to help recover Gibraltar not borne out by the evi-
dence, but it is impractical and absurd, for it must be clearly recog-
nized that Congress had the means to act only on the defensive and
ith the expulsion of the British it could accomplish nothing further.
France herself received no adeouate compensation for the
promises she gave Snain. The right to fortify Dunkirk was no equiva-
lent for the guarantee of Gibraltar and the other mutual concessions
bore almost the same degree of relative importance. In spite of this
Vergennes approved the action of Ilontmorin in signing the convention
and looked eagerly to the time when the French navy, reinforced by
1. Bancroft, v, 308; Van Tyne, American Revolution, 512.

that of Spain, should sweep the British from the seas. Spain also re
alized that this convention meant war, and at once prepared her fleet
for action and ordered it to unite with the navy of France. 1 Before
war was declared she commenced hostilities, and began with vigor her
first campaign, which she believed would end the struggle. The two
crowns planned a grand attack along the whole line of the British em-
pire while against them was gathering the vast power of England for a
desperate struggle. And across the Atlantic the new republic was la-
boring to protect its integrity from the grasping ambition of Spain.
1. Doniol, Histoire, ITT, 752.

CHAPTER V.
GERARD AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST
News of the signing of the treaty of alliance with Prance
produced a feeling of joy and hope throughout the United States.
There were sore who objected to accenting aid from the ancient enemy
of the English race but their expressions of dissatisfaction were soon
stifled. The intervention of Prance, however, was to prove the source
of a new anxiety to patriotic Americans. During the months from the
autu-n of 1773 until the close of 1770 Congress was forced to work out
a policy in regard to the final settlement of the war. Many problems
were to come up: the extent of territory to be given the new nation,
the navigation of the Mississippi, and the Newfoundland fisheries, and
all three were closely connected and presented themselves together.
The decision of them was the occasion for bitter feeling and for the
formation of hostile factions within Congress, upon which the adroit
and ingratiating intrigue of the French minister, Gerard, played with
varying success.
Gerard had come to America with definite instructions as to
the policy of France toward that part of British America not in rebel-
lion. The idea of Vergennes to leave Canada in the hands of Great
Britain has been explained, and how circumstances moulded his plans
has already been described. Florida the French minister wished to go
to Spain and by the end of 1778 Congress had practically agreed to
this proposition. Not included in Gerard's instructions, however, was
the nuestion of the navigation of the Mississippi river, and the ow-
nership of the territory of Eastern Louisiana. Tt has already been
told that I iralles demanded these for Spain and that Gerard opposed
lis demands as unreasonable and of such a character that Congress
would not accept them, but he reported to his court that ^j^Pgj-^

would seize the course of the lississippi as far as the Ohio the ne-
1
got iat ions would be simplified.
Gerard had been received in great state by Congress and soor
entered into very intimate relations with many of its members. It was
not until the winter of 1779-79 that the policy of the French court
became apparent, and even then, on the question of the conquest of
Canada, Gerard had managed not to commit himself. He had been in-
structed not to incur the ill will of the Americans by any decided op-
position to their projects, and under these circumstances he had given
a half hearted approval to the expedition against Canada and then had
allowed affairs to take their course.
By November, 1779 Gerard felt well enough acquainted with
Congress to push the policy of his court and to urge the interests of
Spain. He insinuated his influence into Congress under the pretext of
giving advice and began by urging a conciliatory policy towards the
Spanish court. From Miralles he surmised the ambitions of Florida
Blanca and in turn passed them on to Congress. He did not discuss
matters with the whole body of Congress and official business he ordi-
narily transacted with a committee, usually the committee of foreign
affairs
.
In October, 1773 Gouverneur Morris of the committee of for-
eign affairs cane to Gerard to seek his help for the invasion of Cana-
da. It was at this interview that Gerard first suggested the inter-
ests of Spain in the Floridas and the west, and Morris at once reveal-
ed the existence of a sectional feeling. For the annexation of Canada
ie put forth his most effective arguments. Toward the territories in
the west and south he manifested utter indifference and even hostili-
ty. He declared that he in common with many members of Congress was
opposed to any extension of boundaries toward the southwest and fa-
1. Etats-Unis, V, no. 35.

- 9<T
vored giving Spain exclusive control over the Mississippi in order to
hold the frontier population in dependence on the east. 1
In December Gerard had an interview with a committee of
Congress, composed of John Jay, the president, and several delegates.
^ne of the members, he describes^ as coming from Virginia and another
from New York. Gerard declared that he succeeded in convincing Jay
and the Virginia delegate of the wisdom of renouncing all conquests
but the delegate from New York became angry at the suggestion. Gerard
soon perceived that there were many influential men interested in the
Mississippi valley and he declared that the question must be handled
carefully. The western interests, he wrote, were centered in three
regions, the Illinois and two projected establishments on the ~hio,
and all these, he thought, would unite in opposition at the first sug
2gestion of giving up any part of the west. Gerard had won, however,
to the idea of giving up Florida and the Mississippi two of the most
influential members of Congress, and the committee of foreign affairs
was instructed to do nothing without his advice.
Soon however a party arose in Congress opposed to the wes-
tern policy of the French, but Gerard still felt he had a majority on
his side. The opposition declared the navigation of the Mississippi
indispensable to the development of the country and urged the inter-
ests of the people settled in the Illinois country, in the land of the
Hatchez and in 7est Florida. These people, they held, must not be a-
bandor.ed, for they formed a great body of the American population and
should be admitted to the Confederation.
To this argument Gerard replied that mere personal interests
1. Gerard to Vergennes, Oct. 20, 1778. Ftats-TTnis, V, fol . PS-S4, no.
•7 -7
2. Gerard to Vergennes, Dec. 14, 1778. Ftats-Unis, V, fol . 301-516,
no. US.
3. Gerard to Vergennes, Jan. 28, 1779. Ftats-Unis, VIT, fol . 129-155,
no. 52.

should not be considered when the welfare of the republic wap at stak*
In this discussion for the first time he raised doubts as to the va-
lidity of the claims of Congress to territory not included by British
law in the limits of the thirteen states. The United states had no
better claim, he declared, to this territory than had Spain if she
should wish to conquer it. Furthermore he insisted that such preten-
sions were absolutely foreign to the alliance, and the king of France
would not prolong the war a single day in order to maintain them. 1 If
Congress persisted in its desire for conquest, it would incur the en-
mity of Spain, and when tine came for peace it would find itself
crushed between the hatred of the English and the jealousy of the
Spaniards. Gerard urged further that the honor and the interests of
the United States were opposed to conquest. "Already your territory
is unwieldy", he argued, "and how much more so will it become by this
enormous addition of territory?""'"
The development of a party favorable to western expansion
caused Gerard many misgivings but he still hoped that Florida would go
to Spain. It was still in British hands, and he regarded it as proba
ble that in return for pecuniary assistance Congress would be willing
to renounce all claims to a province it did not possess. He was soon
reassured by a member of Congress who came to him and announced that
the committee of foreign affairs would recommend the cession of Flori-
da to Spain. Gerard flattered himself that he had seized the criti-
cal moment, when the party of expansion was feeblest, to take away
from the United States lands which they regarded as the patrimony of
2
their overflowing population. By the end of January he had formed a
party favorable to his rlans while there was a considerable opposition
1. Gerard to Vergennes, Jan. 28, 1779. Ftats-Unis, VII, fol . 120-1^5,
no. 52.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, Jan. 29, 1779. Ibid, fol . 136-139, no. 53.

as yet unorganized. Soon he was able to have a committee, whose op-
inions were favorable to him, appointed to consider the question of
the west, and this committee promptly offered to cede all the Floridas
to Spain, although it would not commit itself on the question of the
i.
Missi ssipri .
: iralles had also been active but Gerard did not feel cer-
tain of the result of his interference. He felt that the decision
would depend largely on circumstances. The most effective means of
bringing the Americans to terms, he believed, was the desire for peace
and despair of extending their conquests. 1
After the beginning of 1779 Gerard had almost daily confer
ences with members of Congress on the question of the boundaries of
the republic. Gerard uniformly held to the policy of limiting the U
nited States to- the territory which they had "held as English colonies'
In FeijTrluary a member of Congress unexpectedly introduced the discus-
sion of the northern boundary. So much bitterness was displayed on
the question that Gerard feared it was likely to prove a point of
great difficulty..
On February 1£ Gerard had an interview with Congress on the
conditions of peace. He made a speech to the members in which he out-
lined the policy of France and the interests of the United States. TTe
maintained that Spain should be conciliated and her alliance sought.
As to conquests, he declared that the English held Canada so firmly
that it could be taken only after a "most fortunate war", and in the
south they were so powerful that they could not be dislodged. From
these conditions he urged Congress to make peace without seeking any
additions of territory. To the inquiries of a delegate from North
Carolina as to what France expected to get out of the war, Gerard re-
1. Gerard to Vergenres, Feb. 13, 1779. Etats-Unis, VI T , fol. 215-219,
no. 89.

plied that his government would be satisfied with the acknowledgement'
of the independence of the United States 1 and did not wish any addi-
tions to its own possessions.
The discussion "began to assume an unfriendly tone and Gerard
felt that he must conciliate. He disclaimed any purpose to push the
interests of Spain and declared he was anxious only to get her into
the alliance. While he declared that Spain was content with her pos-
sessions, still if Congress would offer her some inducements such as
Pensacola and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, it might
influence her more favorably to the American cause. Several members
expressed their willingness to surrender Pensacola but the navigation
of the Mississippi aroused angry discussion. No decision could be
reached and the question was left open.
Gerard felt that he must use great care in the negotiations
regarding the' Mississippi, stid called to his aid his friends in Congres
and soon built up a party in favor of this scheme. He worked skill-
fully on the jealousies of the eastern delegates to secure their aid
and asserted that even members from Virginia and North Carolina came
to his point of view. They felt that the west was being rapidly set-
tled by a lawless class which would soon prove dangerous to the east-
ern governments. These people would become equally hostile to the
Spanish government, they argued, and some way must be devised to re-
strain them. To accomplish this, the friends of Gerard's project
thought the best means would be to hand over to Spain complete control
of the navigation of the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico. There
were hov/ever a number who contended for a depot or place of deposit
at the mouth of the river. The great aim of the Gerard party, how-
1. Gerard to Vergennes. Feb. 17, 1779. Etat3_unis, VTT
,
fo*, 233-242,
no. 93.
2. Gerard to Vergennes. Feb. 17, 1779. Etats-Unis, VIT, fol . 233-244,
no. 93; Feb. 13, Etats-Unis, VII, 244-249, no. 100.
T. Gerar-1 to Verrcnnes. Feb. 13. 1779. Etats-Unis, VII, fol . 244-249,
no. 100.
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ever, seemed to be a Spanish alliance, and to obtain this it was will
ing to go to almost any lengths.
On the question of the northern boundary Gerard took a very
decided stand. Washington had opposed the conquest of Canada and Ger-
ard felt that he could take the same course and accordingly asked Con-
gress to renounce all claim to the northern possessions of England.
They have not been in rebellion, he argued, and have no claim to help.
This is not a war of conquest, but only to obtain independence for the
United States and when this is accomplished we are ready to make peace
Gerard wrote to Vergennes on the first of March that his views on the
boundary question had made considerable progress in Congress. He de-
clared that it would be willing to cede the Ploridas to Spain and to
grant her the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi river, provided
that the western settlements received a port of entry on the Gulf.
Spain however wa3 expected to reward this concession with a large
money payment
.
The projects of Gerard furnished the cause for a great battl
in Congress. On one side were the New Englanders who insisted on the
acquisition of Nova Scotia and the fisheries as necessary for their
prosperity and safety. On the other side was the southern and west-
ern party which desired to hold the navigation of the Mississippi and
to extend American influnce in the west. Gerard was the center of all
controversy and his house became the committee room of Congress. Here
came his partisans to discuss the situation and to fortify themselves
with arguments. Here came the opponents of his policy to argue with
dim and to present the claims of the United States. It is difficult
1. Gerard to Vergennes. February 18, 1779. Etats-Unis, VII, fol.
244-249, no. 100.
2. Gerard to Vergennes. Ibid, fol. 290-295, no. 123.
. Ibid, no. 130.

to determine the nor.. .• of the- partisans of Gerard, hut he mentioned |
Gouverneur Morris and John Jay. His most determined opponents were
the Adams family from Massachusetts and the Lees of Virginia. These
families had formed a sort of alliance termed the "Junto" and were un-
j tiring in their opposition to the measures of France and Gerard de-
clared that its purpose was to maintain the war until England could
send new commissioners to America, whom they thought would offer liber
al terms of peace."'"
|
The Journals of Congress reveal little of the feeling behind
j the discussions. In many cases even the vote is not given and the de-
cision of any particular motion sheds little light .on the struggle
that preceded it. On February 17, 1779 Congress appointed a special
committee of five to consider the foreign affairs of the country.
jThis committee represented well the various sections of the country.
New England was represented by Smauel Adams, New York by Gouverneur
Morris, New Jersey by Witherspoon, Virginia by Smith and North Caroli-
na by Burke . That this committee was of varying opinions was shown by
[the votes of its members on the various questions submitted to its
| consideration.
This committee reported on February 33. It laid down as the
"boundaries the United States should demand at the close of the war: on
! the ancient limits of Canada as contended for by Great Britain which
would give the United States all the Great Lakes, on the west the Mise'
issip-pi and on the south Florida. It maintained also the right of nav
j igating the Mississippi and of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland.
It recommended the conquest of the Floridas to be given Spain for an
adequate compensation and also the occupation of Nova Scotia. The
discussion of this report occupied many days and from the despatches
1. Gerard to Vergennes, March 4, 1779. Etats-Unis, VII, fol . 528-338,
no. 133.
2. Secret Journals, II, 131-138.
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of Gerard we get an idea of the bitterness aroused. This report em-
bodied two sets of ideas, those' of the east and those of the south.
The party of the east looked to an extension of boundaries far into
Canada, with the conquest of Nova Scotia and the right to use the New-
foundland fisheries. The party of the south held to the possession of
the Mississippi valley and the right to navigate the river. Gerard
was -keenly interested in the debates and used his influence to suggest
amendments.
^
One delegate came to him with a plan to limit the western
boundaries by the terms of the treaty of 1763 and the proclamation of
the king of England of the same year. 1 This plan Gerard regarded as
very simple and fair and as it would satisfy the desires of Spain he
urged it strenuously on Congress.
The debates in Congress covered a wide range of matter. In
them the whole history of English colonization and diplomacy was gone
over. The trend of the discussion soon convinced Gerard that the
claim to Nova Scotia would be abandoned but the question of the north-
west boundary v;as fought out on more equal terms. Those who advocated
the retention of the Northwest Territory justified it on the grounds
both of conquest and of occupation. They further contended that the
surrender of this territory would be to accept the Quebec Act v.'hich
was one of the causes of the Revolution.
The debates on the question of the boundaries and the navi-
gation of the Mississippi continued from the 1st of I.Iarch to the 19th.
On the question of the Mississippi important interests in the west and
south united to demand the right of navigation. Those interested in
he Northwest Territory pictured the great advantages to the south of
controlling the trade of this region. If our people do not get this
1. Gerard to Vergennes, March 17
,
1779. Etats-TJnis, VII, fol. 319-72*,
no. 131.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, 7 arch 4, 1779. Ibid, fol. ?2S-"3fi , no. 133.
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trade, they argued, the English will, and thus become j -nl in •
region where it is to the interest of both Spain and the United States
1
to keep them out.
So powerful did the opposition to giving up the Mississippi
J become that Gerard felt it necessary to interfere. Through one of his
partisans he learned that the western party proposed to treat directly
with the British crown for the navigation of the Mississippi. Gerard
protested vigorously against this scheme as vicious and dangerousX©-
its purpose and unjust in its tendencies and declared that Congress
j acted as if it wished to dictate first to Spain, then to Great Brit-
ain. He remarked that Spain had no contract with the United States
and was under no obligation to them, and that the Spanish king would
never consent to surrender his rights over the Mississippi and on this
ouestion the king of Prance would probably take his part. He observed
that it seemed strange that Congress should think of treating with
j England to despoil Spain and that it appeared that America would soon
be at war with the Spanish monarchy. This interview with Gerard was
'skillfully used by his friends, who believed that they had a majority
j against the proposition. They desired however to win over the import-
! ant state of Virginia. They expected to bring the ouestion to a vote
ion .:arch 11, but in the meantime the delegates from South Carolina
2
;were recalled and some time was necessary to rebuild their majority.
| The final vote on the question of making the right to navigate the
1
1 Mississippi an ultimatum was taken on March 24. Only one state fa-
• vored the motion. T*.vo were divided and the others voted no.
The debate on the boundaries wa3 milder and there was from
jthe beginning greater unanimity of sentiment. Several of those oppose
1. Gerard to Vergennes, March 8, 1779. Etats-Unis, VII, fol . 339-345,
no. 135.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, March 10, 1779. Ibid, fol . 387-374, no. 147-.
Secret Journals, II, 147-143.

lo the policy of Gerard informed him that they would not demand con-
quests beyond what really belonged to the thirteen states. 1 There wad
considerable fear that if Canada were left to Great Britain she would
prove a dangerous neighbor. Gerard reassured them with the promise of
the unfaltering support of Prance who would never allow them to sink
back under the power of her rival.
1
He also suggested that the whole
question of boundaries be left until after the peace for settlement
but this plan received no support at all in Congress. 2 The debates or
the acquisition of Nova Scotia convinced the New England delegates
that it would not carry, and they substituted a demand for the right of
fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, to which there was practically
no opposition.
On March 19 Congress decided on the boundaries it would de-
mand as an ultimatum. This boundary ran irregularly to the south end
of Lake Nepissing, thence to the source of the Mississippi, down the
middle of that river to the thirty-first parallel, thence along the
4
northern boundary of Florida to the Atlantic. This vote was a com-
promise. It did not grant the demands of New England for the posses-
sion of Nova Scotia, but laid claim to the whole region of the Great
Lakes. At the same time the south and west received no promise of the
navigation of the Mississippi or the possession of the Ploridas. In
this contest the partisans of Gerard had not yet showed their full
strength. They felt sure of a majority in favor of the French policy
but were confronted by the untiring opposition of Lee. Such war the
changing character of Congress that no policy could well be assured,
1. Gerard to Vergennes, March 8, 1779. Etats-Unis, VII, fol . 339-345,
no. 1^5.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, March 12, 1779. Ibid, fol . 575-386 j no. 144.
3. Secret Journals, II, 145; Gerard to Vergennes, March 18, 1779.
Etats-Unis, VII, fol . 407-410, no. 159.
4. Secret Journals, II, 1^8-139.

aha the partisans of oeraro. were waiting until tne time wnen tney
J
could carry their measure "by such a majority that Mr. Lee would find
himself the only one in opposition".^
The vote of Congress in March on the question of the bounda-
ries and the Mississippi had satisfied no one. On the ouestion of the
2
fisheries the antigallican party had been active. New England was
not content with the idea of having the English on its northern boun-
daries and renewed its proposal to conquer Canada. Gerard was tire-
less in his opposition to this plan and urged upon Congress the futil-
3
ity of continuing the war for this purpose. While' he admitted that
the treaty of alliance did not define the limits of the states whose
independence was guaranteed, still he insisted that the guarantee
could not be made to apply to territories not in the possession of the
4
United States.
By July Gerard had come to feel that his policy with regard
to the boundaries was triumphant. He had built up a large party in
and out of Congress but he had lost his influence over the leading men,
He depended on men of minor caliber, like Jenifer of Maryland, who
sided \in\^with the French policy and favored limiting the boundaries of
the United States as much as possible."
On the 12th of July Gerard held a conference with Congress
in committee of the whole, in which he reviewed the whole history of
French intervention and declared that the world was convinced that the
war had no object of conquest but only to secure the independence of
the United States. In this conference he urged also that Congress
1. Gerard to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, VIII, no. 10.
2. Doniol, Kistoire, IV, 175.
3. Gerard to Vergennes, March 14, 1779. Etats-Unis, VIII, fol .87, no M
4. Gerard to Vergennes, March 21, 1779. Ibid, fol . 83, no. 59.
5. Ibid, IX, fol. 103, no. 17.
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should seek the favor of S^ain by the offer of such moderate terras as
1
would incline His Catholic Majesty to the American interests.
As a result of his management Gerard believed that he held
i the affair of boundaries well under control. He did not flatter him-
self that Congress would renounce all its former pretensions, but he
believed it would make no objection to the cession of the Floridas to
; Spain and would tacitly let go the navigation of the Mississippi. He
even expressed his belief that if necessary it would willingly abandon
Georgia.
The partisans of Gerard had postponed the final vote on the
boundaries until a time when they could hope to carry their plan by an
I overwhelming majority. On July IB Gerard wrote that the committee of
i
foreign affairs stood eight to four in favor of his measures, and that
his parts' worked unceasingly to win over votes. One of the most ac-
tive supporters of this policy was John Jay, the president of Cong-
ress. Gerard who himself took an active part in the campaign thought
: that it was time to bring the question to a vote and to pass some meas-
ures favored by the opposition in return for their support on the boun-
daries. He felt that the strength of the antigallicans was weakened
! by the failure of England to offer favorable t^rms of peace, but if
i
the opposition should carry the vote in Congress he proposed to attack
its validity on the ground that the Articles of Confederation provided
; that every state must ratify a treaty."
In the meanwhile the "Junto", opposing the policy of Gerard
was very active. Its organization and workings are obscure but it
suddenly attained great power in Congress. Its strength was unknown
to Gerard who declared that the influence of Tjee in Virginia was de-
1. Secret Journals, IT, 196-200.
2. Gerard to Vergennes, July 20, 1779. Etats-Unis, IX, fol . 109, no.
46, D. 177.
7, Doniol, Kistoire, IV, 221-222.

Istroyed and the opposition was confined to Nevr England. 1
On the question of the boundaries and the treaty with Spain
I several plans were laid before Congress. Gerard favored a plan to
outline the boundaries as vaguely as possible and to leave their final
i settlement until after the peace. On the question of cessions to
gSpain he felt there would be no difficulty."
In spite of his words of assurance, however, Gerard feared
the power of the "Junto" . He learned from his confidants that it would
ask Congress to demand as an ultimatum an extension of boundaries as
far north as 46°. The opposition declared openly that the justice of
the king would never refuse these conditions so essential to the safe-
ty of the United States.
Early in August the battle in Congress openly began. On the
5th M*Kean moved that if Great Britain persisted in the war Congress
should seek to conclude treaties with both France and Spain providing
for the conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and Bermuda. Spain and
France were to be offered for their aid equal rights in the fisheries.
'This resolution was made in the interests of the northern states, but
the southern delegation secured an amendment providing for the con-
!
quest of the Floridas and demanding the "free navigation of the Miss-
L . •« 4
i
lssippi"
.
This resolution was an open defiance to Gerard. It repudia-
ted all his advice and outlined a new policy of conquest. It is doubt
ful, however, if it was put forth seriously as a plan of action. More
11. Gerard to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, IX, fol . 116, no. 100, p. 30*.
t
1 2. Ibid, ^he actual disposition of Congress, Gerard wrote, is "to re-
nounce the Floridas and tacitly to give up the navigation of the Miss-
issippi, of which the two banks belong to that crown (Spain) provided
they are given a free port for exporting their goods and importing
merchandise". Etats-Unis, IX, fol . lie, no. 100, p. 307.
5. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 222.
4. Secret Journals, II, 219-226.

likely It was intended, ao a feeler to tent the strength or tne antl- |
gallican party in Congress. The motion was not voted upon but it
threw open for debate the whole question of the territories and of the
navigation of the Mississippi. Poth sides understood that this was
the last card in the game. Gerard however felt that he would win, for
he controlled the committee of foreign affairs, and through it trans-
mitted his arguments and threats to Congress.
In the meantime a special committee had been appointed to
draw up terms of peace. It had done its work in consultation with
Gerard and on August 14 presented its report. The terras were more
moderate than the demands of the antigallicans . Florida and Canada
were to be given up but the northern boundary was to extend as far as
Lake Nepissing. Several reasons were back of this decision. News
had just reached America of the alliance between France and St>ain and
it was seen that the latter power would make strong demands for the
2
Floridas
.
The entrance of Spain into the war was made the occasion for
I
new propositions of a treaty of alliance. On this question the ex-
treme antigallicans maintained their fight. On September 9 they in-
! troduced a resolution providing for an alliance with Spain whereby
\
that power was to assure to the United States the possession of Cana-
da, Nova Scotia, Bermudas, and the Floridas, as well as the navigation
of the ississipni. This motion provided however that if Spain should
i insist upon it, the United States would cede to her the Floridas and
i the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi below the thirty-first
parallel. The character of this resolution clearly revealed the weak-
ness of the extreme position, and it was tabled at once to make way
for a more moderate one. After several days of debate it was resolved
1. Pecret Journals, TT, 219-226.
2. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 205.

that if Spain would accede to the treaty of alliance, Congress would
make no objection to her acquiring the Florida3, provided that the
"United States shall enjoy the free navigation of the river Mississip-
pi into and from the sea."'1'
On information furnished by Gerard that England would proba-
bly soon seek peace Congress resolved to send a representative to Eu-
rope who should be on the ground when the first advances were made.
There were two leading candidates named, Jay and John Adams. Gerard
and his partisans favored Jay as being more moderate in his views
while the ant igallicans gave their support to Adams.'" After several
days of delay the vote was taken on September 27 and Adams was elected
minister plenipotentiary to negotiate a treaty of peace with Great
Britain.' At the same time Jay was elected minister plenipotentiary
to negotiate a treaty of alliance with Spain. Cn the next day in-
structions for Jay were decided upon,which in regard to the Floridas
4
and the Mississippi were identical with those agreed to on the 9th.
On October 1? rTritherspoon roved that Jay be allowed to recede from the
claim of a free navigation of the Mississippi below the thirty-first
|
parallel if such were necessary in order to obtain the alliance with
'Spain, but this motion was promptly defeated/ The instructions to
Adams were the same as those agreed upon on August 14.
The resolutions of August and September in regard to the
i boundaries and the Mississippi mark the formation of a definite policy
; by Congress. This policy was a compromise between the east and the
! south, between the French party and the antigallicans
.
"hile Gerard
1. Secret Journals, II, 241-249.
2. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 209.
3. Secret Journals, II, 257.
4. Ibid, 262.
5. Ibid, 27^.
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was not entirely satisfied with the conditions laid down, still he
1
felt that they were not unfavorable to Prance. He regarded the ap-
pointment of Jay as a decided step towards "conciliation" with Spain,
Snd as a hid for the friendship of Charles III.
The work of Gerard as minister to the United States was fin-
ished. Ke had long been laboring under a severe malady attributed to
the climate of Philadelphia and had struggled heroically against dis-
ease while upholding the interests of France and Spain, The Chevalier
de la Luzerne, his successor, had already arrived in the United States
and was in close touch with him. Congress regarded his departure with
regret. In spite of his interference in American politics he retained
his popularity till the last. Congress had his picture painted for
its council chamber and wrote to Louis XVI a flattering letter de-
: scribing his loyalty and ability.
The mission of Gerard was unfortunate from the standpoint of
both his own country and the United States. To Vergennes he gave a
| one-sided picture of conditions in the United States, and led him to
'believe that the great body of sober-minded intelligent citizens fa-
i
vored restricting the boundaries of their country, and that the oppo-
sition was made up of a few narrow and bigoted fanatics. His meddling
| in the politics of Congress and his formation of a faction around him-
self led to serious results. It made the opponents of the French pol>
: cy more determined and aggressive and aroused in the minds of many
Suspicion of the honesty and friendship of the French monarchy. This
I interference of Gerard alienated the ablest men in Congress, men like
'Jay and Morris, who had honestly favored the policy he advocated. As
a result of his course of action the diplomacy of the United States
rcas entrusted to his enemies and thus to men who looked with distrust
on any policy advocated by Frenchmen. John Adams was elected minister
1. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 211.
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plenipotentiary by an anti-French party and against the will of Ger-
ard. Jay had long been associated with the French policy but his
change of heart was probably known to his colleagues before his elect-
ion as minister to Spain. Gerard had carried out his policy without
direction and without consultation with the French foreign office. Af
ter his first instructions, which directed him to look after the in-
terests of Spain and to restrain Congress from all attempts at con-
quest, he acted nearly always on his own initiative. The result was a
lack of harmony between the representations of Gerard in Philadelphia
and the promises of Vergennes at Paris. The course of Gerard received
the approval of Vergennes and considerably modified the general policy
of the French court, and upon his reports were based the instructions
to his successor Luzerne. Thus arose a serious divergence between the
views of Congress and those of Vergennes, which was in turn bo lead to
mutual jealousies and suspicions, and to the conduct of Gerard is due
in a large measure the irritation which later broke out between Ver-
gennes and the envoys of Congress.
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CHAPTER VI
.
VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE.
The alliance between France and Spain did not win a friend
for the United States. While it added another to the list of those
fighting the British Empire it divided the councils of her enemies
! for the ambitions of Spain were unalterably opposed to the interests
and aims of the United States. Florida Blanca had long feared the'
growth of a powerful rival in the new world and before Spain entered
the war he had urged that Great Britain be allowed to keep her domin-
ions in Canada and Florida as a check to the power of the new republic
j
and although it was not stipulated in the convention, it was under-
!
stood at the time that no further effort would be made to conquer the
1 British possessions north of the thirteen states.
1
'Then Spain began
;
seriously to consider entering the alliance, she made exorbitant de-
i mands as to the territories she should acquire in North America. To
: her possession of the Floridas the Americans made little objection,
1 but her demand for the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi river
! became a question of great difficulty and her desire to acquire the
:
territory east of that river was so unwarranted that Congress would
i not consider it.
Back of Spain's purpose to keep the United States a weak and
dependent nation was the desire to build up a united and productive
;
empire around the Gulf of Mexico. Cuba, Mexico, and Louisiana formed
: three quadrants of this circle and the possession of Mobile and the
1. ""/hen peace is made it will be well" not to expel the English from
Canada". Florida Blanca to Montmorin, Apr. 2, 1779. Esp., 593, no.
77, p. 180. "We shall neglect nothing to excite the Americans and
arouse them to some enterprise. They incline to the conquest of Can-
I ada but as your excellency always thinks it best for this province to
remain in England's possession we shall work constantly to deter them
from this project". Vergennes to Florida Blanca. Mar. 18, 1779. Esp.,
393, no. ?3
,
p. 81.

coast of Florida would complete it. But if the vast prairie to the
north, the territory of ancient Eastern Louisiana should become peopl
ed by a powerful and alien race, Spain would confront a new danger
when the rude frontiersmen, seeking an outlet to the sea would come
down and overwhelm her colonies. To avert this the United States
must be kept to the Atlantic sea board, and even then, to make assur-
ance doubly sure, England should still be dominant. The power and am-
bitions of the British empire were known; but the formation of this
strange republic on the outskirts of civilization filled the ministers
of Charles III with strange and unreasoning terror.
Hardly had the ink dried on the signature of the convention
uniting Spain and France in the war when Florida Blanca proposed fresh
restrictions on the growth of this new power. He suggested to Mont-
morin that the English should be left in possession of all territory
in the United States held by them at the time of the ratification of
the treaty of peace."
1
" At this time it was known in Europe that the
English forces were in possession of New York, Long Island, of the
greater portion of Connecticut and Rhode Island, including the city of
Newport, of Georgia, and a part of Virginia besides a number of sea
ports. To the credit of Montmorin and Vergennes they both replied
positively that France could not agree to such terms. Vergennes de-
clared that such a course would make it appear that France had aban-
doned her allies and would provoke their enmity and suspicion. More
1. Florida Blanca wishes to leave the English in possession of New
York and Rhode Island. I represented to him how difficult it would be
to get the Americans to consent, and told him to consider our engage-
ments with them. He replied that the Americans needed peace so much
that they would make no difficulty of the means of obtaining it. Mont
morin to Vergennes. Apr. 26, 1779. "The king of Spain proposes a
fixation of limits and that each should hold as his own territory what
he holds at the instant of ratification". Reflections on project of
Spain for oeace between France, England and the United States, Mont-
morin. May, 1779. Esp., 594, fol. 192. Esp., 593, fol . 57, no. 147,
p. 320.
. Esp., 593, fol. 23, no. 157, p . 343.
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than that it would be an open violation of the treaty of alliance and
and as such would bring dishonor on the French monarchy. This de-
cided stand on the part of France put an end to the idea of a settle-
ment of American affairs on the basis of uti possidetis and assured
to the United States a geographical unity.
Although it was apparent to Spain that France would insist
on the preservation of the territorial integrity of the United States,
the Floridas were a subject of conquest and it was against these pro-
vinces that the Spanish arms were directed. To make this conquest
Spain was anxious to have the help of American arms, and Florida Blanco
himself wrote to Vergennes asking that the Americans send an expedition
into Florida from the north while the Spanish troops attack it from
2
the Mississippi. Vergennes declared that it would be difficult for
the Americans to perform their part in the project on account of the
British occupation of Georgia but he promised to instruct Luzerne, who
was then on the eve of his departure for the United States, to propose
the matter to Congress. It appears however that Florida Blanca soon
became suspicious of the Americans and proposed that, instead of co-
operating with the Spanish army, thay should attack St. Augustine and
leave Pensacola entirely to the Spanish troops. It was not until June
however, that Spain sent orders to her officers in America to attack
4
the English possessions. These orders were sent to Galvez, the gov-
ernor of Louisiana, and the other Spanish governors in America were
'ordered to help him.
1
1
. Esp. ,."594, fol . 192.
12. "It would be well for the colonies to try to enter Florida while on
! our side we will make a strong diversion by way of the Mississippi".
Florida Blanca to Vergennes, May 17, 1779. Esp., 594, no. 136, p. SO.
3. Vergennes to Montmorin. Esp., 594, no. 40, p. 2*"; no. 41, p. 2^7;
no. 68, p. 171; no. 73, p. 180.
4. Montmorin to Vergennes. Esp., 594, fol. 52, no. 120, p. 278.
5. Don Juan Baptiste Bonet, Governor of St. Domingo, to Gonsales de
Castejon. C. 0. 5, 131, p. 7, Letter book of intercepted correspon-
dence. Montmorin to Vergennes, Esp., 595, no. 174, p. 469.

The English had long known the designs of Spain on their
territories in the southwest* and prepared to resist them. As soor. as
hostilities were declared they ordered an attack on New Orleans, Lou-
isiana, and the regions west of the English posts' in the Illinois
country." They hoped al3o by this prompt move to hold the friendship
of all the Indians in the southwest/
In spite of the efforts of the English, Galvez began an en-
ergetic campaign against their possessions in the southwest. In the
fall of 1779 he drove then from Manchac and Baton Rouge and from the
whole region of the Mississippi , and during the next year and a half
3Mcc°° '.ed in capturing Mobile and Pensacola, thus shutting out the
English from any port on the Gulf of Mexico.
'Thile Spain was definitely planning the conquest of the Plor-
idas, Vergennes was worrying about the attitude of Congress on the con-
ditions of peace. In January he had been informed of the projected
I expedition against Canada but for several months he had received no
I certain intelligence from America. He conversed frequently with
,
Franklin on the matter but could determine nothing satisfactorily as
long as he was in the dark as to conditions in the United "tates^ The
only terms he was determined to insist upon was independence with the
I restitution of all the territories dependent on the thirteen states.
[The attitude of Spain was also a source of considerable annoyance to
j Vergennes. Montmorin had intimated to him that negotiations between
11. See memorials of Ross, Campbell, Graydon, etc. Colonial Office, 5,
117.
12. Germain to Hal demand. Colonial Office, 5, 7.
8, Germain to Gov. Dalling, June 17, 1779. Colonial Office, 5, 7.
Germain also planned an attack on all other Spanish possessions in
America. To Lords of Admiralty, Colonial Office, 5, 151, o. S57.
4. Vergennes to Montmorin, May 14, 1779. Esp., 594, fol . 33, no. 2°,
p. 87.
5. Vergennes to Bretuel, June 29, 1779. Esp., 594, no. 151, p. "50.

that country and the United States must he handled carefully. Ver-
gennes was constantly worrying about the conditions Spain was likely
2
to demand m the arrangement of terns of peace. It had been demon
-
;
strated to him that Spain had no regard for the interests of the Uni-
; ted States, and from her projects against the British on the Mississ-
.1
i ippi he felt that his two allies were in danger of clashing. After
i several weeks of delay Montmorin succeeded in getting from Florida
Blanca an expression of his opinion on the terms of settlement. The
Spanish minister had, at last, seen that independence of all the thir-
; teen states was inevitable, but he still wished England to keep Canada
j and Nova Scotia and also the Ploridas excepting Pensacoia and Mobile,
l
which should go to Spain with as much of the coast as would exclude
I
England from the Gulf of Mexico. At this time too Florida Blanca in-
', sisted on the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi river, and "inti-
j mated that this was a point he would not yield. He expressed the de-
i
sire to close all access to Spanish America not only to the English
5
but to the Americans as well.
In the meantime the despatches from Gerard had arrived and
!Vergennes was told that Congress would probably surrender its claim on
i the Floridas and Canada, as well as the right to navigate the Mississ-
ippi. At the same time came the report of the strong antigallican
feeling among the eastern delegates and their proposal to treat direct-
ly with England on the navigation of the Mississippi. In the light of
1. "'.Then they (the United States) send some here to treat in their in-
terests I believe that it is essential that the choice should fall on
j some one of a character supple and conciliatory. It is necessary that
he have firmness but accompanied by sweetness and patience." Montmo-
jrin to Vergennes, June 3, 1779. Esp., 594, no. S5, p. 4^.
2. "I should like to know what might be the views of the Catholic King
and his minister on this matter.... we would not like to propose any-
j thing which might cross their ideas." Vergennes to Montmorin, July
27, 1779. Esp., 594, fol . 50, no. 201, p. 457.
5. See Chapter III. Tontmorin to Vergennes, May 17, 1779. Esp., 594,
fol.41, no. ?A.
4. Vergennes' instructions to Luzerne, July IS, 1779. Etats- Unis,
IX, fol. 1, no. 41.
_-_
6. "They (Spain) desire sincerely that the thirteen united states
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this information from America vergennes prepared the instructions to
Luzerne who was to go out ac the successor to Gerard, and it is evi-
j dent that they were drawn Up in a spirit of hostility to the United
States. T7ergenr:es judged from the reports of Gerard that therp was a
, strong English party in America and believed that if such could exist
in time of war there was little dependence to be placed on the perma-
nent friendship of the republic. 1 In instructions he discussed the
three objects of greatest interest to Spain, - the western boundaries,
the navigation of the Mississippi , and the Floridas . As to what
should be the western boundary of the United States Vergennes did not
!
| attempt to decide but feared the danger of a dispute between the Uni-
!
ted States and Spain over the lands from which the English might be
I
driven, and urged Luzerne to restrain the ambitions of the states, es-
pecially those of the south.
©n the question of the navigation of the Mississippi he was
i equally unfriendly to the claims of the United States. Before this
time he had expressed himself favorably toward the American claim, but
1 now he declared that it was shown to his satisfaction that the Ameri-
cans had no right to it. He based his reason on the ground that be-
fore the Revolution the boundaries of the crovinces did not extend to
i the Mississippi, and that it was absurd to claim the right of England
! whose authority they had abjured. ' On the question of the Mississippi
! Vergennes asked Luzerne to demand a categorical explanation from Cong-
' re s s , and also a promise that the United States would renounce all
should be independent ' but they desire England to keep Canada and Nova
(Scotia. They would not be sorry also if England kept the two Floridas
except ^ensacola and Mobile, which Spain desires to acquire." Fontmo-
rin to Vergennes, July 31, 1779. Esp., 594, no. 220, p. 491.
' 1. "We see clearly that there exists in Congress a party of opposition
which, if it is not sold to England at least favors the views of that
power." Doniol, Histoire, IV, 97.
2. Instructions to Luzerne. Etats-Unis, 17, fol . 1, no. 41.

all pretensions to it, and would limit themselves to soliciting the
favor of the king of "pain.
m
o the Floridas Vergennes also declared that the TTnited
I
States had no right. They were still an Fnglish colony and as such
'open to conquest "by Spain. : 7 e declared further that the United States
:had no interest in possessing them while Spain had a double interest,
!
first at one tine they had belonged to her, and secondly it was neces-
sary to secure to her control of the Gulf of Lexico. 1
Three separate kinds of considerations dictated these in-
structions : dislike of the antigallican party in America and fear that
it would lead the United States into a policy unfavorable to France,
a desire to conciliate Spain, and lastly the belief that a large num-
ber of Americans favored these terms. Just how strong each of these
considerations was, is impossible to say. For the first and third he
had ample reason in the reports of Gerard, but Spain had as yet sug-
gested only vaguely her ambition to control the Mississippi river and
'
valley
.
Spain had given her orders for the conquest of the Floridas
land months were to pass with no news of the future of her expedition.
[Don Juan de Liralles had been authorized to concert with the Americans
la joint attach on these provinces. Before deciding on any further
I military operations it was necessary to wait for news from D'Estaing
(who had been instructed to make a naval demonstration in support of
the Spanish attack." Spain however still manifested no desire to aid
the cause of the independence of the United States.' She was willing
to grant thern subsidies but they were to be used only in an "expedition
against the Floridas. As month after month passed with no news of the
1. Instructions to Luzerne. Etats-Unis, IX, fol . X, no. 41.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Sept. 27, 1779. Bap. ,696, 87, no. 165, p. 41*8
5.. "As you have well remarked before and is shown by the writings of
Florida Planca, Spain, I say, has never gratuitously given anything to
the .-.mericai-^" . hontmorin ,o i : . *LqJ_:lJJ-:L-JL' " r P * » h ' r'* 1
88, no. 168.

expedition against Florida the anxiety and ambition of the Spanish
court increased. The king felt that the conquest of Pensacola was the
object in America nearest his heart and urged that every effort be put
;
forth to effect it. 1 Plans were hurriedly rushed through to send re-
inforcements from Havana and the Americans were to be urged more vig-
2
orously to aid the conquest. So fearful did Florida Elanca become of
the fate of the Spanish expedition that he finally entreated France to
7.
send assistance and promised that if Vergennes would furnish troops
4
and ships for the attack he would pay all their expenses. To this
proposal Vergennes at once agreed and declared that the French would
I be ready at any time with their contingent. He thought however thati
1 it would not be advisable to speak of this project to the Americans
! for fear of offending them. At the end of December n6ws came of the
success of Galvez on the Mississippi and his proposed attack on Mobile
6
and Pensacola and Florida Blanca at once began to hedge on the project
I of accepting French aid in the conquest of Florida. He felt that if
victory could be assured by the efforts of the Spanish troops alone,
'it would be folly to pay for French assistance. To Montmorin he in-
timated that Spain did not wish to attack Pensacola, and that she wcul<
.
' 7
! not subsidize the French troops prepared for the expedition, but sug-
jgested that the united forces make a descent on England.
News of this change of plan aroused much indignation in the
1. Montmorin to Vergennes, Nov. 8, 1779. Esp., 596, 100, no. 76,ppl79
2. Esp., 596, 90, no. 8, p. 81. Esp., 596, 103, no. 95, p. 224.
1 5. Montmorin to Vergennes, Nov. 22. Esp., 590, 104, no. 108.
4. Montmorin to Vergennes, Dec. 13. Esp., 596, no. 167, p. 371.
5. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 17. Esp., 596, 81, no. 183, p. 407.
G. Montmorin to Vergennes, Dec. 15, 1779. Esp., 596,113, no. 215, p. 468
7. Florida Elanca to Aranda, Jan. 9, 1780, enclosed with Montmorin'
s
despatchs of same date. Esp., 597, 1, no. 22, p. 51.
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mind, of Vergennes who declared that the surest and quickest wa> to
finish the war was to push it in America."^" He felt that Florida
Blanca was unreliable in his promises and would present all sorts of
excuses for not keeping them^and henceforth there was little sympathy
manifested between the two courts and the efforts of France became
directed almost entirely to the preservation of the independence of
the thirteen states.
At the beginning of 1780 Jay and Adams arrived in Europe
with instructions on the views of Congress relative to the boundaries
and the navigation of the Mississippi . Jay had been friendly to the
•5$
plans of Gerard'" and was regarded very favorably by that minister who
believed he would consent to the Spanish pretensions, but had become
suspicious of French policy before he left America and he had imbibed
4
a still deeper distrust of the ambitions of Spain. With Jay, to
think was to act, and he had thought deeply on the claims and preten-
sions of the Spanish monarchy to the Floridas and the Mississippi val-
!
ley/ He had come, however, to secure the alliance of Spain and the
recognition of the rights of the United States, and no sooner did he
land than he began preparations to carry out his instructions. On his
arrival at Cadiz he sent his secretary, William Caraicheal, ahead to
|
1. "I am much provoked (bien fache'* ~)nbh^t"~Fibridar^lanca has renounced
J
his enterprise on Pensacola" . Vergennes to M ntmorin, Jan. 13, 1779.
Sep., •'597, 5, no. 35, p. 106.
2. Esp., 597, 8, no. 77, p. 219.
13. Gerard to Vergennes, Sept. 9, 1778. Jay wrote that "....both Mr.
i Gerard and Mr. Miralles . . . .had shown me every mark of civility and at-
j
tent ion, though I have reason to think both of them held higher opin-
;
ions of my docility than were well founded". Jay, On the Navigation
i of the Mississippi, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 328.
4. Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 329.
5. "V/lien Spain afterwards declared war for objects that did not in-
clude ours', and in a manner not very civil to our independence I be-
came convinced that we ought not cede to her any of our rights, and of
course that we should retain and insist upon our right to the naviga-
tion of the Mississippi". Jay, On Navigation of the Mississippi, Cor-:
resnondence and Public Works. I. 331.
_
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Madrid to sound the Spanish ministry on its intentions towards the
United States with instructions to do justice to the interests of Vir-
ginia and the western countries near the Lississippi , and to represent
to the Spanish court that it would be ages before these extensive re-
1 gions would be settled. He also asked him to find out the intentions
of Spain in regard to the Floridas and the country along the lississ-
ippi . From these instructions it is clear that Jay thoroughly under-
j
stood the ambitions and intentions of Spain. His information had come
: to him, when as the friend and comrade of Gerard and Miralles, he had
spent long evenings talking over an alliance with Spain and the con-
2
cessions her king would exact as the price of his help. He knew also
that the conditions he had to offer were not such as Spain would wish
! and that she would likely refuse to acknowledge the independence of
the United States unless her terms were acceded to} but to her demands
however, he had resolved not to agree.
Jay had not learned that Spain was the dictator in her al-
liance with France^and he did not know that Vergennes was exerting all
his power to bring about an understanding between his allies, and that
; it was Spain who wished to restrict the power of the United States,
and who was to prove herself a thorn in the flesh to his efforts to
j
secure the territorial integrity of his country. Franklin had long
been silent on the question of the west. Vergennes had not chosen to
enter into negotiations with him on the subject, and Congress had sent
him no instructions in regard to it; but Franklin, ever awake, had per-
ceived the drift of Spanish policy, and its hostility to his country,
and he understood full well that there was no sentiment in the Spanish
i 1. Jay, Correspondence" and Public Papers, I, 266-268
.
2. Ibid, I, ?27.
3. "I am persuaded that pains will be taken to delay my receiving a
j
decided answer as to my reception, until the sentiments of France
shall be known". Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 266.

ministry favorable to an alliance with trie United States. 1 Franklin
knew too that Congress had at last decided on a policy and he was
ready to work loyally with Jay in carrying it out. Henceforth the re-
presentation of Congress in Europe was vigorous and aggressive while
yfergennes was compelled to play the role of peacemaker between his
allies
•
Florida Blanca proved to be more hospitable than Jay had
hoped. He wrote a friendly note to Jay inviting him to court but at
the same time informing him that he could not be received as the min-
2ister of an acknowledged power. Carraicheal, in company with Gerard,
was received kindly by the French ambassador who furnished him much
3
information about the disposition of the Spanish king. He learned
that several monthe before I.liralles had been instructed to enter into
engagements with Congress to conquer Florida, and he regarded this as
significant for the prospects of a treaty of alliance.
The politenecs of Florida Blanca did not convince Jay of the
good intentions of Spain. He felt sure that the message of the Span-
ish minister meant that independence would be acknowledged only if the
United States acceded to his terns. Back of the Spanish king he
4
thought he perceived the power and influence of France. Jay however
1. "But I own too, that my expectations of great aids from that nation
are not much stronger than yours. As yet they know us too little, and
are jealous of us too much; their long delay in entering into a treaty
with us.... is to me a mark of their not being over fond of a connectiofli
with us". Franklin to Carmichael, Jan. 27, 1780. Wharton, Dip. Cor.
Ill, 476.
2. Florida Blanca to Jay, Feb. 24, 1780. Wharton, Dip. Cor. Ill, 515.
3. Carmichael to Jay, Feb. 15, 1780, Ibid, III, 496-7.
4. "There are many reasons which induce me to suspect that France is
determined to manage between us so as to make us debtors to their in-
fluence and good correspondence with Spain for every concession on her
part, and to make Spain" hold herself obligated to their influence and
good correspondence" with us for every concession on our part". Jay to
Congress, March 3, 1780. Wharton, Dip. Cor., Ill, 530.
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returned a polite answer to Florida Blanca' s note^and the two boom en-
tered into a discussion of the resources of the United States with the
p
apparent purpose of forming an alliance. It was not until May 11
that they held a discussion on the main points of difference between
the two nations. In this conversation Florida Blanca plainly intimat-
ed that the great obstacle to the alliance was the claim of the United
States to the right to navigate the Mississippi river. He urged also
that they settle the question of the boundaries and expressed a desire
to obtain such concessions that the English would be entirely excluded
from the Gulf of Mexico. Jay reminded Florida Blanca that many of the
states had for their western boundary the Mississippi and were inter-
ested in its navigation but he expressed the opinion that they would
be willing to adopt any reasonable precaution against the carrying of
contraband. The Spanish minister courteously expressed his desire for
an amicable adjustment and the interview closed. Jay reported to Con-
gress that if it remained firm there would be little doubt of the out-
3
come
.
Equally anxious with Jay for an understanding between Spain
and the United States was Vergennes, but far better than Jay, he under
btood the aims of Spanish diplomacy. He knew its dislike of the new
republic, and its fear that the example of a successful rebellion woul
have a dangerous effect on the extended colonies of Spanish America,
and finally he understood from long experience its utter selfishness
1. Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 276.
2. Florida Blanca wrote to Jay, March 9, desiring before entering into
discussion on alliance to know civil and military state of the United
States. Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 277. Jay replied in a
lengthy memorial on April 25, Ibid, I.
3. Jay, Notes on Conference with Florida Blanca taken immediately afte)^
the conversation. VJharton, Dip. Corres., Ill, 722 et seq.
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{and greed. At the same time he felt that, in order to hold Spain to
the war he must further all her projects as agreed to in the conven-
tion, and in accordance with this policy he proposed attacks on Flori-
st , 3da
,
Jamaica, Gibraltar and other English possessions . " In fact the
'French ministry displayed more ze n l and energy in these undertakings
than did the Spanish court, of all the campaigns inaugurated by Flor-
ida Blanca only that of Galvez in Louisiana was carried out with vigor,
4
and he was unsupported by the other Spanish governors. While Span-
iards were congratulating themselves on their victories on the Miss-
issippi, their French allies were urging them on to the attack on Mo-
bile and Pensacola, and even against Jamaica. Pensacola was regarded
I
as of immense importance because of its control of the Gulf of Mexico,
4
j but the conauest of St. Augustine was held of little value to Spain.
In Larch ''ontmorin reported to Vergennes his suspicions that
As
j
Spain had begun through the Coukt of Lisbon negotiations for peace
j with England. These negotiations were a source of much uneasiness to
I
the French ministry; and it was felt necessary to take part in them so
i as to assure the principal object of the war, the independence of the
5
! United States. Montmorin at once began representations to Florida
1 Blanca of the danger of allowing the United States to return to the
j dominion of England, to which he replied that it was to his interest
I
6
i to keep a constant quarrel and division between the two. Vergennes
saw at once that if these negotiations were allowed to continue the
1. Vergennes to Montmorin, March 13, 1780. Bsp. , 598, IP, no. 37, p.
! 106 . Vergennes frequently expressed his opinion of Spanish policy as
selfish and unreasonable with no interest for the rights of other na-
tions .
|
2. Vergennes to Montmorin, March 13, 1730. Ibid, 17, no. 38, p. 108.
3. Montmorin to Vergennes, Larch 13, 1730. Ibid, 27, no. 181.
4. Montmorin to Vergennes, ."..arch 13, 1780. Esp.,599, 51, no. 41, p. 76.
5. Lontmorin to Vergennes, ' arch 15, 1780. Esp.,598, 87, no. 43, p. 126.
6 . :,.ontmorin to Trergenr.es, April 14, 1780. Ibid, 41, no. 1*0, p. 413.
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interests of the United States would be sacrificed and Prance humili-
ated. So serious was the situation that Louis XVI' wrote directly to
Charles III urging that the two powers should continue to act together
To this the response was favorable and Charles declared that he would
never "compromise either the dignity of his crown or its sacred en-
2gagements. Florida Elanca gave some rather lame excuses for the pre-
sence of a British agent in Spain and the affair was allowed to drop.
This incident convinced Vergennes that it was necessary to
give Spain additional assurances if she was to maintain her interest
in the war. In order to allay Spanish suspicions he preparedy^a mem-
orial on the benefits of an alliance with the United States in which
I
he maintained that there was no danger to the possessions of the Span-
ish monarchy as long as the United States were dependent upon the two
crowns for protection and that this dependence would exist as long as
England held Canada and Ohio. 1" Montmorin observed that the great ob-
stacle to an agreement between the two countries was the navigation of
.4
the Mississippi and on this account negotiations between Jay and Flor
ida Blanca were proceeding slowly and likely to continue so. He ex-
pressed to Vergennes the belief that it would be well to inform Spain
of the terms of alliance between France and the United States, to
which the latter replied that the best explanation of the relations
between the two countries was the text of the treaty of alliance. "In-
dependence", he wrote, "is the first of all; it is the basis of one
common treaty and ought to be for the negotiations of peace. The guar
antee of the domains of the United States is contingent, their extent
will be determined only by a future pacification".' He was still de-
1. Doniol Histoire IV, 551-554.
2. Doniol Histoire IV, 456 note.
3. In hand of Vergennes, Apr. 26, 1780. Esp. 599, no. 35, p. 8.
4. Esp., 599, no. 51, p. n9 . Ibid> 599j 6Qj nQ> 85 ^
5. Vergennes to Llontmorin, June 12,1780. Esp., 599, no. 44, p. *S2T
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termined however to drive the English out of all territory which was 1
1
an integral part of the thirteen states.
In June 1780 news reached Spain of the capture of Mobile by
the amy of Galvez. The court and nation gave way to the livliest ex-
g
i pressions of joy and the feeling arose that the Spanish army could de-
feat the English without any foreign assistance. The effect was dis-
astrous to the work of Jay who found Florida Blanca henceforth more
arrogant and exacting, and more unfavorable to the claims of CongresS.
After his conference with Florida Blanca in May, Jay was unable to get
any further propositions from him on the subject of a treaty. Ke al-
ways side stepped any mention of giving aid to the American cause and
to the notes of Jay on the subject he had returned no reply. Bills
kept coming in for Jay to pay and finally in desperation he went to
Lontmorin for help. The French minister promised to do what he could
and early in September Florida Blanca sent his secretary Gardoqui to
reopen negotiations with the American commissioner.
The conferences with Gardoqui began on September 3 and the
'first question that came up was the payment of bills drawn on Jay.
i Gardoqui remarked that if the United States expected any help from
!
Spain they must be prepared to offer some consideration in return.
I
He hinted that, among other things, the renunciation of the right to
4
i
navigate the Mississippi would be most acceptable to his court. To
I this suggestion Jay replied that the Mississippi could not come in
- question as a consideration for a hundred thousand pounds. He de-
! clared furthermore that the American nation regarded this river as the
natural outlet to the vast and fertile regions of the west, and that
1. Vergennes to kontmorin. Esp., 599, 15, no. 120.
I 2. Esp., 599, no. 65, 66 - 21 Esp., 599, 75, no. 194.
Is. Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers I, 386.
4. Jay to Congress. Wharton Dip. Cor. IV, 64.

— liiy -
without it the settlers beyond the Alleghanies could never hope to
get their products to the sea. 1 To these arguments Oardoqui observed
that the Americans would not need this navigation during their gener-
ation and that future generations could care for themselves.
Jay was much discouraged at the progress of his negotiation:
2in Spain and wrote in a discouraged tone to Franklin. Me felt that
little help could be expected from Spain and that the only just friend
•7.
of his country was France.^ Franklin however was more optimistic and
urged Jay to continue his efforts. He agreed with him however that
the United States should never give up the right to the free naviga-
tion of the 1- ississippi
On the evening of the 23rd Jay was admitted to a conference
with Florida Elanca on the points at issue between the two countries.
During the conversation Jay once more brought up the question of an
alliance, but Florida Elanca replied that there was no occasion to
hurry and Jay would have time to obtain instructions from Congress on
the articles to be proposed. Re then brought up the question of the
exclusive navigation of the Mississippi and its importance to Spain
rho, he declared would adhere to its rights. He observed that "unless
Spain could exclude all nations from the Gulf of ilexico they might as
well admit all", that it was one of the principal objects of the war
and of greater importance even than Gibralter. If he could obtain
1. Jay, Correspondence & Public Fapers I, 395.
2. Jay, Correspondence & Public Papers I, 395.
3. "THien I consider on the one hand that France was our first, and is
still our best and almost only friend, that she became an ally on
terms of equality, neither taking nor attempting to take ungenerous
advantage of our situation. .. .gratitude and generosity forbid me to
solicit a further tax on her generosity". Jay to Congress, Sept. 22,
1780. Y/harton, Dip. Cor., IV, 65.
4. "Foor as we are yet as I know we shall be rich, I would rather agre 3
with them to buy at a great price the whole of this right on the y.iss-
issippi than sell a drop of its waters. A neighbor might as well ask
me to sell ny street door". Franklin to Jay, Oct. 2, 1780. T/harton,
ZiDlomatic Cor.. iV, "

this, he declared, it would be a matter of indifference whether Spain]
obtained any other cession. 1 This interview convinced Jay that there-
was no hope of an immediate treaty with Spain and he turned his atten-
tion to other matters.
Although Spain had given the fullest assurances of loyalty
to her alliance, she continued her negotiations with England. Prance
was aware of her actions but was in no position to interfere. The war
in America had produced no brilliant victories, the treasury was de-
pleted; and the king, grown despondent of the victories, was anxious
for peace. The fears of Louis were further increased by the represen-
tations of the Spanish court, which was constantly urging suggestions
of pacification. Vergennes also was anxious for peace but he had re-
solved to obtain it only on terms honorable to his king and in accord-
3
ance with his promises to the United States. That which disturbed
him most was the Spanish demand for the uti possidetis in America
which would leave England in possession of New York and the two most
4
1 southern states. In spite of this he urged Montmorin to sound Flor-
: ida Blanca again to see if he would consent to the recognition of the
; western states with all their possessions.
- Florida Blanca continued his negotiations with England, on
the basis of the cession of Gibraltar to Spain and of leaving England
' 5in possession of all other territory then held by her arms. This pol
1. Jay to Congress, Ilov. 6. \7harton, Dip. Cor., IV, 146.
2. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 487.
3. Ibid, 488, Vergennes to the king, Sept. 27, 1780, Archives Nation-
:ales, 164, no. 3.
4. Vergennes to ^ontmorin, Sept. 27. Esp., 601, 73, no. 17, p. 38.
5. "Either the outcome of the war will be most happy for England or
that power will suffer great misfortunes, in the first case Spain will
redouble her efforts to make peace with least disadvantage to herself
and probably with greatest disadvantages to us, in the second case the
court of London will make Spain offers the most liberal and most ap-
propriate to seduce her, she will show herself disposed to cede Gi-

icy would have given Spain possession of all she wished In Florida and
have left the United States at the mercy of their neighbors, but it
was a policy to which Vergennes would not agree. To Lontmorin Florida
Slanca asserted that the United States were still attached to Fngland
'and would prove ungrateful allies to France; 1 but such arguments did
not appeal to Vergennes who reasoned that with England in possession
of Canada and perhaps one or two of the southern states, there could
2be nothing but perpetual hostility between the two nations.
It was apparent that Spain would endeavor to make peace on
^
the basis of uti possidetis and the French court feared that it might
| have to accede to these terras. In order however to obtain for the Uni-
| ted States as much of their territory as possible Montmorin proposed
i to transfer the seat of war to America, and endeavor to drive the Brit'
ish out of New York and their position in the south. ' This proposi-
tion received serious consideration from Vergennes who saw that the
j
Spaniards were trying to confine the United States to the interior
4
;with England in possession of all their seaports, and this was a meas-
1 ure which he was resolved to prevent. Spain had no sympathy for Eng-
I land but she was forever jealous of revolting colonies and she wished
to make this rebellion a terrible example to her own possessions. No
! other motive could have led her to demand such hard conditions as the
I price of recognition of the United States, and to demand such condi-
tions in the face of her old time friend and ally, France.
braltar, Fensacola and Mobile, and perhaps a part of the fisheries of
j Newfoundland providing the Americans should be abandoned and France
jforced to break her agreement with them." Vergennes to Eontmorin,
(Sept. 27, 17S0. Esp., 601, 85, no. 155.
1. Eontmorin to Vergennes, Nov. 20, 1780. Ibid, 115, no. 142.
2. Vergennes to Eontmorin, Dec. 8, 1780. Ibid, 90, no. 172.
3. Montmorin to Vergennes, Oct. 30, Dec. 20, 1780. Ibid, 108, no. 100;
ibid, 109, no. 101; ibid, 121, no. 219.
4. Vergennes to ] ontriorin, Nov. 20, 1780. Ibid, 85, no. 155, p . ?85
.

Vergennes was now firmly convinced that the only aim of
Spain was to get all she could out of the war even at the sacrifice
of the interests of the United States and the honor of France. As-
late as Larch, 1781 Florida Blanca had intimated his objections to
recognizing the independence of the United States and had suggested
that it would be a great concession if their independence should be
assured with such territory as they held against the British," and
intimations came to France that Spain desired to control the naviga-
tion of the ' ississippi and to gain possession of a strip of territory
embracing the ancient province of Eastern Louisiana," in addition to
the Floridas. On these questions Vergennes took no stand for he felt
that they could be settled at the time of the peace by negotiations
4
between the two interested powers. At the same time he declared that
the United States must be recognized as an independent nation with all
the territories that were a rightful part of their dominions.
France was anxious for peace and was ready to make many con-
cessions to obtain it. The French treasury was empty and there were
constant demands upon it, not only to supply French needs but also
those of her allies. The war had on the whole been unsuccessful and
reports of victory were infrequent. Before seeking peace, however,
Trergennes resolved to make one more attempt to drive the English en-
tirely out of the United -Hates and thus secure for them territorial
1. "Never lose sight of the fact that Spain is devoted to her own in-
terests before all else and that she will subordinate to them all oth-
er conditions of peace, that she will interest herself very little in
the Americans whose independence she would see with grief." Vergennes
jto i.ontmorin, Jan. 22, 1781. Fsp., 602, 5, no. 47.
I
2, i.ontmorin to Vergennes, March 11, 1781. Ibid, no. in, p. 50?.
5. harbois to Montmorin, Oct. 17, 1780. Esp., 601, 10, no. 65, p. 155.
4. hontmorin to Vergennes, March 12, 1781. Esp., P02, no. 18, p. 510,
Vergennes to Montmorin, April 12, 1781. Esp., 605, 22, no. 25, p. 57.

unity and a real independence. If this attempt should succeed France
could then enforce an honorable peace; "if we fail", he wrote, "we
ought not, at least, be blamed for having neglected anything in our
power to procure it."
1
The efforts of the French forces were to be
directed equally in the interests of Grain and of the United States.
De Grasse was sent with a powerful fleet to America, and large sums
of money were given to Washington with which to equip new troops." At
the same time preparations were made for a new expedition against Pen-
4
sacola. Soon after this Vergennea wrote to Luzerne that the king was
| in accord with the policy of Congress to uphold the territorial rights
of the union, but warned him the fortunes of war were such that some
! sacrifices might be necessary for peace. The tone of this message
I displayed a spirit of fairness and cordiality towards the United Stats,
in striking contrast to the arrogant demands of Spain.
During the past Spain and France had drifted farther apart,
I
and had moved along different lines of action. Spain wished to aban-
i don the United States for concessions to herself from England; France
insisted that independence should be the first condition of peace and
•that other advantages should be sought only after this was recognized.
This was a policy he^ had consistently maintained, and in the face of
| military reverses and of. an impoverished treasury and in opposition to
i
the entreaties and threats of his Spanish ally, he remained the loyal
and unfaltering friend of the nation he had called into life.
1. ^oniol, Histoire, IV, 544.
2. Esp., COS, IS, no. 137.
|3. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 587.
,4. Esp., 6055, 24, no. 30.
5. Etats-Unis, XVII, 19, no. 155.

CHAPTER VII.
LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN
The independence of the United States was, with Vergennes,
the prime object of the war, and to assure this independence continued
throughout/ the first aim of his policy. To him independence meant
the independence of the thirteen revolting states with all the terri-
tories belonging to them. The extent of their dominions was unknown
to him and his idea of it varied at different times, but never did he
consider either Canada or the Floridas a part of the United States,
for these provinces had never joined in the rebellion, and throughout
the war remained peaceful subjects of England. From the idea that
they were still integral parts of the British empire there followed
naturally enough the opinion that they were legitimate subjects of con
quest for any nation at war with the mother country. Canada he re-
solved to leave in subjection to the British crown, but the Floridas
were looked unon with greedy eyes by Spain and he saw no reason for
refusing her desire.
There yet remained the questions of the disposition of the
Mississippi and the control of the great river that gives it its name.
On these questions Vergennes had expressed no opinion before the mid-
dle of 1779, but as both the Spanish ministry and the American Cong-
ress had thoroughly discussed them, he thought it well to take some
stand. He had no knowledge of the merits of the dispute, and depended
for information on the reports of Gerard and the representations of
Florida Blanca. From the former he learned of the different opinions
in Congress and of the large number of delegates who were willing to
surrender the west; from the latter he heard only assertions of
Spain's right to these regions and demands that it be acknowledged.
It is doubtless true that Vergennes was also influenced by political

considerations. He was anxious to hold Spain to the war and was will-
ing to make many concessions to keen her government in good humor; and
he identified the party in Congress opposed to Spanish pretensions
with the antigallican party. Under these circumstances he drew up in-
structions for Luzerhe, the new minister to the United States, in Ju-
ly, 1779. These were, in brief, that Spain should be given the Plori
das and control of the navigation of the Mississippi river. On the
question of the disposition of Eastern Louisiana he did not commit
himself but urged that the two powers come to a definite understanding
and that the United States be restrained from any encroachments on ter-
ritories to which they had no right. 1 On every point these instruct-
ions were distinctly unfavorable to the claims of the United States.
It is probable that at that time Vergennes had no idea of the extent
of Spanish pretensions to the territories east of the Mississippi, but
when Spain did present her claims France had been committed to the
support of the Spanish position.
Luzerne arrived in America at a time when Congress was most
anxious for an alliance with Spain and was willing to make concessions
2
in return for her help. Although Gerard still performed the duties
of minister, Luzerne at once began to acquaint himself with conditions
in America. He landed in Boston and it was the New England attitude
he first investigated. He quickly came to the conclusion that this
section still desired the annexation of Canada and especially of Nova
Scotia in order to control the fisheries," and he even discussed with
1. Vergennes to Luzerne, July 18, 1779. Etats-Unis, IX, 1, no. 41.
2. "A number here wish to make an alliance with France and Spain to
continue the war" . Gerard to Vergennes, Aug. 14, 1779. Etats-Unie,
IX, 11«, no. 100. See also resolutions of Congress, Sept. 9, in favor
of alliance and practically conceding Florida to Spain.
"I have observed that the conquest or the independence of Canada
lies close to the hearts of the states of New England and they esteem
it their safeguard, but if they were compelled to choose between the
HnAM t^ fty wmiirl t.n.Vft Nnva Scotia on account of the fisheries,

1various people plans to conquer these provinces. He did not, however,
dwell long on the project against Canada but proceeded to Philadelphia
where he began to survey the field under the tutelage of Gerard.
At this time Congress had practically agreed on a policy by
which the Floridas were to go to Spain on condition that the right to
navigate the 1Mississippi and the use of a port on the Gulf be given
the United States. 1 To the southern delegates, according to Gerard,
the use of a port on the Gulf was of more importance than the right to
navigate the river." It was his idea, however, that Spain should take
possession of the Floridas and leave the question of granting an out-
3
let to the west for later negotiation.
Luzerne found on his arrival at Philadelphia a Congress very
friendly to the alliance with France and anxious for a treaty with
Spain, but he also found a Congress more independent and assertive
than the one which had followed Gerard so faithfully during the pre-
ceding year. He was favorably impressed by his reception and the atti
tude of the Americans, who, he thought, would offer no serious objec-
tions to the demands of the Spanish court. He was confirmed in his
opinion after an interview with Washington, who expressed his desire
to see Spain in possession of the Floridas and declared his willing-
4
ness to aid in the conquest.
On the question of the southwest he realized that there
would be greater difficulties, for it was a question on which the
but with the loss of this country Canada would be impossible for Eng-
land. " Luzerne to Vergennes, Sept. 3, 1779. Etats-Unis, X, 3, no. 4.
1. Secret Journals, II, 249. Gerard to Vergennea. Etats-Unis, X,
123, no. 37.
2. Gerard to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, X, 123, no. 37.
5. Gerard to Vergennes. Etat3-Unis, X, 122, no. 20.
4. Luzerne to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, X, 4, no. 40.

states themselves could not agree. Out of this disagreement, howev-
er, was to come his policy towards the west.
Gerard received his first public audience with Congress on
November 17, and entered with energy on the duties of his mission.
For some time Miralles had taken little part in the discussions on the
west and apparently without orders from his court, he left the claims
of Spain to the care of Gerard. In November, however, he received or-
ders from Florida Blanca to urge Congress to aid in the conquest of
2 7)
Florida" and at once communicated these instructions to Luzerne' with
a request that he present the matter to Congress. The instructions
relative to the Floridas were in accord with the avowed policy of
Spain but Miralles was equally charged to urge Congress to aid in the
4
conquest of the territory to the north and east of Louisiana. Noth-
ing was said of the interest of Spain in this conquest, but in view of
the fact that Willing and Clarke were known to have undertaken expedi-
1. "It is to be feared that these conquests will be a cause of disor-
der in the American republic and that the first conquest of their uni-
ted arms will sow new seeds of disunion. The delegates of the neigh-
boring states pretend to have an incontestable right in virtue of
their charters, which includes all that which extends westward to the
Pacific. On the other side the delegates of the states whose charters
do not give them any of this country hold to the principle that a con-
quest by their common arras and with the united forces of the republic
ought to belong in just proportion to all." Luzerne to Vergennes,
Nov. 8, 1779. Etats-Unis, X, 9, no. 81.
2. "The honorable Congress having previously proposed to undertake the
siege of St. Augustine in East Florida to restore it to the troops of
His Catholic Majesty in case of success, I am charged to invite the
said Congress to direct the arms of the United States against this ci-
ty, in the hope that this division will powerfully second those which
the arms of the king of Spain have made against Pensacola " Copy
of letter from Miralles to Luzerne, Nov. 25, 1779. Papers of Conti-
nental Congress, no. 95. Letters of Luzerne, Vol. 1, p. 21.
7. Luzerne to Vergennes, Nov. 50, 1779. Etats-Unis, X, 15, no. 100.
4. "I am equally directed to invite the honorable Congress to under-
take the connuest of the territory ... .occupied by the English to the
northeast of Louisiana and as the government of this province by its
knowledgecan contribute infinitely to the success of a like enterprise
it desires to know the plan of operation which Congress has decided on
in this region so that on its part it can second all their efforts."
Copy of letter from Miralles to Luzerne, Nov. ao, iyyw. Papers or thtr
Continental Congress, no. 95. Letters of Luzerne, Vol. 1 , p. 22.

tions in this country, the suggestion was significant. Miralles also
asked that a committee of three be appointed to confer with him and tc
explain the ideas of Congress so that the two nations could the better
cooperate. In accordance with this request Luzerne submitted his sug-
gestions to Congress and urged most strongly that they should be a-
dopted. 1
To the proposition regarding the Floridas Congress returned
an answer which gave Luzerne reason to think that the United States
would surrender West Florida to Spain as soon as its possession was
2
secure. It informed him, however, that before making a definite re-
ply it wished to send a committee to confer with Washington. After
listening to the committee Washington approved of the expedition a-
gainst Florida if the British could first be driven out of the south-
ern states and Congress so informed Luzerne. 4 At this time it also
raised a question about forming any definite engagement with Miralles
unless he could obtain official credentials from Spain. The assuran-
ces of Congress in regard to the Floridas were satisfactory to Mi-
ralles, but he was disappointed at receiving no reply concerning the
conquest of Louisiana. He had been promised the position of minister
plenipotentiary to the United States as soon as Spain should judge it
proper to name one and he felt it necessary to accomplish all that was
1. Papers of the Continental Congress, no. 9*5. Letters of Luzerne,
Vol. 1, p. 25.
2. Luzerne to Vergennes, Nov. 30, 1779. Etats-Unis, X, 15, no. 100,
p. 291.
5. Luzerne to Vergennes, Dec. 17, 1779. Etats-TInis, X, IB, no. 118,
p. 337. This committee was appointed Nov. 30 and consisted of Philip
Schuyler and John Marchant - Journals of the Continental Congress (Hunt
ed.) XV, 1331-2. It reported on Dec. IP and on the same day Congress
sent its answer to Luzerne - Ibid, 1387.
4. Journals of the Continental Congress {Hunt ed.) XV, 1369, 1387.
5. Luzerne to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, X, 18, no. 118.
6
.
Luzerne to Vergennes . Ibid, p. 342.

asked of him. He requested Luzerne to again Present the matter to
Congress in a more urgent manner, but that diplomat hesitated, for he
clearly understood the difficulties in the way. Virginia claimed all
the country westward to the Mississippi in virtue of her charter and
was busily engaged in conquering it. On the other hand Luzerne judged
that Spain had designs on the same territory and "that in inviting the
United States to make this conquest she supposes it will be in the
same condition that East Florida would be in case they should conquer
it". He clearly saw that the aims of Congress were by no means agree-
able to such a policy, and he advised that if Spain wanted this terri
tory she must seize it before the Americans should occupy it.'
Luzerne reported however that there were a number of dele-
gates in Congress who regarded this territory as still belonging to
1. "You will notice that in the response which the President of Cong-
ress has made....he keeps silent on the requisition made to him by Mi-
ralles 'to busy themselves with the conquest of those parts of Louis-
iana and its dependencies, of which the English are in possession',
without adding for whose account this conquest should be made. I have
grounds to presume that the interests of some states and their views
of aggrandizement are the cause of this silence.... Moreover, Virgin-
ia follows her enterprises against the parts of British territory
which are found included in the ancient limits of this state as far as
the Mississippi and pretends that her charter gives her an incontesta-
ble right to this land.
"On the other side the uncertainties which subsisted before the
peace of 1763 touching the ancient limits of Louisiana, and the let-
ters of the governor of navana to Don Juan, appear in some respect b,
to indicate that the court of Madrid has views on the same territories
and that in inviting the United States to make this conquest she sup-
poses it will be in the same manner that ^ast Florida would be in case
they conquer it. If such is the plan of His Catholic Lajesty the ul-
timatum of Congress and the operation of the provincial troops of Vir
ginia are of a nature to oppose these plans. The state expects to con
quer it at her own expense, for her own account, and for her own par-
ticular aggrandizement, as it is richer and more powerful than the oth
ers. It appears to have a system of aggrandizement, into which enters
some jealousy of Spain and as its ambitions have on several occasions
already showed it is likely that it will not be easily induced to sell
or cede what it has conquered."
Luzerne to Vergennes, Dec. 17, 1779. Etats-Unis, X, 18, no. 118.

iGreat Britain and as such open to conquest. These delegates were caret
pll to add, however, that Clark had already advanced as far as the
Mississippi, a declaration which, to Luzerne, meant that this region
was already regarded as conquered.^
At the time when Hiralles was most urgent for American help
to conquer the Floridas and the British posts on the Mississippi Cong-
ress revived the idea of an invasion of Canada. This time Washington
approved the project and suggested sending a secret agent to learn the
2disposition of the Canadians. Luzerne had previously informed Samuel
Adams that the French king was not disposed to aid any conquests, but
General Gates again came to him for assistance.' This time the reply
was decisive. He observed that Congress should try to drive the enemy
out of the southern states before they attempted such a conquest, but
if it preferred an outside attack the Floridas were niuch ^morej prefera-
ble. It is doubtful, however, if this project had any other object
than to draw out the ideas of France. When the demands of Miralles
1 were presented to him, Washington had insisted that the British be
driven out of the south before any expedition on Florida should be un-
dertaken, and on December 15. he had written Congress that the army was
4 ,
on the point of dissolution. Under such a condition of affairs it is
absurd to think that he would seriously contemplate an attack on Cana-
da. He had always been suspicious of the designs of the French, and
the year before had opposed such an expedition because he thought it
had the support of the French ministry. Now when the interest of his
ally was turned towards the Floridas, he favored an invasion of Canada.
1. Etats-Unis, X, 19, no. 118, o. 344.
2. Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), VIIT,i41.
3. Luzerne to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, X, 17, no. 110.
4. Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), VIII, 138.

With him were the New England delegates in Congress, who were sincere-
ly devoted to the annexation of Canada and the antigallicans
. In Jan-
uary, KcKean of Delaware asked Luzerne if he did not think that the
most useful thing the French fleet could do was to conquer Canada.
1
To him the French envoy replied that he had no instructions on the suh
ject hut that he thought the most important duty was to drive the Eng-
lish from the states, and then it would be honorable to offer freedom
to the Canadians. 1 In all these discussions of an attack on Canada
while the British were in possession of the south Luzerne could see
nothing but jealousy on the part of the north. 2 It is more probable,
however, that they were only evidences of lack of harmony and unity of
interest
.
The distrust of Spain was greatly increased in January, 1780
when Luzerne revealed to Congress the terms of her professed mediation
on the basis of uti possidetis. Luzerne himself did not feel that
such conditions were unfair and he urged Congress to use every effort
'
• 4to drive .out the British before beginning negotiations for peace.
The committee aooointed to receive these communications from Luzerne
duly reported them to Congress, where their reading was a signal for
many bitter speeches. Congress no longer had the great men who had
adorned its hall in former years, but it was composed of members who
were resentful and narrow, and who were determined to thwart the pur-
poses of Spain. The proposals of the Spanish court had awakened a
1. Luzerne to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, XI, 27, no. 33.
2 "they (the north) see without disquietude the danger of the
southern states whose rivalry in resources they fear, and T have
grounds to believe that they would abandon them to their fate without
regret, if they were sure this sacrifice would facilitate the conquest
of Canada." Luzerne to Vergennes, Jan. 23, 1780. Etats-Unis, XI, 27
no. 33.
3. Secret Journals, II, 305.
4. Ibid; Etats-Unis, XI, 28, no. 56.

distrust in America that did not subside during the continuance of the
war, and to the end made a settlement between the countries impossible
Thus far both nations had been playing merely for position
and neither side had made any definite demands, although Congress had
not receded from its instructions to Jay. In January 1730 the issue
was declared in a conference between Luzerne and a committee of Con-
1
gre3s, called to discuss the negotiation of a treaty of alliance with
Spain. Luzerne, at the instance of Miralles and on behalf of Spain
submitted four articles on which Congress should explain itself before
beginning the negotiation of a treaty. These articles were:-
1. "A precise and invariable western boundary to the United States.
2. The exclusive navigation of the river Mississippi.
3. The possession of the Floridas.
2
4. The lands on the left or eastern side of the Mississippi".
Cn these articles Luzerne explained the ideas of the court of Spain as
follows. On the first, that the boundaries of the United States should
extend no further westward than those authorized by the royal procla-
mation of 1763.
If this were granted it would follow in regard to the second
article that the United States without any territory on the Mississippi
would have no right to navigate that river. On the third it was
thought probable that Spain would conquer the Floridas during the war
and all dispute over them between the two powers should be removed.^
mhe fourth r>ro-oosit Ion applied to the lands along the east
bank of the lower Mississippi included in ^est Florida by the royal
ordinance of 1767. Spain held that all these lands upon which settle-
1. This committee was composed of seven members, Mathews, Livingston,
Ellsworth, G-erry, Burke, Griffin and McKean. Secret Journals, 11,298
2. Secret Journals, II, 310.
3. Ibid, 310, 31]
.

Iments were prohibited by the proclamation of 1763 still belonged to
Great Britain and were subject to conquest. Luzerne declared that she
considered the United States as having no right to these territories,
because they had never held possession of then before the war and
could make no clain to them in virtue of the sovereignty of Great
Britain, allegiance to whom they had thrown off. Not content with
this exposition of the merits of the case Spain asked that the states
refrain from all settlements or conquests in the west and should leave
1
the whole Mississippi valley to her possession.
Upon the disposition of the Floridas, apparently no question
was raised. Congress had wished to fix as their northern boundary the
line laid down in the proclamation of 1763 while the court of Madrid*
2
sought to extend them farther to the north. The question was greatly
simplified by the Spanish victories at Fort Natchez which put Galvez
in possession of the disputed territory. Miralles had previously been
authorized in case the Americans conquered this country, to buy their
interests, and Luzerne had already sounded Congress on the purchase
when ners of this victory arrived. It was clearly understood in Con-
gress that Spain would not surrender any territory held by her arms
and the question was not discussed in the conference.
The navigation of the Mississippi received little attention
at this time, and in fact there was no need for discussion until the
question of the ownership of Eastern Louisiana was decided. Congress
1. Secret Journals, II, 510, 311.
2. "The court of Madrid will desire perhaps to give them (the Flor-
idas) more extent to the north beyond the 31st degree of latitude,
but Congress is of the opinion that his Catholic Majesty will find as
much more advantage in the present fixation as, under the Spanish dom-
ination the Floridas did not extend in the direction of the northeast
farther than the river St. John while the proclamation assigned the
river St. Marie as the actual boundary". Luzerne to Vergennes, Febru-
ary 11, 1780. Etats-Unis, XI, 30, no. 53, p. 190.

in claiming the Mississippi as the western boundary had insisted on
the natural right to navigate this river and had reinforced its pre-
tentions the guarantee of the treaty of 1763. Congress had however
offered to confine its right to merchant ships, and to make suitable
regulations against contraband in return for the use of a port on the
gulf.
1
Spain had heretofore based her claim to the exclusive naviga-
tion of the Mississippi on the ground that the states were in no sense
a party to the treaty of Paris and could claim no rights under it.
But if the United States must give up their claim to the back countrie
their pretentions to navigate the Mississippi would be absurd, and the
right to do so useless. So this question gave way to the greater one
of the ownership of the territory between the Mississippi and the Al-
leghanies
.
The possession of this territory had never before been
questioned in Congress and Luzerne himself was not aware of Spain's
ambitions until Don Juan communicated to him the instructions he had
received in November/' He knew already the position of Congress from
the instructions of Jay but nevertheless he sounded several members
on the question, from none of whom he received a favorable reply. He
found that the delegates from the southern and middle states were
firm in the persuasion that "the lands which extend from the Atlantic
to the Mississippi in parallel lines from the equator, belong to them,
either in virtue of their charters or of divers acts of possession".'
Some of the eastern delegates were more moderate and recognized that
if the Spanish should drive the English out of any part of this terri-
tory it would be difficult to get them to surrender it, but this view
1. Luzerne to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, XI, 30, no. 53.
2. Luzerne to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, XI, 30, no. 53.
3. Luzerne to Vergennes. Ftats-Unis, XI, 30, no. 53.
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was not the prevalent one in Congress
.
Many members of Congress had become suspicious of Spain
when they heard that she had proposed terras of peace on the basis of
uti possidetis and when they learned of her ambitions against the west-
ern frontier their distrust flamed into indignation. Hardly had the
suggestion of giving these lands to her been uttered when Burke of
North Carolina interrupted by declaring that the western boundaries
of his state were as precise as the eastern, and as authoritative,
for they were all fixed under the same title.
The committee of Congress based its arguments for the Miss-
issippi as the western boundary under four articles; the colonial
charters, the treaty of Paris in 176?, the proclamation of the king of
England in the same year, and the terms of the alliance with Prance.
Luzerne admitted that the charters favored the claims of Congress but
protested that they were not valid evidence for they were loosely
drawn and often contradictory and had been set aside by subsequent
proclamations and acts of the British government, the authority that
"ad granted them. He maintained further that these were domestic re-
gulations, unrecognized by the king of Spain and of no force in inter-
national relations. These pretentions have never been upheld by the
English government, he argued, which had acknowledged their extrava-
gance in accepting the Mississippi as the western boundary of its
possessions
.
1. "I had hardly exposed that which concerns the countries situated
on the left of the Mississippi, when a member of' the committee from
North Carolina said, "our charters, the treaty of 176?, the proclama-
tion of the same year, and finally our treaty with Prance are precise.
I represent myself from the state of which I am a delegate, possession
of land bounded by the Mississippi. I know the force and extent of
our charters and of our rights, and if those of my condtituents in the
territories in question are not clear and certain our rights on the
Atlantic coast are eoually obscure and doubtful, for they emanate
from the same source". Luzerne to Vergennes, February 11, 1780.
Etats-Unis, XI, ?0, no. 53.
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In regard to the treaty of Paris Luzerne pointed out that it
had ceded Eastern Louisiana and its dependencies, not to the colonies
who could not enter into the treaty but to the king of England. Be-
fore this time France had possessed this territory which was never in-
corporated as part of the colonies, and now Spain was merely attempt-
ing to reconquer it from a country with which she was at war. In a
case of this kind, he contended, possession was the best title and
Spain held this title in virtue of her forces and garrisons already
in the country
.
The committee replied that England had never acknowledged
French right to any territory east of the Mississippi, had gone to war
to support her claim to the lands in question and had obtained ac-
knowledgement of it by the treaty of Paris.
To this Luzerne answered that the ambition of England had
compelled France and Spain to again take up arms to defend their ter-
ritories and that her acts had thrown open to modification the whole
treaty of Paris. From this he held that Spain had a legitimate right
to make what conquests she could and espicially conquests which France
had occupied before the war.
In regard to the proclamation of 1763. Luzerne pointed out
that it had forbidden English governors to make any grants beyond the
head-waters of rivers which emptied into the Atlantic. The committee
replied that this provision was the occasion for many protests and un-
iversal discontent, and that the proclamation itself contained an ar-
ticle providing that the lands reserved should still be considered
as under the provisions of the colonial charters. They declared that
this reservation was made only for the protection of the Indians and
that the United States would follow the same policy, but if the sav-
ages wished to sell their lands Congress had the exclusive right to
buy them. With this much knowledge of the policy of the English gov-

eminent they did not ^recognize that the proclamation of 1763 was but
a temporary expedient.'
1
On the fourth point Luzerne denied that the treaty of alli-
ance assured the possession of the lands west of the Alleghanies and
there appears to have been no further discussion of this question.
In closing the conference Luzerne remarked on the disposi-
tion of Congress to substitute for the principles of fairness and jus-
tice the subtleties of the law, but in spite of this he assured them
that the court of Spain would show itself moderate in its demands.
The committee in turn declared its loyalty to the alliance with France
and that the Unites States would abandon their interests to the jus-
tice and wisdom of His Christian Majesty. 2
In this conference Luzerne was not convinced of the success
of his arguments and urged his master that if Spain wanted the land in
question she should conquer it before the Americans could occupy it.
Within a month news reached Philadelphia that the Spanish troops had
seized the lands along the lower Mississippi and in order to inform
the Americans of the Spanish occupation Miralles had an account of the
conquest published in the papers with the intimation that Spain would
hold them. This information aroused much bitterness among the people
many of whom held grants of land in this region, and Congress proposed
4
to take the matter under consideration. Luzerne perceived that such
1. See Alvord, Genesis of- the Proclamation of 1763.
2. The only account of this interview is given by Luzerne in his re-
port of Feb. 11 to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, XI, 50, no. 53, p. 184.
3. Luzerne to Vergennes, March 13, 1780. Ftats-Unis, XI, 33, no. 79.
4. "Several inhabitants of Philadelphia pretend to the possession of
Ithese same lands, either by virtue of patents acquired from their re-
spective states or by purchase from the savages.... They tell me that
they fear the court of Madrid has not been informed of the state of
the question, and that it is from lack of knowledge of their rights
that it has turned its arms against territories comprised in the re-
[spective charters of the states. A company of merchants called the
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action would set the United States and Spain in open opposition and "he
used his influence to have all discussion of the subject postponed un-
til resentment had cooled.'
1
Luzerne now felt that the time was near when a decision must
he reached. He suggested that Miralles and he work together and de-
clare boldly to Congress the pretensions of Spain, and seek to win it
to a more liberal policy. Miralles replied ridiculing the claims of
Congress, but insisted that he must wait for further instructions froTr
his court. He also begged Luzerne to take no further part in the ne-
gotiations, and declared that he "would see with pain an affair of
particular interest to the king treated by another than himself." 2
Henceforth Luzerne took no part in the formal negotiations on the sub-
ject but he continued his efforts to influence individual members of
Congress
.
When the report of Luzerne on his conference with the mem-
bers of Congress, reached Vergennes, the latter replied in a oommunica
tion notable for its moderation. He complimented Congress on its jus-
tice in leaving the Ploridas to Spain and expressed his pleasure that
that affair was settled. On the question of Eastern Louisiana he mainjj-
tained that Spain had a right to conquer it, but he urged also a rec-
ognition of the interests of the United States. He felt that the dis-
pute might arouse ill-will between the two countries and instructed
India Company, continues to grant lands.... and they have sent to Steu-
ben a patent containing the gift of 25,000 acres of land situated on
the Mississippi.... Some members of Congress have at last spoken to
me of this conquest and say that they see with pain the thirteen
states differ from the court of Spain on this important question, and
that it is necessary to prevent early the bad feeling which may re-
sult...." Luzerne to Vergennes, March 1?. Etats-Unis, XI, 33, no. 79,
2. Luzerne to Vergennes, March 13. Etats-Unis, XI, 55, no. 79.
3. Luzerne to Vergennes, March 13. Etats-Unis, XI.

Luzerne to be careful of the feelings of the allies of the king and to
give neither any cause for offence. 1 He hinted that Florida Blanca
was likely, of his own free will, to give up the lands east of the
Mississippi and even to accord the Americans some rights to navigate
the river and suggested that Congress throw itself on the magnanimity
of the Spanish king. 1
News of the Spanish conquests in the southwest aroused great
indignation in Congress, and Luzerne fearing a breach between the two
countries began to advocate a more liberal policy towards the United
States. He still maintained that Spain had a right to conquer the
territories in question, but he also suggested that the United States
had an equal right to conquer them. The practical result of his argu-
ment, however, was in favor of Spain for he insisted that, since that
j
power had already occupied the country, the United States could not
| out of considerations of justice and prudence, attempt to seize it.
The delegates of Congress had come to admit the right of Spain to
j seize the country but they protested that the seizure of a few posts
at the mouth of the Mississippi did not give Spain possession of the
whole basin of the river" They furthermore contended that the United
1. "It follows from these considerations that you ought to abstain
carefully from any ministerial interview on this matter. It is fit-
ting that we should leave the discussion to Don Miralles . . . .but if you
are in a position to make some confidential insinuations to leading
members of Congress you should limit yourself to counsel them not to
speak to the court of Madrid of right but to ask only the magnanimity
of His Catholic Majesty. If I am well informed the Spanish minister
is not far removed from abandoning to the Americans the rivers east of
the Mississippi beyond the Floridas and likewise to accord them some
navigation on this river." Vergennes to Luzerne, June 3, 1780. Ftats-
Unis, XII, 7, no. 61.
2. "I have already made the only delegates who represent Carolina in
Congress believe that although the United States had the right to make
the conquest of these countries before Spain had taken possession of
them over the comron enemy, this power had also the right to conquer
them and that, being at Present in possession of them the United
States could not lay claim to them without wounding, at the same time,
the laws of justice and of good neighborliness , as well as the rules
Qf prudence 'May Heaven preserve us f , the delegate said to me,
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States had an eoual claim to most of the east bank of the Mississippi
in virtue of the settlements made there and of the conquests of
Clarke. 1 The answer of Luzerne was that these settlements were made
by the authority of the British crown and as such were subject, not to
2
the states, but to Fngland.
:
5 iralles saw with distrust the informal negotiations going
on between Luzerne and members of Congress and again importuned the
French minister not to discuss the question. For a time Luzerne con-
formed to the wishes of the Spanish agent and Congress devoted itself
to other matters. But Luzerne did not lose his interest in the affair
He continued his speculations in long despatches to Vergennes and Mont
morin, in which he advised that Spain should seize the disputed terri-
tory and that if Congress wished to obtain possession, it should throw
it self on the generosity of His Catholic Majesty.'
Two months passed by without further discussions of the
western territories between Congress and Luzerne. During this time
Miralles died, begging with his last breath that Luzerne should not a-
'even from an idea of a contest with Spain, but you will admit that,
for having conquered a corner of land near the mouth of the Mississip-
pi and the river Iberville, this power has not the right to say that a
country of 500 leagues of extent has fallen under her power, and to
attribute to herself the sovereignty I " Luzerne to Vergennes, March
13, 1760. Etats-Unis, XI, 33, no. 79.
2- "This delegate told me that he saw with grief that Spain did not
act on nrinciples as liberal as the king their ally, and he added that
for several years there had been numerous emigrations of the inhabi-
tants of the United States who had established themselves in these
countries, each within the extent of the charters, that their inten-
tion had been to remain under the government of the English colony.
....and it was necessary to regard this occupation, accompanied by
acts of jurisdiction, as equivalent to a conquest, and that the states
having the advantage of priority over the Spaniards it was the latter
who had troubled the states in their possessions." Luzerne to Ver-
gennes, March 1?. Etats-Unis, XI, 3?, no. 79.
5. "I answered that this occupation did not give any more right to the
subjects of the thirteen states than it would have been able to give
to France, to Poland, or to Germany, if after the peace of Paris, the
French, the Poles or the Germans had established themselves in that
part of ancient Louisiana." Luzerne to Vergennes, March 1^, 1780.
fctats-Unis ,XI
,
33, no. 79.
3. Luzerne to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, XI, 35, no. 87.

jgain interfere. Luzerne made the promise, but it was not long until
he was again agitating the matter with his friends in Congress. From
them he learned the difficulties of the question and came to the con-
clusion that the two powers could never come to an agreement. The ac-
tual ownership of the country, he believed, could be determined only
2by military occupation.
During the summer of 1780 Congress assumed a more indepen-
dent attitude. It believed that independence was assured and began to
make greater efforts to extend the boundaries of the United States.
Again the project of invading Canada was suggested and was supported
by a large number of delegates. The north supported the idea from a
sincere desire to gain possession^ of the country with> all its valuable
fisheries, while the middle and southern states favored it with the
design of exchanging territory conquered in that section for the sur-
render of the three southern states which were occupied by the Brit-
ish.'. On the question of the western boundaries it showed no sign of
receding and Luzerne became alarmed. He declared that England would
neve^_ consent to exchange the three southern states for Canada,"* and
entrenched in the southern part of the continent, she would become a
menace to both the United States and Spain.
Under the circumstances he felt justified in disregarding
the wishes of the dead Miralles and the instructions of his court and
] . "14 . i.iiralles has begged me not to try to change the sentiments of
Congress on this matter. He has told his court the motives that led
him to ask me to remain inactive and as he has constantly insisted on
this opinion I shall conform to it until further orders." Luzerne to
Montmorin, May 7, 17 Q 0. Espagne, 599, no. 16. What these motives
were can probably be learned only from the Spanish archives.
2. "It will not perhaps be agreeable to the thirteen united states to
change resolutions, formed after long debates, resolutions that Cong-
ress considers as the most favorable to the Spaniard.... I say frank-
ly that I count little on any one f s being able to come to an accomoda-
tion by any amicable means." Luzerne to Montmorin, May 7, 1730. Es-
jpagne, 599, no. 16, p. 25.
|L5. Luzerne to Vergennes, May 20 , 1780. Etats-Unis, TTI
,
49, no. ?5.
Luzerne to Vergennes, Aug. 26, 1780. Etats-Unis, XI I I, 74, no.
-
152.
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began to -pe-pmia.de members of Congress towards a more favorable view of
the desires of Spain, and on the 16th of May he asked Congress for the
appointment of a committee to confer with him concerning the costs
held by the British and all matters connected with the territories of
the United States.
It was, however, by conferences with individual members of
Congress that Luzerne hoped to get the best results. He first ap-
proached the president of Congress, Samuel Huntington of Connecticut,
and his friends. He succeeded in arousing their jealousy of the west
"by suggesting the great immigration which would inevitably set in froir
the east to these fertile valleys. He pointed out also that the pos-
session of the Mississippi valley would never be a source of strength
but would cause constant friction with Spain. 2 In these interviews
Luzerne felt that he had convinced the north of the right of Spain to
conquer Eastern Louisiana, since it was ceded to England by the treaty
of 176?5 and was still actually in her hands. ? After winning over to
his side the president he passed on to the delegates from New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware. These states had little inter
est in the western lands and he felt they would come to his aid. He
found them in a state of indifference but unwilling to abandon the
claims of their sister states. Even the delegates from Virginia lis
tened with favor to the propositions of Luzerne, for the County of Ken-
tucky had just declared its independence, and in this incident they
4
feared the beginning of the dissolution of all the states.
1. Papers of the Continental Congress, no. 95. Letters of Luzerne, Vol.
2. Luzerne to Montmorin, May 12. Espagne
,
599, 4, no. 49.
3. ijuzerne to Vergennes, June 11. Etats-Unis, XII, 54, no. 7 A .
4. "Virginia shows less attachment to that which she formerly sustained
and I have found the delegates of this state much more moderate than if
had heard. This change is perhaps due to a particular circumstance,
that the inhabitants of that part of the state removed from the seat

Maryland, he found the most favorable of all to the projects!
of Spain. She had no interest in the west and Jennifer, her delegate,
was intensely jealous of the power of the larger states. He declared
to Luzerne that Spain not only had a perfect right to make the con-
quest, but that if she should drive the British out of Georgia that
state would also be a legitimate prize. 1 Here was a man who could
perform valuable service in the Spanish cause and Luzerne enlisted
him at once and through him urged his arguments on Congress.
It was not long however before the activities of the French
minister aroused the suspicions of the zealous and vehement Burke of
North Carolina. Since the arrival of Luzerne the two had held oppos-
ing opinions and not unfrequently had clashed. We have no full ac-
count of Burke's arguments but we know that they were of a character
to arouse the fear of the French minister,"
1
and it is- probably his
fiery denunciations that terrified Miralles into silence. Burke open-
ly denounced the ambitions of Spain as overbearing and unjust, as
contrary to the rights of the states and as prejudicial to their hap-
piness and tranquilty. The report of Jay on his mission to Spain had
not yet arrived and Luzerne feared that if it should be unfavorable
to the American demands, Burke would sweep all Congress to his side
and induce it to lay claim to the Floridas as well as the western ter-
ritories. Henceforth there were two well defined parties in Congress,
the French and Spanish party with Jennifer for spokesman and the oppo-
sition under the radical leadership of Burke.
of government announce at this moment, their views of independence
and their project of forming a seperate state. This incident and the
i
difficulty of holding the insurgents make them see better all the
reasons against distant possessions and extended ones, and the danger
I
of dismemberment of a state. Luzerne to Montmorin, June 11. Espagne,
599, 5, no. 117.
1. Luzerne to Montmorin. Espagne, 599, 5, no. 117. Etats-Unis, XII,
54, no. 74.
12. Espagne, 599. 5 t no. 117; Etats-Uni3, XII, 54, no. 74.
3. Luzerne to Montmorin. Espagne, 599, 5, no. 117.

The ardor of Burke soon won many delegates who had Previous-
ly been friendly to the Ideas of Spain. One delegate from New York
informed Luzerne that he could, without any complaint from his con-
stituents, renounce in favor of France Canada and Nova Scotia, which
were not included in the charters of the thirteen states, and which
had not joined in the war. But if he should vote to surrender Eastern
Louisiana, which was plainly included in the charters of the southern
states, he declared that he would expose himself to the charge of hav-
ing sold the vast possessions of these states for money, and of having
violated the sacred laws of the union in sacrificing the rights of
some states for the benefit of others. 1
When Luzerne found that argument could not convince Congress
of the justice of Spain's pretensions, his tone changed from persuas-
ion almost to threats. The United States has no means to conquer the
western territories, he declared, while Spain has. He urged Congress
to enter at once into negotiations on this matter and seek only what
Spain would give, but the only promise he could obtain was the decis-
ion to wait for Jay's reports. With this he had to be content, but he
was little satisfied with the attitude of the Americans. 2
Luzerne continued his efforts with the individual members of
Congress but attempted to make no more official representations on the
question. He was much afraid that the report of Jay's mission would
produce illfeeling and did all he could in advance to discount its ef-
feet. He had thought first of trying to get Congress to cede, by a
preliminary treaty, the disputed territory to Spain, but he knew that
such an attempt would precipitate violent debates, in which New Fng-
1. Luzerne to Kontmorin. Espagne, 599, 5, no. 117.
2. Luzerne to Montmorin. Ibid, 4, no. 49.
5. Espagne, 599, 5, no. 117. Ftats-Unis, XII, 54, no. 74.

land, anxious to get sore part of Canada, would support the southern
pretensions. The best way out of the dilemma, he considered, would be
for Spain to seize what she wished and leave the Americans dependent
upon her bounty."1"
The English themselves were fearful of an attack on Canada
and increased its defences
.
2 they sought also to win over the people
of the three southern states and insinuated to them that their compa-
triot s of the north had abandoned them and had proposed to the court
of London to treat for independence with the exclusion of Georgia and
the Carolinas from the union. Luzerne perceived the drift of British
policy with its conciliatory attitude towards the southern states in
striking contrast to its severity in the north, but he still believed
that Congress would remain true to the interests of the confederacy
and its engagements with the king. These southern states were in the
hands of British soldiers, but they kept delegates in the Continental
Congress, and many patriots, expelled from their homes, came to Phila-
delphia to concert measures for driving out the enemy.' Luzerne
thought this a favorable moment to get them to yield their claims to
Eastern Louisiana and sought to push this policy regardless of Cong-
ress. He gave his attention first to patriotic southerners who had
4
been driven out by the British. The most prominent of these was Gov-
ernor Rutladge of South Carolina, who expressed much confidence in the
* 5justice of Spain. He was, however, ignorant of the points of differ-
1. Espagne, 539, 5, no. 117. Etats-Unls, XII, 54, no. 74.
2. Luzerne to Vergennes, June 24, 1780. Etats-Unis, XII, 57, no. 118,
p. 396.
3. Espagne, 599, 6, no. 182.
4. Luzerne to Montmorin, July 11, 1780. Espagne, 599, 6, no. 182.
5. "He told me that the Spanish governor had replied to his officer
(who had been sent to demand help)in a manner to convince the Carolin-
ians of the sincere interest which His Catholic Majesty has in the
-prrrrr" ?t ior of t^o-if inHp^nHrnop." Luzerne to Montmorin, Aug. ?, |
1780. Espagne, 600, 7, no. 29.

ence between the two countries and had no idea of surrendering the
western lands. When he learned that Spain laid claim to Eastern Lou-
isiana and had already attempted to possess it, his attitude became
at once suspicious and even hostile. He insisted that the southern
states never would agree to such conditions, and that if Spain at-
tempted to extend her sovereignty over these regions she would expose
herself to perpetual war. "Congress cannot see without jealousy", he
exclaimed, "another nation in possession of this territory with power
to incite the savages against us and to expose our frontier to contin-
2
ual invasion. If these principles are admitted as just, he insisted,
Spain has a right to conquer Canada in spite of the danger it would
bring the United States.
Luzerne in turn pointed out the loss of population which the
older states would surely suffer if the west were incorporated into
the union. He maintained that the balance of power would shift beyond
the mountains and finally the government itself would receive its di-
rection from the banks of the Mississippi. In reply to this Rutledge
advanced an idea entirely new to the French minister that the west
should be formed into states entirely independent of the east or con-
3
federated with it on equal terms.
The attitude of Rutledge is typical of the state of public
feeling. He was a patriotic American trusting in the good will of
France and Spain to recognize all the claims of his country. He, like
his countrymen, did not realize that Spain had any interest in the
west or believe that she had any right to it. Eastern Louisiana had
been for so many years a recognized part of the colonial domain that
1. "Rutledge appeared to have no knowledge of the question. He asked
me if this (the demand of Spain )would be the left bank of the Mississ-
ippi as far as the 31st parallel which Spain would ask as her bounda-
ry." Luzerne to Montmorin, Aug. 3. Espagne, 600, 7, no. 29.- Etats-
Unis, XIII, 7, 90.
2. Espagne, 600, 7, no. 29, p. 60. Etats-Unis, XIII,- 7, 90.
J, Espagne, 600, 7, no. 29, p. 62. Etats-Unis, XIII, 7, 90.

it seemed incredible another could make any claim to it. The feeling
of the country had been reflected In Congress, which took a definite
stand on the. western boundaries in its first instructions to Jay. The
mere fact, however, that this body so definitely stipulated the west-
ern and southern boundaries indicates that it feared the ambitions of
the Spanish court, and was resolved to seek as early recognition as
possible of its claims.
Against the historic belief of the American states was op-
posed the jealousy and greed of Spain. Greed and jealousy both were
there: that insatiable greed for land and wealth that has been the
curse of the Spanish monarchy, jealousy that a new power should rise
which might attain a degree of prosperity and strength that would her
own. Jealousy in this case was stronger even than Spanish greed, but
perhaps it was a jealousy not unmixed with fear. Spain had no need
for the fertile plains of Eastern Louisiana while across the river
were the boundless regions of her own territories, still undeveloped
and as yet hardly touched by cultivation. The east bank of the Miss-
issippi was beginning to show traces of improvement under the labors
of the hardy frontiersman, but there was not enough yet to tempt the
cupidity of Spain. It was jealousy - blind jealousy - that sought to
coop the new republic between the Alleghanies and the sea. It was
jealousy that had opposed the independence of the United States, that
SHJ.
had dictated the professed mediation, by the terms of which England
was to hold the inlets and outlets that of right belonged to this
country, and it was the same jealousy that opposed the union of Canada
and Nova Scotia to the new republic. It was a jealousy that assumed
many forms. Nov/ it was the fear of the example of rebellion before
the Spanish colonies, then it was the menace of a new power on her
frontiers, again it was the desire to recover the historic empire of
France
,
and finally it was the pretense of rendering justice to the

icqX «J i- ? —
Fnglish crown.
Vergennes had long understood this feeling of the Spanish
court^and it was one of the chief efforts of his diplomacy to render
it harmless. After the convention of 1779 he sought earnestly to
bring his allies into a new triple alliance2 against the power of the
British empire. Failing in this he turned his attention to holding
the balance even between the United States and Spain. The prime ob-
ject of the war, he had often declared, was to secure the independence
of the thirteen states without sacrificing any part of them. This was
a big guarantee and Spain insisted and enforced the contention that
she should be given equal advantages. From the first Vergennes had
found the office of mediator a trying one, in which he was frequently
the dupe of Spain, and yet he strove faithfully to fulfill his obliga-
tions to both. He drafted his first instructions to Luzerne at a time
when he did not know of the ambitions of Spain but had heard of the
extravagant demands of Congress for the conquest of Canada and the
Floridas. His decision in favor of giving to Spain the exclusive nav-
igation of the Mississippi river, he regarded as of little detriment
to the United States and as immensely valuable in the eyes of Spain.
His instructions to restrain the Americans from the spirit of conquest
in the west can in no sense be taken as a decision against the right
of the states to their western possessions. He had as yet received no
intimation of the overwhelming ambition of Spain but wished only to
preserve for her the province of West Florida, guaranteed to her in
the alliance between the two countries.
1. "The principle of personal interest directs the conduct of Spain
towards the United States." Vergennes, March IS, 1780. Espagne, 598,
16, no. 37.
2. "Spain takes no interest in the independence of the United States,
and the king is firmly opposed to recognizing it." Montraorin to Ver-
gennes, March 20, 1780. Espagne, 598, no. 110.

Luzerne interpreted his instructions to look after the in-
terests of Spain and to restrain the aggressions of the Americans with
more ardor than discretion. In them he found reference to some "lands
on the Mississippi conquered by the English" and another clause to
"prevent encroachments", 1 so when Miralles revealed his intention to
seek the annexation of the territory east of the Mississippi, he de-
cided to support these pretensions. In following this course of ac-
tion Luzerne exceeded his instructions, which did not in the least au-
thorize him to advance the pretensions of Spain but merely to restrain
the ambitions of the states. That the policy advanced by Miralles was
new to him and a complete surprise he frankly confessed, and he could
well assume that it was unknown to his master.
As soon as the question of Eastern Louisiana came up, Ver-
gennes sent new instructions to Luzerne, in which he did not pretend
to decide the merits of the dispute between his allies but advised
that Congress throw itself on the generosity of the king of Spain. 3
1. "As the Spanish possessions touch those of the United States or to
speak more accurately, there are on the Mississippi some lands con-
quered by England and as there is ground to believe that that power
will be dispossessed of them, their occupation will easily occasion
discussions between Spain and Congress, and it is of the greatest in-
terest to this assembly to prevent them, by fixing in a manner, clear,
precise, and invariable, the boundaries and pretensions of the United
States in that region and above all to prevent encroachments and to
hinder the southern provinces from giving way to the spirit of con-
quest." Vergennes to Luzerne, July 18, 1779. Etats-Unis, IX, 1, no. 41.
2. Etats.-Unis, XI, 30, no. 53.
3. "I do not know well enough their rights nor those of Spain to have
a fixed opinion in this matter, ... .but I think the Americans, if they
wish to conduct themselves wisely and decently can do no better than
expose with frankness and confidence their desires to the Catholic
king, not speaking of right, but saying that the magnanimity of this
monarch will dictate to them." Vergennes to Luzerne, Sept. 25, 1779.
Etats-Unis, X, 126, no. 38.

He was pleased with the result of Luzerne's conference with Congress
in January, 1780, and expressed his satisfaction at the liberality of
the Americans in making no claims to Florida. On the dispute between
Congress and the Spanish monarchy over Eastern Louisiana he gave as
his private belief the right of Spain to conquer this province, but
strongly urged his minister not to interfere or express an opinion on
the subject. 1 He realized that it was a delicate question and that if
France wished to keep the good will of her allies she must, under no
circumstances, interfere in their disputes. In August of the same
year he repeated these instructions in which he authorized Luzerne to
go no farther than to try to create in Congress a confidence in the
2justice of the Catholic king.
That Vergennes had the true interests of the American repub-
lic at heart is shown again in a particular project' to Lafayette in
which he advised him and Washington on the course America should take.
He suggested helping Spain conquer the Floridas in order to win her
good will but he also urged that they drive the enemy as far as possi-
ble from their territories. He declared that there would be great
danger to the Americans if England were left in possession of Florida,
the Mississippi, and Canada.
All the private opinions and public despatches of Vergennes
indicate a true interest in the welfare of the American republic. He
was willing to reward Spain for her services, but he never offered her
more than the Floridas. On the other hand he always insisted upon, as
the first triumph of the war, the independence of the United States in
their fullest extent. To justify to him their right to the Mississip-
pi valley was to insure his efforts to secure it. And this determina-
tion to secure the full rights of his ally remained his to the end.
1. Etats-Unis, XII, 7, no. 61.
2. Ibid, XIII, 8, no. 101.
3. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 318.

CHAPTER VIII
.
THE TRIUMPH OF THE ANTIGALLICAN PARTY.
The efforts of Luzerne had left the Congressional mind in a
state of indecision and the direction of further negotiations at Phil-
adelphia hung upon the success of Jay. If Spain showed a favorable
demeanor toward the new nation, her agents could hope for many conces-
sions; if she frowned upon its ambitions, the work of bringing about
an agreement must be begun again. Under theBe conditions all factions
awaited anxiously news from Spain. Some hoped for a message recording
failure, but the more moderate element in Congress expected an account
of mutual concessions. Luzerne feared that nothing would be accom-
plished and did his beet to prepare Congress for such intelligence.
He knew from the attitude of Miralles that the American demands would
not be granted, and he feared that Spain would reject all overtures of
an alliance.
The despatches of Jay giving an account of activities during
the spring of 1780, reached Philadelphia in August, 1 and were not as
unfavorable as Luzerne feared. The demands of Florida Blanca for the
exclusive navigation of the Mississippi were not unexpected, and his
suggestions for the western boundaries were so vague that no one could
understand them. The Spanish minister had mentioned Cape Antoine or
2
Antonio and another cape with name left blank. Where Cape Antonio
was, no one knew and there were various suggestions as to what the
other cape could be. No one could say in what direction the line was
to be drawn, but Luzerne suggested that it was a meridian extending as
3
far as Spain should wish to prolong it, and this was the occasion of
1. Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed
. ) , XVII ,727,7^7,749
.
2. Jay to Congress. 'Tharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 7?A .
Espagne, 600, 3, no. 108.
5. Espagne, 600, 8, no
.
108.

much more discussion. Some thought that it might be extended as far
as Lake Michigan in which all the western possessions of the states
i A-
would be cut off. The agitation continued for some time when on Aug-
ust 22 a committee of three 2 was appointed to report on the meaning of
this part of Jay's letter.'
Luzerne felt that his promise to liralles was fulfilled in
the arrival of Jay's letters and he at once proceeded to interview the
members of this committee in behalf of Spain. The report of Jay shed
such a different light on the Spanish demands that Luzerne felt at
loss to know what to insist upon, and so resolved to confine his ef-
forts to winning the confidence of the committee4 and of the other
members of Congress.
The first member whom he sought out was Joseph Jones, dele-
ct
gate from Virginia/ who had previously informed Luzerne that he dis-
approved of the ambitions of his state and that he considered "its im-
mense extent and that which it proposes to acquire as a cause of fee-
5
bleness and ruin". Jones declared that he still held to his princi-
ples but that he was bound by instructions from his constituents to
insist on the right to navigate the Mississinpi and to carry on trade
5
through some part of the gulf. These instructions said nothing of
1. Espagne, ^00, 8, no. 108.
2. Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVII, 734. The mem-
bers were Joseph Jones, George Walton and Thomas McKean.
Espagne, £00, 8, no. 108.
4. "I have believed that I ought to enter into some communication with
Congress as soon as these letters arrived, but I am still less in-
structed of the true intentions of Madrid.... I have determined to
see in particular each of the members of the committee to engage them
to depend on me to satisfy the court of Madrid." Luzerne to Montmo-
rin, Luzerne to Vergennes, Aug. 25. Etats-Unis, XIII, 73, no. 150.
Aug. 25, 1780. Fspagne, 600, 3, no. 108.
5. Report of Luzerne, Aug. 25. Etats-Unis, XIII, 73, no. 150. Es-
pagne, 600, 3, no. 103.

the boundaries, for Virginia had never imagined that they would be a I
cause of dispute, but Jones said, that under the circumstances, he
would not dare accede to the demands of Spain. Jones then passed on
to describe the annoyance and anger in Congress that an outside power
should attempt to take advantage of the distress of the states, and as
the interview progressed he began to show hostility to the designs of
Spain. in regard to the clause in Jay's despatch relating to the
boundaries Jones disolayed considerable feeling. He had placed the
Cape Antoine mentioned by Jay at a point fifteen leagues above the
mouth of the Ohio and complained that this boundary would rob the
states of the richest part of their patrimony.
1
Congress, he declared,
can treat with Spain only on solid and endurable terms and although it
can make some concessions they must be based on justice. If we cede
all this territory to Spain, he declared, she can not possess it, for
the people already there will never submit to her yoke.'' On the ques-
tion of the navigation of the Mississippi Jones soon became equally
obstinate. He insisted that this river and the St. Lawrence were the
only natural outlets of the west, and the people there had so long en-
joyed the use of the former that it would be impossible to make them
give it up.
To both conditions Luzerne responded vaguely and advised, in
accordance with Vergennes' instructions, that Congress should throw
itself on the generosity of the king of Spain. This did not satisfy
Jones who declared that it had been observed that if Spain had the
1. "....Our most beautiful territory will be threatened by invasion,
we shall see ourselves despoiled of the lands washed by the Ohio, and
the rivers Cherokas (Tennessee) and Cumberland, which empty themselves
after having watered the richest country of this continent, the numer-
ous population who possess it, and whose work has made it valuable
will be forced to abandon it. n Luzerne's report, Aug. 25. Etats-
Unis, XIII, 77, no. 150. Fsnagne, 600, 8, no. 108.
rl

- 164 -
right to take the western territories she had an equal right to con-
quer any place in the possession of the Fn^lish, such as Georgia,
South Carolina, or New York. Luzerne i.ranolitically replied that such
was the case but that the friendship of Spain would make no unjust de-
1
raands. This answer in no way satisfied the delegate, who had become
suspicious df Spanish intentions, and who in a great degree reflected
the ide^,s of Congress.
At this time Jennifer was absent and his aid was sorely
needed by the French minister; With the defection of Jones there was
no one on whom to rely and he was compelled to go in person to learn
the designs of the antigallicans
. The committee told him that the in-
structions to be given Jay on the question of the Mississippi would be
such that Soain could accept, but the members refused to commit them-
selves regarding the boundaries.
1
Luzerne was not content and went to
other members, whom he found agreeable enough in conversation, but who
2persisted in opposing his plans in Congress. At the same time there
was apparent a movement of the northern members to support the preten-
sions of the south and Luzerne conjectured that they were planning an-
other attack on Canada.
This belief soon became a certainty and Luzerne learned that
Canada was to be sought as a pledge for the evacuation of the southern
states. He did not believe, however, that the English would be wil-
ling to make the exchange and he thought they would attempt to unite
these states with the Floridas to form a new colony.
Deprived of any active assistance from the Americans Luzerne
1. Etats-Unin, XIII, 73, no. 150. Espagne, 600, 8, no. 108.
2. Luzerne, Aug. 25, 1780. Ibid.
3. Etats-Unis, XIII, 74, no. 152.

enlisted the services of his secretary Marbois and the two planned to
curb any radical policy that should get free rein In Congress. Then
r \ I
twoj found it difficult to get definite information, and Congress it-
self, torn by the fear of losing the assistance of Spain and the de-
sire to hold the I ississippi, was undecided what course to take. It
soon becam^clear, however, that this body would not yield, ^ne dele-
gate informed Luzerne that it was disposed to grant Jay greater dis-
cretion in regard to the Mississippi river, but on further discussion
he revealed that this discretion would allow only a more systematic
8
regulation of contraband.
On the question of the disposition of the western territo-
ries there were numerous opinions. Many members thought the report of
Jay was so vague that they could take no action on it, and wished to
wait for further advices. Luzerne regarded this delay as favorable
to the Spanish interests and he and his secretary strained every nerve
to win over a majority of Congress. In these negotiations he labored
under a great disadvantage in having no precise instructions fron
Spain and in not knowing the exact limit of her pretensions. Eagerly
he searched the papers of Miralles, left in the hands of the dead
Spaniard's secretary, but in them was no trace of the designs of Flor-
ida Elanca. Anxiously he awaited the arrival of a new Spanish agent,
4
who could furnish the chart of his movements. The legal status of '
the west claimed the attention of the learned Marbois. With members
of Congress he went over the charters of the different states, com-
1. Etats-Unis, XIII., SO, no. 186.
2. Ibid, 78, no. 176.
3. Luzerne to Vergennes,- Etats-Unis, XIII, 78, no. 176. Marbois to
Vergennes, -Ibid, XIV, 88, no. 14.
4. Luzerne to Vergennes, Sept. 19, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIII, 80, no. 186

-
1
pared then and pointed out that they were "contradictory, i nccnsi stent
and ridiculous" . In them he found imaginary boundaries and designa-
tions of countries that never existed. Under his logic and ridicule
the claim of immemorial right was abandoned and Congress took its po-
sition on the ground of occupation and possession."1
Borne down by the arguments of the Frenchman several members
of Congress indicated their willingness to accept a compromise. They
suggested the cession to Spain of the lands between the Mississippi
and the right bank of the Appalachicola, as far north as the river
2
Chikautaus. In these overtures T/uzerne had little faith for they
were bitterly attacked by the southern states who raised the cry that
Spain was seeking their dismemberment, and many northern delegates,
anxious to gain Canada, supported their contentions. One member
brought to memory an old resolution that the thirteen states were in-
dissolubly united, and argued from this that Congress must maintain
the right of the states to all their possessions and in no case could
Sit allow any diminution of territory. He demanded that it declare ir,
precise fashion the exact limits of the various states and draw up a
mutual guarantee to maintain them. Another delegate, in his anger,
proposed that, in case the Spanish court did not admit the American '
claims, Jay should be ordered to break off negotiations and quit the
country. Wiser counsels prevailed and neither of the propositions
passed. Congress did not wish to lose the aid of Spain by displeasing
her- but it put faith in Jay* 8 suggestion that if it remained firm she
would "finally be content with equitable regulations."
1. Marbois to Vergennes, Sept. SO, 1780. Etats-Unis ,7111 ,85 , no. 211.
2. Luzerne to Vergennes, Sept. 8, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIII, 78, no. 176,
3. Ibid. Luzerne states that there were motives but they are not giv-
en in any of the published journals of Congress.
4. Tharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 725.
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The decision in regard to new in struct ions to Jay hung fire I
until the beginning of October. Fvery day was expected to bring a
letter giving fuller and more definite explanation of Spain's proposed
boundary. Congress itself appeared to the French embassy, hopelessly
divided on the question. Some wished to follow Jay's advice to remain
firm, others insisted that the states should make reasonable sacri-
fices for the common good. So opposed were opinions that many would
not discuss them at all for fear of violent and bitter debates. 1
Jay had asked for definite instructions, and at last Jenni-
fer insisted that they be given him. "Decency, the regard due to
Spain, and the interests of the states," he said, "demand that we
2
should consider this affair without delay." He then moved that Jay
be instructed to nromise Spain satisfaction on the points in disputed
and defended his proposition in a lengthy speech, describing the fail-
ures of the last campaign and the necessity of help from Spain if in-
dependence were to be secured. Many speeches were made in answer to
hi 8 argument and the whole question of the boundaries and the naviga-
tion of the Mississippi was again gone over. Jennifer's opponents
discoursed on the sacred sanction of the charters, and declared the
necessity of conserving the rights of the states if unity and prosper-
ity were to be attained. They spoke of the generosity and fairness of
the king of France in contrast to the ambition of Spain and her evi-
dent intention to take advantage of their distresses. One speaker ex-
claimed that "if Spain had the right to make the conquest of all that
belonged to the king of Great Britain, His Catholic Majesty, by virtue
of this principle would form claims on Georgia and South Carolina
1. Barbe de Larbois to Vergennes, Oct. 10, 1780. Ftats-Unis, XIV,
SB, no. 14. The published journals of Congress do not give this mot la 1.
2. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 10, 1780. Ftats-Unis, XIV, 88, no. 14.
Z. The whole debate is described in Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 10.
Etats-Unis, XIV, 88, no. 14.

--
which were then in the hands of the British." Others asserted that ifl
they abandoned their fellow citizens, Spanish rule would prove so op-
pressive that revolution would soon break out. Especial emphasis was
also placed on the duty of Congress to protect the interests of the
states that were then invaded arid it was heralded about that if the
southern delegates assented to the cessions demanded "they would an-
swer for it with their heads."
1
The arguments of Jennifer were feebly
supported by the other members and the motion was finally lost.
On October 4 Congress unanimously8passed resolutions to ad-
here to its former instructions and two days later appointed a commit-
;
;tee consisting of Fadison, Sullivan and Duane to draft a letter to Jay,
Of this committee Marbois judged Madison to be the most moderate but
he was bound by instructions and could not recede from the pretensions
4
of his state. He was willing, however, to talk over the question
with the French envoy, who attempted in every way to get him to tone
down the letter to Jay. Madison was conciliatory in his attitude to-
wards France but he remained firm on the policy approved in Congress."
After the resolutions of October 4 there appears to have
been only one advocate of concession in Congress, Daniel of St. Thom-
as/ Jenifer had for nearly two years been a most earnest supnorter of
the Spanish alliance and had throughout shown entire willingness to
grant any sacrifice to obtain it. Before he had come to represent hit
state at Philadelphia he had, as president of the senate of Maryland,
5
attracted the notice of Gerard and the two had become firm friends.
1. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 10. Ftats-Unis, XIV, 88, no. 14.
2. Secret Journals, II, 325,- Marbois says somewhat ambiguously that
It passed by a plurality of six votes. Etats-Unis, XIV, 88, no. 14.
3. Marbois to Montmorin, Oct. 17. Espagne, 601, 10, no. 63.
4. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 21. Etats-Unis, XIV, 92, no. 29.
Marbois to Montmorin, Oct. 21. Espagne, 601, 11, no. 71.
5. Journals of the Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XII, 1141.

Upon entering Congress in November, 1778, he at once identified him-
self with the French party and soon became its most active and radi-
cal member. When the designs of Spain to get control of the west, be-
came noised about, and it became apparent that they received the sup-
port of the French minister, many of the old adherents of Gerard, men
like Jay and Gouverneur Morris, determined upon an independent course.
No so with Jennifer. He became an ardent enthusiast for any conces-
sion that would help to gain Spanish assistance or would please the
king of France. His views do not appear to have been regarded as un-
patriotic by his constituents at home or his colleagues in Congress.
He became the center of opposition to the combination of Samuel Adams
and the Lees to push Hew England interests in Canada and Virginian am-
bitions in the Mississippi valley. He was the first representative of
the small states party and drew to his side all factions jealous of
the dominance of the "Junto".
Maryland had no interest in a colonial policy and dreaded
the dominance of her southern neighbor. The navigation of the Miss-
issippi and the control of its valley meant no increase in her re-
sources but only an added expense to conquer them. Delaware, Pennsyl-
vania, New York and New Jersey were likewise circumscribed in their
limits and never displayed much enthusiasm for acquisitions to the
territory of their sister states. At the behest of Gerard^ Jennifer
had led the fight against the demands of Congress for the right to
navigate the Mississippi as expressed in Jay's first instructions. In
the winter of 1779-80 when Luzerne and Miralles were urging acquies-
cence in Spain's pretensions to the ownership of Eastern Louisiana,
Jennifer had been their spokesman and had continued the advocate of
Spain during the second struggle over the policy of Congress towards
the west
.
[ Not at all daunted by his defeat in the resolutions of Octo-

ber 4, Jennifer planned with Marbois 1 to renew the fight when the cora-
p
mittee should report its draft of the letter to Jay. They sought to
influence the members of Congress both by private conferences and by
arguments delivered before the whole assembly. They were still handi-
capped, however, by their inability to speak authoritatively on the
position of Spain. The secretary of Miralles had been left as charge
de affaires in Philadelphia and he had only a vague notion of the de-
sires of his court.' He was frightened, however, at the stand of
Oongresa and begged I::arbois to exert his influence in behalf of more
moderate measures. With different members of Congress different argu
ments were employed. To the more radical there was pointed out the
need of an alliance with Spain and the danger of displeasing her if
the claims of Congress were based on pretensions of right . To them it
was urged that the United States should throw themselves on the magna-
nimity and generosity of the Catholic king. To those who were very
friendly to the French king and yet suspicious of Spanish ambitions,
Marbois urged concession because it would please His Majesty, and this
argument, he thought, had. a powerful effect. Throughout the whole war
there were frequent expressions of gratitude for French aid, and on
these the French representatives depended, though with little success,
for substantial acts of gratitude. In this case, however, Marbois re-
ceived more than ordinary encouragement and felt confident of success.
Samuel Huntington himself, the president of Congress and a New Eng-
lander, expressed alarm at the prospect of incurring the enmity of
Spain and promised to urge moderation in the new instructions to Jay 1;
At the solicitation of Marbois and with his help Jenifer un-
1. Luzerne had left Philadelphia on his vacation.
2. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 10. Etats-Unis, XIV, 38, no. 14.
3. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 17, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIV, 91, no. 23.
Marbois to Montmorin, Oct. 17, 1780. Espagne, 601, 10, no. 63.
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dertook to prepare a memoir which would set forth the pretensions of
Spain in the most favorable light and answer all the arguments of the
opposition. 1 The result of his labors is the clearest and most con-
vincing exposition of Spain's position that appeared during the Revo-
o
lution. He goes over all the old questions of the validity of the
charters, the treaty of 17*7, the necessity of a well defined frontier
such as the Mississippi, and all the legal and diplomatic questions
involved. In this document the Maryland delegate argued that those in
terested in the question ought to have no voice in the decision, but
no states would consent to remain defenseless while its claims were
set aside. The most powerful point of his argument, however, was for
3
concessions to win the alliance of Spain.
His legal analysis, keen though it was, could have little
effect on a body of revolutionists who held it their duty to obey the
wishes of their constituents. Alliance with Spain, however, had be-
come a vital ouestion. Gates had been ignominiously defeated in South
4
Carolina and the interior of the whole region as well as the cities
along the coast were in the possession of the British/ The patriot
:
party in the south was broken up and such of its leaders as were alive
and free had fled to the north. It was the time of greatest discour-
agement for the American cause. The American army was unpaid and un-
provided for and the French king had refused to grant another subsidy
or to send more troops, and the French navy had for a long time ren-
1. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 17. Etats-Unis, XIV, 91, no. 27.
Larbois to l.ontmorin, Oct. 17. Esragne, 601, 10, no. 6^.
2. The title of this memoir was "Observations on the points contested
in the present negotiations between Spain and the United States." Cop-
ies were enclosed to Vergennes and Montmorin with the despatches of
:oct. i7.
p. Etats-Unis, XIV, 91, no. 25.
4. "Observations, etc ." with despatch of Oct. 17. Etats-Unis, XIV, 91,
no . 25 .
5* Ibid. Van Tyne, American Revolution, 501.

dered no service. In the midst of this general distress news of Ar-
nold's treason added to the all pervading spirit of gloom. 2
It was a fitting time to urge any concession to the help of
Spain and Jennifer made the most of his opportunity. In contrast to
the reverses of the Continental army, Spanish troops were victorious
on the Mississippi and it was believed would soon overrun the whole
territory in dispute. Why not then, he argued, make a virtue of ne-
cessity, and in return for the alliance of Spain grant that which we
2
can never hope to conquer? With the help of Spain he held that suc-
cess was assured; without it failure was inevitable. Under the exist-
ing conditions he believed that the war carried on by Spain was more
of harm than good to the American cause, for Spanish demands were a
drain on the resources provided by Prance, 'nth the Spanish troops to
attack from the south and the Americans from the north, he argued the
British would be between two fires and would soon be driven out of the
S
country
.
How are to secure this needed assistance? he asked. There
was only one way possible and that was to grant to the Catholic king
Eastern Louisiana and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi. In
this opinion he was backed up by the powerful influence of the French
4
embassy and he felt that Congress must agree to make the concession.
The opposition to surrendering American interests in the
west, strangely enough was led by New England, while the southern
states were rather inclined to give uo their claims. The eastern del-
,1. Marbois to Vergennes. Etats-Unis, XIV, 91, no. 27.
2. Van Tyne, American Revolution, 306.
3. "Observations on the points contested .... M with despatch of Oct. 17.
lEtats-Unis, XIV, 91, no . 26
.
4. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 17, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIV, 91, no. 26.
Larbois to Montmorin, Oct. 17, 17B0. Esioagne, 601, 10, no. 63.

egates argued that since Jay was on the ground hie opinion should be
I
of force and it was for remaining firm. Marbois, however, thought
there were other reasons for their stand. The eastern states had nev-
er been amenable to French influence and had been the hotbed of the
antigallican party. Their attitude had often before been attributed
to hostility to the French alliance and Marbois thought that this hos-
tility was more bitter in its opposition to Spain. In these states
the British power was considered broken and he believed that their
leaders wished to continue the war in order to conquer Canada and Nova
Scotia. 1 Still another reason he suggested, that they feared if the
ultimatum on the western boundaries was set aside, the southern states
would desert them on the issue of the northern limits.
The attitude of the middle states was more moderate. New
York held strongly for the former instructions on the western boundary
but was willing to surrender the navigation of the Mississippi. Mar-
bois believed that she hoped if the right to use this river were pro-
hibited, her citizens could then control the western trade by way of
the lakes and the Hudson. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Mary
land appeared, for the most part, indifferent to the west and strongly
anxious for the favor of the king of France and the alliance with
'Spain. Marbois thought that when the question came up for final de-
1
cision they would all vote in favor of his projects. Virginia led by
Madison was inflexibly opposed to any concession. The delegates from
the three southern states expressed to Marbois their opinion that
Spain should be conciliated, but declared they must not vote to make
any sacrifices of the rights of their states."1'
On October 17 the committee submitted its draft of a letter
to Jay explaining the "reasons and principles" on which the resolu-
1. Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 17, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIV, 91, no. 2*
.
Marbois to Montmorin, Oct. 17, 1780, Esmgne, 601, 10, no. 63.

tions of the 4th were founded. 1 This letter was prepared by Madison2
and is in his handwriting. 3 it presents a masterly defense of the
principles agreed upon two weeks before and answers in detail the mem-
oir of Jennifer with a breadth of view never attained by the member
from Maryland. It states simply and conciaely the position of Cong-
ress, then passes to a discussion of the questions involved. In his
contention for the Mississippi as the western boundary Madison ignores
the obsolete delimitations of the charters and bases his argument on
I the cession by the treaty of 1763. "It is sufficient that by the def-
inition of the treaty of Paris, of 1763, article seventh, all the ter-
ritory now claimed by the United States was expressly and irrevocably
ceded to the king of Great Britain, and that the United States are, in
consequence of the revolution in their government
, entitled to the
benefits of that cession." 4 The sovereignty of this territory, he
contended, was vested in the king of Great Britain in virtue of his
position as king of the people of America. Consequently when this sov-
ereignty over the thirteen states was overthrown, it returned to the
4people. "From these principles", he asserted, "it results that all the
[territory lying within the limits of the states, as fixed by the sov-
ereign himself, was held by him, for their particular benefits, and
must equally with his other rights, and claims in quality of their
sovereign, be considered as having devolved on them, in consequence of
; their resumption of the sovereignty to themselves." In answer to the
Spanish claim of right of conquest Madison replied that these con-
quests did not extend further north than Fort Natchez while the re-
mainder of the territory had been conquered and was held by American
j 1. Journals of the Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVIII, 935.
Secret Journals, II, 326
.
2. "Mr. Madison charged by his two colleagues to show in a memoir the
state of the question of the navigation of the Mississippi and the pos-
session of the lands situated on the left of that river has communica-
ted to me this writing...." Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 21, 1780,-
Etats-Unis, XIV, 92, no. 29; to Montmorin, Espagne, 601, 11, no. 71.
| Joygagyyi q£ thP finnt inentnl flnngrpRfl (H"*--* ^ , WT LLl^A7 .-— —
*
4. Ibid, 936.

arms. He furthermore insisted that the United States, as an indenend-J
ent nation, could not permit another power to conquer territory con-
tained within its limits. He defended the rights of the United
States to this territory on the grounds of a national boundary and its
settlement by American citizens. The right to navigate the Mississip-
pi river Madison based on arguments the same as those advanced for the
possession of the western territories, and the right of passage
through the Spanish possessions he supported by appeal to the law of
nations. The document as a whole shows much learning and a thorough
understanding of the principles of international law. It is clear in
exposition and expresses the most subtle ideas in a simple and concise
manner. In spite of the fact that Marbois considered the pretensions
of the United States as set forth in this document as too ambitious/
the letter was accepted by Congress, with the belief that it would
convince Spain of the justice of the American position. 4
According to Marbois, however, Jay was left much discretion
as to insistence on the resolutions of Congress. He was not to pre-
sent them as an ultimatum, and was authorized to retract as circum-
4
stances ana prudence suggested.
Although the French representatives did not approve the stan<:
of Congress they recognized a spirit of moderation that promised a
reasonable settlement. If Spain acceded to the conditions laid down
by Congress, Marbois wrote that her action would cause general satis-
faction in America. He was not, however, sanguine of such a conces-
1. Journals of the Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVIII, 97,8.
2. Ibid, 345.
3. '- Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 21. Etats-Unis, XIV, 92, no. 29.
4. "The nresident of Congress has said that he believes an impartial
power will find the new instructions satisfactory for the court of Ma-
drid." Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 21. Etats-Unis, XIV, 92, no. 29

sion, and sought to prepare Congress for harder terns. He was handi-
capped in his efforts by ignorance of the full extent of Florida Blan-
ca's demands 1 and felt constrained to inform Congress of his lack of
definite knowledge.
The decision of Congress in these instructions to Jay marks
the end of the personal diplomacy of the French ministers. Upon the
gratitude of Congress and personal council to individual members of
Congress Gerard and Luzerne had built up a powerful machine in the in-
terests of Spanish ambition. One by one the members of this organi-
zation had fallen away, and after the debate of October, several
months elapse before Jenifer's name appears in the votes of Congress. 2
With his departure the last partisan of the old French party disap-
pears and the diplomacy at Philadelphia begins to assume the character
of international relations.
This effort of Luzerne and Ilarbois also marks their last at-
tempt at active intervention in behalf of Spain. Gardoqui, the suc-
cessor of Miralles, had arrived and he neither gave information to the
French representatives nor sought their confidence. Henceforth there
is no intimation that French and Spaniard are hand in glove and Gardo-
qui is left in independence to pursue his aims. Another reason for
this withdrawal from Spanish affairs may be found in the instructions
of Vergennes. He had -nreviously declared his ignorance of American
rights in the west and he feared incurring the distrust of the United
States. In ccnseauence he directed his representative to cease his
1. He believed, however, that Spain "had demanded at this moment of
Congress that part of Louisiana which in the atlas of Damible is com-
prised between the Mississippi on the west, the Floridas on the south,
the river Athbarcnus or Anpalachicola on the east, and a line drawn
from the sources of these rivers to the mouth of the Ohio in the Miss-
issippi." Marbois to Vergennes, Oct. 21. Etats-Unis, XIV, 92, no.
29, p". 112.
2. He is not recorded as voting until April, 178].
?. See ante, p.

interference and to urge nothing against the will of Congress.
1
Thus by the close of 17R0 the United States had received
recognition in spirit as previously in fact and was no longer a merp
protege of the French monarchy. It was acknowledged that Congress
could judge of its own rights and interests and was not to be domina-
ted by notions of sentiment. Spain must seek her ends through the
channels of ordinary diplomacy and the United States were henceforth
permitted to work out their own destiny.
1. See ante, p.

CHAPTER IX.
THE CT.OSE OF THE WAR.
Congress proceeded to the exercise of its new found freedom
with moderation and discrimination. Harbois had expressed the belief
|
that the shifting membership of this body would sooner or later cause
a change in its policy 1 and within a few months his opinion was appar-
ently justified. While Congress had unanimously agreed in October to
the resolutions on the boundaries, these, in no sense, expressed the
ideas of all the members and many of them assured riarbois that they
would be satisfied with less extended limits, but that political con-
aitions made it necessary to present a united front.
There were other conditions however that pointed to the ne-
cessity of concession. Cornwallis now held Georgia and South Carolina
'and had advanced northward far enough to proclaim North Carolina a
j 3
conquered province, and it appeared that without more effective aid
i these three states were lost to the union. In the north Washington
was inactive, and no additional help was then expected from the French
Still another danger menaced the Americans; the danger that Spain
[would make a separate peace with Great Britain, and early in 1781 came
a letter from Jay which aroused greater doubts of Spanish designs.
Jay had learned of Cumberland's mission and of Spain's disavowal of any
^ 4
I
purpose to treat independently, but Cumberland still remained. "If
they have rejected all overtures of Britain why is Mr. Cumberland
i 5
still here?" asked Jay,' and his suspicions found an immediate e cho
jl. karbois to Vergennes, Get. 21, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIV, 92, no. 29.
2. luarbois to V°rgennes , Oct. 21, 1780. Ibid, 92.
S. Van Tyne, American Revolution, 324.
4. See ante, p.
5
.
Jay to Congress, Nov. 6, 1780. Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 148.
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Congresr . ~ i
The leaders of Congress had abandoned their claim to any
territory by charter right, 1 ana now realized that their claims, in
order to be effective, must be maintained on other grounds. They un-
derstood at last that when they came to treat for peace the enemy
would surrender territory in their possession only for adequate compen-
sation. This truth had been urged upon by Vergennes and his minister,
'who had insisted that their first aim should be to expel the enemy
from their borders," but nothing had been accomplished. How with the
, British in possession of the southern states, and the Spaniards active
along the Mississippi, Congress resolved to retrieve itself and pro-
j
posed two plans of action: an effective military campaign, and renewed
efforts to obtain help from Spain. Washington was entrusted with the
military plans and prepared for energetic measures. Once more he
I turned his eyes towards Canada and succeeded in convincing the reluct-
ant Luzerne of the advisability of its conquest. Luzerne expressed
I
the desire of his court to free the French in Canada as it had done
! the Anglo-Saxons in the united colonies, and its eagerness to attempt
I any measure for the humiliation of England'; and he also wrote to his
I master that he thought the invasion would be "practical and of great
I utility" . Vergennes lent a favorable ear but urged that the British
ishould first be expelled from the territories of the United States.
I
After this should be accomplished he would be willing to support the
I
undertaking, for he regarded it as necessary that at least Halifax and
Penobscot "should belong either to us or the Americans".
1
The project
1. See ante, o.
2 . See ante
,
p .
3. Luzerne to Vergennes, Nov. 3, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIV, 95, no. 49.
4. Luzerne to Vergennes, April 29, 1731. Etats-Unis, XVI, 137, no. 62.
5. Vergennes to Luzerne, Oct. 22, 1790. Etats-Unis, XIV, 9, no. 32*
wee. Z2, "l'7 0. Ibid, no. 95.

Was continually discussed In Congress 1 but military events forbade its
undertaking. The advance of Cornwall! s to the north threatened the
central states and gave an opportunity to capture the British general
boo good to lose and thus ended the last attempt against Canada.
In the Mississippi valley American power was equally preca-
rious although in the regions of Kentucky and Tennessee settlers from
the states had occupied the land and it seemed that possession here
was assured. The expedition of Clark had given claim to a large part
of the territory north of the Ohio but the British 3till held posts
K
on the lake shore, such as Niagara, Detroit, and Macinac, and these
commanded an extensive region. To reduce these posts Washington felt
was necessary, but he did not have the military strength necessary,
but he offered to aid Virginia in any attempt she might make against
them. The Spaniards in this region had become an object of fear. ;
Their designs on Eastern Louisiana were well known and their expedi-
tions along the Mississippi were not of a character to reassure the
Americans. *~ Galvez had early captured the British posts on the lower
Mississippi without protest, but when in 1781 the Spanish commander at
St. Louis sent an expedition across the Illinois country which cap-
tured St. Joseph, there was a cry of alarm among patriotic Americans.
1. This measure was chiefly fostered by the New Fngland delegates who
insisted that their states would never be secure as long as Great Brit
ain held Canada. Samuel Adams was most urgent for this,- Luzerne to
Vergennes, April 29, 1731. Etats-Unis, XVI, 157 ^ no. 62. The south-
ern delegates in order to avoid any division in Congress supported
New England but only to the limits fixed in 1779,- Luzerne to Ver-
gennes, May 12, 1731. Etats-Unis, XVI, 139, no. 7.5.
2. Washington to Jefferson, Dec. 23, 1780. Writings (Ford ed.), IX, 31.
3. Geo. Rogers Clark to John Todd, March, 1730. "I am not clear but
that the Spaniards would fondly suffer their settlements in the Illi-
nois to fall with ours for the sake of having the opportunity of re-
taking both." John Todd Papers in Chicago Historical Society Collec-
tions, IV, p. 326.
4. E. G. Mason, March of the Spaniards across Illinois, Magazine of
American History, XV, 457. He regards this expedition as an attempted
conquest of the Northwest.
"I see by the newspapers that the Spaniards, having taken a lit-
- 1
! 3 L •_ I _ » , iiu i.o nadfl ft connw- at—a~ j ' 1,.

There is no evidence that Spain had any designs on territory north of
the Ohio, but her intrigues to obtain that south of this river con-
vinced nany that she was trying to get possession of the whole ^Miss-
issippi valley.
In harmony with Washington's idea, and possibly on his sug-
gestion, two expeditions were planned against the Northwest,
1
onp was
to be composed of the French "habitants" along the Mississippi under
p
the leadership of La Balme, the other was to be made up of troops
from Virginia and Kentucky, commanded -by Colonel Clark. La Balme was
the first to start. Early in 1780 he had gone west with a commission
from Congress, and began stirring up the Indians and French against
linois country. In what light does this proceeding appear to Cong-
I
ress? While they decline our proffered friendship are they to be suf-
|
f ered to encroach on our bounds and shut us up within the Appalachian
; mountains? I begin to fear they have some such project." Franklin to
.Livingston, April 12, 1782. Writings (Smyth ed.), VIII, 425.
"The ne?/s of the capture by the Spaniards of Fort Joseph on the
;
river of the same name has come to Congress. This establishment....
seems to be of so little use to Spain and is so difficult to guard
I
that we can not conceive by what motive she has made the conquest. It
I
has caused the greatest surprise to the Americans and a delegate of
New York told me that it was extraordinary that this power should make
I
conquests in tne very center of the state." Luzerne to Vergennes,
! Aug. 9, 1782. Etats-Unis, XXII, 261, no. 8, p. 24.
"The Madrid Gazette of 12th March contained a paragraph of which
you ought not be ignorant." Then follows description of expedition to
j
St. Joseph. "The destruction of the magazine of provisions and goods
which the English had there ... .was not the only advantage resulting
from the success of this expedition, for thereby it became impossible
j for the English to execute their plan of attacking the fort of St.
1 Luis of the Illinois; and it also served to intimidate these savage
nations and oblige them to promise to remain neuter, which they do at
[present." Jay to Congress, April 28, 1782. VJharton, Dip. Cor. ,V, 364
' Herein lies sufficient explanation for the raid.
I
l."It appears to me that an expedition against the forts of Niagara
j
and Detroit has been secretly resolved." Luzerne to Vergennes, Hay
I
12, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVI, 139, no. 75.
j
2. La Balme was a French officer sent over by Deane in 1777. Ante, p.
3. Luzerne to Vergennes, Hay 12, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVI, 139, no. 75.
4. "Colonel de la Balme, who came from Congress, provided with a com-
mission of inspector general of all the cavalry in America, and with
a letter of recommendation, dated June 25, 1780, addressed to the_ sup-
pliants by Mr. Fowler, who was formerly our commandant...." Petition
; to the governor by inhabitants of Kaskaskia, May 4, 1781.
T'askaskia Records, 2^7.
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against the British. His activities aroused among the Americans sug-
O
picions that he was in the employ of Prance, but in spite of their
opposition he proceeded westward to Easier ski a. There he found the "hab-
itants" full of hatred towards the "Virginians" who, they claimed, had
J
despoiled and were oppressing them. He skillfully appealed to their
patriotism as Frenchmen and promised them redress from Congress whom
4
;he would inform of their plight. Through his efforts a small force
5
of French settlers was raised which started towards Detroit but be-
fore it reached its destination -the little band was ambushed and La
Balme and most of his force was slain.
1. La Balme to Luzerne, June 27, 1780. Kaskaskia Records, 163.
12. Bentley to Clark, July 30, 1780. Kaskaskia Records, 169.
|S. Luzerne to Vcrgennes, May 12, 1781. Etats-Unis, WI, 139, no. 75.
4. La Balme to the French settlers on the Mississippi, Sept. 17, 1780,
i
Kaskaskia Records, 181. In accordance with his promise La Balme ad-
dressed a memorial to Luzerne asking him to intercede with Congress
for them as ancient subjects of France. Luzerne sympathized with their
,
condition, but since they were now citizens of the United States he
' did not feel at liberty to make any formal demands in their behalf and
! contented himself with speaking privately to various members of Cong-
ress .
5. "A colony of French established on the banks of the Mississippi in
j the county of Illinois, at the post of "askaskia, has thought recently
that it should undertake an enterprise against the fort of Detroit and
'under the conduct of Mr. La Balme, went up the !
'Tabash...." Luzerne to
jvergennes, May 12, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVI, 1.39, no. 75.
! 6. There has been some suspicion that La Balme' s expedition was a
i
scheme of France to get possession of the Northwest, (Turner, Am.
'Hist. Rev., X, 255), but there appears no direct evidence for such a
theory. Against this idea may be placed the whole policy of Vergennes
!
in opposition to conquests. Direct evidence against this is Luzerne's
1 letter to Vergennea in which he reports the expedition merely as news,
. speaking of his refusal to interfere in behalf of the French "habi-
tants", and describes the Kaskaskians who "recognize the supreme au-
thority of Congress", and in general approves the American project of
'attacking the Northwest. Luzerne to Vergennes, March 12, 1781. Etats-
Unis, XVI, 139, no. 75.
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In the east Clark was slow in raising his troops and before
he could start events were hurrying the war to a close, and the expe-
dition never set out.
Luzerne had merely agreed to the invasion of Canada, but the
i expedition against the Northwest met his earnest approval. "If it
; succeeds", he wrote, "it assures the frontier of the thirteen states
to the north. It will make them (the Americans) masters of two im-
portant T?osts on Lakes Michigan, Huron, Frie, and Ontario, which are
j
in the compass of the limits which they have fixed, and this possessia
; would give them the means to negotiate on a footing much more advan-
I
tageous with Great Britain." 1 The failure to concmer these posts re-
,
suited as Luzerne had foreseen, and with the British in possession of
them they long remained a fruitful cause of trouble.
In the south Washington realized the seriousness of affairs,
2
but felt powerless to remedy conditions without the help of Spain.
,
If the Spanish attack on Florida were made more energetic, he believed
I that the British would have to evacuate at least a oart of these re-
's
:
gions and both Spain and the United States would reap the benefit.
j Nothing cam of this plan for Spanish cooperation but De Grasse prom-
' ised to join the American general in August for a campaign along the
i
i
I
Chesapeake. Before the French admiral could arrive, Cornwallis, se-
|
cure in the possession of the southern states, moved into Virginia,
and there was fought the final battles, to drive the British from the
; United States.
The desperate condition of its affairs inclined Congress to
J
offer concessions in return for Spanish aid, and before the end of
II. Luzerne to Vergennes, March 12, 1781* Etats-Unis, XVI, 139, no. 75
2. '.Washington to Fitzhugh, Nov, 3, 1780. Writings (Ford ed.), IX, 27.
5. .Washington to Rochambeau, Dec. 15, 1780. Ibid, 58.
4. Van Tyne, American Revolution, ^26.
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1780 some of the southern delegates confided to Luzerne their interi-
tion to reopen negotiations in regard to the west. 1 They had decided
on the sacrifices to make, and a delegate from Georgia was to present
the motion, by which, according to Luzerne', Congress was to surrender
"one hundred miles of land on the left bank of this river" (Mississic.
2 y
pi)
.
There was the same old alignment of parties; the New England
states and Virginia opposing any concession while a majority of the
other delegates favored it. It is notev/orthy, however, that one dele-
gate from Virginia in voting against the measure declared that he did
so in accordance with the instructions of his state but that he re-
garded it as necessary to win by some means the friendship and protec
2
tion of Spam. This measure did not go through, but the agitation
was continued and on February 15 a compromise resolution was passed
,7hich authorized Jay to give up the claim to navigate the Mississippi
below the thirty-first parallel, provided the right of navigation a-
x>ve this line was recognized. Nothing was said of any cessions in
the Mississippi valley, and it was armarent that Virginia and her New
England allies would maintain their position in regard to the western
territories. Congress regarded theseA as the most liberal it could
Offer in its negotiations with Spain and felt little doubt of their
acceptance. Luzerne had also come to the belief that Spain would ac-
cede to the treaty of alliance if she were given control of the mouth
of the Mississippi and had ceased urging extreme measures on Congress!
1. Luzerne to Vergennes, Nov. 26, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIV, 100, no. 39.
2. Luzerne to Vergennes, Dec. 15, 1730. Ibid, 103, no. 120.
3. Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 257. Secret Journals, II, 393.
4. Luzerne thought there was a deal by which the northern states were
to support Virginia* s pretensions to the west, and she in turn was to
support their claims to Maine and an extended northern boundary. Lu-
iZerne to Montmorin, Dec. 19, 1730. Esp.
,
601, 12, no. 191.
5. Resolutions of I ay 23, 1731. Secret Journals, II, 407. A resolu-
tion to allow greater concessions was unanimously defeated on Aug. 10.
Ibid, 463. °
6. Luzerne to ^..Lnorln,
: l, 1781. Esp., rp^
>
no. ^1.
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These resolutions agreeing to relinquish the navigation of
the Mississippi gave new life to the negotiations at Madrid. In Jan-
uary Florida Blanca had demanded this as the sine qua non of entering
the alliance, but Jay had not felt at liberty to grant it and Franklin
had approved his stand. 1 In all his efforts Jay had been counseled by
tontxoorin, the French ambassador, but after the ultimatum of Florida
Blanca, both agreed that nothing further could be done on the question
until the general settlement of peace. 2
On the 18th of May the resolutions of Congress to relinquish
the navigation of the Mississippi below the thirty-first parallel
reached Jay, and on the next day he attempted to reopen negotiations
with Florida Blanca. He did not however reveal his instructions,
though he strongly suspected that the Spanish minister already knew
them. He was still opposed to the cession of the right of navigation
and resolved to make one more effort to conserve it. After all, he
reasoned, Spain will fight as well in our cause without a treaty as
with one. On the 23rd of May the American envoy had another interview
with the Spanish minister, in which he "gave him to understand that
ongress views the speedy accomplishment of this union as very import-
ant to the common cause; and therefore if Spain would consent forth-
with to come into it, in that case they would gratify his majesty by
ceding to him the navigation of the Mississippi below their territo-
ries on reasonable terras." Florida Blanca showed no inclination to
agree to these conditions and declared the whole question could be bet
ter adjusted in a general ppace." Jay then went to Montmorin who ad-
1. I was pleased to find by our last despatches from Congress that
the sentiments expressed in mine of Oct. 2 in respect to selling the
river, happened to coincide with theirs." Franklin to Jay, Jan. 27,
1731. Writings (Smyth ed.), VIII, 202.
2. Jay to Congress, Oct. 3, 1731,- V/harton, Dip. Cor., IV, 739. Mont-
morin to Vergennes, ..larch 12, 1731,- Esp., 602, no. 13, p. 360. "Mr.
Jay counts very little on the success of all his attempts to treat
^
6l
\
i
7»i -^op 1^^
1 n
^
eg°re pfrhe Peace." Montmorin to Vergennes, July
3. Jay to Congress, Oct. 3, 1731. Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 73R-74'

vised hin to continue his efforts, and that the exclusive navigation '
of the Mississippi ought to satisfy Spain, and in accordance with
I
tins suggestion Jay wrote a note to Florida Blanca explaining the po-
,
sit ion of his country in the same light as he had previously done in
conversation.^ Florida Blanca delayed giving an answer for some time
until on July 13 Jay communicated to him a copy of the instructions
approved by Congress on May 23.' No answer was returned but Florida
Blanca excused himself on account of ill health and the press of busi-
ness, but in September he again asked Jay to submit in definite terms
I
the demands of Congress in regard to the boundaries and the Mississip-
pi
.
In reply Jay sent a project of a treaty of alliance which fol-
lowed exactly the conditions laid down by Congress and which contained
!
a guarantee by Spain of all territories north of the thirty-first par-
allel and east of the Mississippi. 4 In regard to the article regard-
ing the Mississippi Jay dwelt at length on the sacrifices it would en-
tail on the inhabitants of the west, and prayed that the generosity of
|
the king would give them some relief. He was careful however to de-
clare that this concession was made only in return for Spanish help
' and would not be considered if postponed till the time of a general
4
peace. This was practically the end of the negotiations with Spain
i on the question of an alliance and the disputes over the Mississippi,
|
for the Spanish minister never could find time to discuss the question
until aft er Jay had departed from Spain.
1. Montmorin to Vergennes, July 6, 1781. Esp., 604, 44, no. 21.
2. Jay to Congress, Oct. 3, 1781. Wharton, Din. Cor., IV, 747. A
copy was sent to Montroorin.
Jay to Congress, Oct. 3, 1781. Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 749.
4. Jay to Congress, Oct. 5, 1781. Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 7^ et seq
.
A copy of this projected treaty is in the French foreign office. Esp.
604, 6S, no. 137. Through some error Van Tyne asserts that "Jay never
revealed these instructions", (American Revolution, 312), while both
Jay and h ontmorin assert the contrary.
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In all his efforts Jay had been ably seconded by the French
ambassador, although to hira Florida Blanca had dwelt much on the per-
fidy of the Americans, whom he declared to be still devoted to Great
I
Britain. The Spanish minister reiterated his fear of aggressions by
the United States, and declared that this was why he would not enter
;
the alliance. He acknowledged that independence was assured but ex-
pressed the hope that the .American republic would always remain feeble
To ~iake sure of this he recalled the old project of the uti possidetis
and planned to leave Great Britain in possession of New York, Charles-
ton and Chesapeake Bay. This he felt would keep the states in subjec-
1
tion. Montmorin answered him decidedly and firmly. He ridiculed the
idea that a people who had fought as savagely as they for so many
years could find any love for their old foe and he declared the policy
of Spain, if carried out, would make of them dependencies of the com-
mon enemy and thus render fruitless the war. If Great Britain should
keep these important posts of the states, he argued, their independ-
ence will not be absolute, and their commerce will be a Drey to the
caprice of England. He nointed out that if Spain desired them to re-
main weak, her wish was assured by the very constitution of the con-
federacy. 1 These arguments had no effect on the Spanish court and it
remained obstinately set against the recognition of American independ-
ence .
The failure of the negotiations of Jay made impossible an
alliance between Spain and the United States. Spain had never desired
their independence, and had always hated the Americans as rebels. She
had first aided them, only out of hostility to Great Britain, but at
the same time had tried in every way to cripple them as a nation. It
is true she had proffered them assistance after she had entered the
war on her own ac count, but it was only to accomplish her own ends,
1. Montmorin to Vergennes, March 12, 1781. Esp., no. 18, p. 310,

and she demanded immediate recompense, rhr fWnish^Fthem mea.no to
undertake the conquest of the Ploridas, but with the understanding
that these provinces should be given to her. 1 After her own nilitary
successes she had repudiated her former promises and sought to en-
croach on the interests of the hated insurrectionists. By her conven-
tion with France she had limited her ambitions in America to the con-
quest of a part of the Ploridas, but it was not long until her agent
at Philadelphia was seeking to extend her influence over the lower
Mississippi valley. '.'.Tien Congress refused this concession, Spain de-
cided to seek it in other ways and henceforth treated the pretensions
of the new republic with scornful indifference.
The ambitions of Spain were quickly discerned by the keen
minded Franklin, who had suspected them in the negotiations over the
ississipni and had become more strongly convinced when he heard of
the Spanish expedition against St. Joseph. During all the tedious
discussions at Madrid, Franklin had been the adviser of Jay and it was
doubtless his influence that determined the attitude of our envoy at
adrid
.
In Congress too the failure of Jay's negotiations increased
the feeling of distrust and hostility towards Spain, a feeling which
had been growing for some time and had its origin in the schemes of
i:iralles. The demand of Spain for the exclusive navigation of the
Mississippi and her manifest designs on Eastern Louisiana had been a
constant cause of friction, and the attack on Fort St. Joseph had pro-
's
duced serious alarm. Added to these was the failure of Spain to fur-
nish assistance in the war and her refusal to grant recognition to th
1. See ante, p.
2. See ante, p.
S. See ante, p.
4. See ante, p.
5. Luzerne to ! ontmorin, Sept. 1, 1781. Esp., 605, 19, no. 119.

new republic. 1 The measure conceding to Spain the exclusive naviga-
tion of the Mississippi had been forced through Congress only under
the pressure of circumstances and then with difficulty, and when it
became apparent that Spain did not immediately come to terms the oppo-
sition increased. 'Then news reached Philadelphia in the spring of
17S1 of the inability of Jay to form a treaty, discontent flamed into
indignation, and many members of Congress demanded that all negotia-
tions be broken off." They felt that the United States had conceded
too much under the stress of adversity, and now that Yorktown had gone
into history they wished to deprive Spain of this concession. Many
schemes were suggested. One member advanced the idea of offering Rus-
sia an establishment in Eastern Louisiana as a check to Spanish ag-
ression and a guarantee of peace in the west. 2 Congress, however,
contented itself with a resolution introduced by ITadison that "the
limitation affixed by him (Jay) to the proposed surrender of the navi-
gation of the I ississinpi in particular corresponds with the views of
Congress; that they observe not without surprise and concern, that a
proposition so liberal in itself, and which removed the only avowed
obstacle to a connexion between the United States and his catholick
majesty, should not have produced greater effects on the counsels of
the latter." This resolution further declared that the concession
was offered for an immediate alliance with Spain and that every delay
detracted from the reason for the sacrifice. Congress further urged
its commissioner that if any treaty were framed it should be on more
liberal terms and with this the question of the navigation of the Miss
1. Luzerne to tfontraorin, Sept. 1, 1731. Fsp., 60S, 19, no. 119.
2. "Those who have confided to me this project, pretend to know with
certainty that Russia as a maritime power is ambitious of forming an
establishment in America." Luzerne tc Vergennes, May 10, 3 7R2. Ftats-
Unis, XXI, 23*, no. 43, p. 15*.
3. Secret Journals, III, 99. Resolution of April 30, 1782, Charles
Thompson to Llontmorin, Lay PA, 1732. Esp., ^07, 23, no. 99.
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issippi river passed out of the diplomacy of the American Revolution.
The treaty with Spain was not made, and her refusal to treat with con
sideration the desires of the United States led to enmity between the
two countries that, during the negotiations for peace, made them act
in constant opposition.
The jealousy and ill will of the Spanish court did not es-
cape the observation of the watchful Vergennes. He had been irritated
at her refusal to acknowledge the independence of the United states,
and her grasping ambition had angered him. He had hoped for a more
liberal policy but the communications of Montmorin had at last con-
vinced him of her hostility to his American allies. 1 He believed tha
Florida Blanca would never accede to the alliance and that the whole
question in dispute between the two countries would have to be thrash-
ed out at the time of the settlement of peace, and even then he feared
the selfishness of Spain, although he believed it useless to continue
the negotiations in face of her obstinacy
. By his advice all efforts
to induce Spain to sign the treaty of alliance were discontinued, and
for the remainder of the war Vergenne3 sought to obtain such harmony
of action as the conditions would permit.
Vergennes was the more willing to leave the questions be-
tween Spain and the United States unsettled until the common dangers
were oast because he realized that the difference between the two
1. "For a long tine I have been convinced that Florida Blanca holds
erroneous principles in regard to America and that he is secretly con-
trary to the independence of the United States, and that he will* cause
us as much embarrassment as he can when we come to treat this matter
directly with Great Britain." Vergennes to Montmorin, April 12, 1781.
Esp., 607, 22, no. 25. On Inarch 14, 1732 Vergennes expressed the same
sentiment with more assurance. Fsp., POP, 11, no. 159.
2. "In this state of things I think it would be in vain to try to con-
vert Florida Blanca, and that we have nothing better to do than to
maintain with firmness the system which we have adopted relative to
the Americans and to abandon to time and circumstances the conversion
of this minister." Vergennes to Montmorin, April 12, 1781. v sp.,
'07
1 22, no. 25.
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countries was likely to lead to serious conseouences
. He had never
held any negotiations with the Spanish court on the western territo-
ries, but he knew from the reports of his representatives in America
the extent of its claims, and shrewdly surmised that these kept Flori
da Blanca from treating with Congress. 1 His best hope was to keep
these conflicting pretensions under cover until the war was finished,
and he continued to keep absolute silence on the question, and en-
joined his subordinates to do the same. 1
The closing years of the war pressed no less heavily upon
Prance than upon the United States. The French government had un-
flinchingly borne the expenses of many campaigns but the strain was
beginning to tell. Vergennes was not the first to complain. There
were others in the government who felt that France had already gone
beyond her strength. In September, 1730 Maurepas informed the king
that the finances were in such a state that they could no longer sup-
port the war and declared that peace was imperative. Vergennes even
then did not retract his position and there was a cabinet crisis in
which his leading opponents quit office and he was given full charge.
This did not relieve the finances, however, and Vergennes himself was
compelled to take measures looking towards peace.
His difficulty was to satisfy the demands of Spain. He had
promised her Minorca, Jamaica, and Gibraltar, but only the first had
fallen, and the others were strongly held by the enemy. ' It appeared
likely that Spain could not get the objects for which she had entered
the war, and now she was clamoring for indemnity in other regions.
Florida Blanca believed that Spain could receive the greatest advanta-
1. Vergennes to Luzerne, Aug. 12, 1782. Etats-Unis, XXII, 38, no. 17
I advised him (Luzerne) to be very reserved on the affairs of Spain
and to leave to Congress the care of the treaty by Jay." Verpennes toMontmorin, April 12, 1781. Esp., 603, 22, no. 25.
2. Lecky, American Revolution (Woodburn ed.), 425.

ges in a settlement on the basis of uU possidetis t l which would givft
her Minorca and the Ploridas, besides some minor conquests, and which
would leave New York and the three southern states in the hands of the
! British. Under these terms also it is probable that Spain would have
I insisted on the possession of Eastern Louisiana as she had already
claimed its conquest, while the Northwest Territory would have remain©
with the British empire.
At the same time it was apparent that the British ministry
was preparing to meet the terms of Spain, and to accomplish the dis-
imemberment of the American union." To this end the Britons were con-
centrating their forces in the southern states and pushing their power
resolutely northward. This threatened partition of the Confederacy
alarmed the Americans and the southern states protested vigorously
against making peace on any other terms than the independence of all.
j Congress at once expressed its determination not to surrender any of
; the states, although in the gloomy months before Yorktown Luzerne
| thought that in case of another serious reverse Georgia might be given
4
!
up
.
Military reverses, financial difficulties, and the demands
of Spain, all were a source of anxiety to Vergennes. He knew that
France could not much longer maintain the struggle, but he felt that
the royal honor demanded independence for all the revolted states.
Cpain's suggestion of uti possidetis he absolutely refused to discuss
and he insisted that France would stand by her alliance with the Amer-
1. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 496.
2. Luzerne to Vergennes, ; arch §1, 1731. Etats-Unis, XVI, 132, no. 25
Luzerne to Vergennes, May 4, 17B1 . Ibid, 178, no. 69.
5. Observations upon the effects of certain late political suggestions
by the delegates of Georgia. Enclosed with despatch of Jan. 31, 1781.
Etats-Unis, XV, 119, no. 12.
4. Luzerne to Vergennes, March 31, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVI, 132, no. 25
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icans - X He realized that back of Spain's demands were motives of
~~
jealousy and hatred for the new republic, for whose interest he was
bending every effort. At the same time he realized that unless the
allied cause should achieve some striking success it would be impossi
ble to force the British to abandon their recent conquests, and he in
structed Luzerne to "familiarize" Congress with the idea that some
acrifices might be necessary. It was with the greatest reluctance
that Vergennes conceded this idea, and he was still determined to do
all in his power to prevent such terms, for he was sensitive on the
maintenance of French honor.
2
In his opposition to the demands of
pain Vergennes acted on principles that should not be called selfish.
He realized that France would gain more by such a settlement than by
any other terms, for French fleets had made many valuable conquests.
During the greater part of 1731 French arms were engaged as seldom be-
fore in upholding the honor of France and the faith of the king.
In order to protect the states Vergennes resolved on more
aggressive military action, and urged upon Spain an attack on East
A
Florida and Jamaica. He strengthened the forces around Gibraltar and
I will not enter into any discussion on what you have said regard-ing the status quo(uti possidetis )because it would be premature, but Ihope that when we come to treat of this matter I shall" be in a state
to show that England must not be left in possession of New York."
Vergennes to i.ontmorin, April 12, 1781. Esp., 603, 22, no. 25.
2. "We still do not see whether we must change relative to the Ameri-
cans, but I can assure you that our firm and invariable intention is
to avoid it, as much as is in our power, and the king will change his
resolutions only when he sees the impossibility of reaching a reasona-ble peace without some sacrifice." Vergennes to Luzerne, June ?0.
1781. Etats-Unis, XVII, 19, no. 55.
3. "As to the status quo (uti possidetis) it would be personally ad-
vantageous to us as well as to SDain because we have made some con-
quests on the common enemy, but it does not enter into our plan rela-
tive to North America. Vergennes to Luzerne, Sept. 7, 1781. Etats-
Unis, XVIII, 21, no. 69.
4. Vergennes to Montmorin, Sept. 6, 1781. Esp., 605, 60, no. 129.
We hope that Jamaica will be given Spain The conquest of St. Au-gustine will prove a division in favor of the Americans." Memoirs
nolosed with .-sp., 605, 66 "which ought to be 67", no. 73.
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projected another invasion of Canada. He sent De Grasse back to A
-
raerican waters, and although he did not ask Spain to attack the Brit-
ish in the United States it was because lie knew Spanish repugnance to
the American cause. This he felt must be the last effort, and if it
failed, he must yield to British terns, but if it triumphed the guar-
antee would be maintained in its entirety. The attack on Jamaica was
not made, Gibraltar did not fall, but the victory of Yorktown solved
the problem and Vergennes declared that he would insist on the mainte-
lance of the independence of the whole United states. 2
The question of the boundaries presented to Vergennes a stil
more serious dilemma. On the north there was no difficulty. He did
not feel that the Americans could conquer Canada but he was anxious
for them to have Halifax, and planned an expedition to help them take
it. The boundaries between the United States and the Spanish poss-
essions were the source of difficulty, and as to the justice of ei-
ther' s pretensions he described himself as entirely ignorant. 4 The
O
only indication^ that he gave of his sympathies are his bitter protest:
c
' 5
against Spanish cupidity and. his praise of the moderation of Cong-
ress .
1. Llontmorin to Vergennes, Oct. 21, 1780. Esp., *05, 70, no. 91.
.
Vergennes to Luzerne, Dec. 4, 1780. Etats-Unis, XIV, 10, no. 111.
3. Vergennes to Luzerne, Oct. 22, 1780. Ibid, 9, no. 32.
4. "According to all appearances the two parties have had great diffi
culty in agreeing on the division of the territories to the east of
the Mississippi and the Ohio." (In reference to Jay's negotiation at
\7adrid). Vergennes to Luzerne, Aug. 12, 1782. Etats-tJnis, XXII, 38,
no. 17. "I think I ought not discuss the article concerning the
boundaries, because the matter is still not sufficiently clear." Ver
gennes to Luzerne, Sept. 7, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVIII, 21, no. 69.
5. Vergennes to Hontmorin, April 12, 1781. Esp., 603, 22, no. 25.
6. Vergennes to Luzerne, Sept. 17, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVIII, 21, no. 69

Thus it was that the opposing claims or Oon.jress and the
Spanish minister entangled Vergennes in a policy that appeared weak
and vacillating and had led to the charge of insincerity. Yet there
is no evidence that he made a promise he did not try to keep, or that
he urged measures he was unwilling to support, and throughout he
showed a willingness, unusual in statesmen of any epoch, to sacrifice
French gains to the cupidity of his allies. In no sense was he re-
sponsible for the differences between Spain and the United States. It
is trrue, he had made great concessions to the court of Charles III
but had promised nothing to which his American proteges ever held any
claim. He had guaranteed to the United States their independence, and
such conquests as they might make, and this guarantee he was deter-
mined to maintain. The question of the west and of the Mississippi
river had not come within his purview until forced upon him by outsid
events, and he did not profess to know the justice of the case. The
territory was a wilderness and so cuuld not be in rebellion, and the
mother country had a clear title by right of conquest. Under these
circumstances he did his best to harmonize differences until the close
of the war when the question could be settled on its merits, and it
was with this decision that Vergennes entered on the negotiations for
peace
.
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CHAPTER X.
VERGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.
The close of the war did not bring any compromise between
the claims of Spain and those of the United States nor did it enlight-
en Vergennes on the rights of either country. He had succeeded in
postponing the question until all were ready to treat for peace, but
with the assurance of pacification the rancor and obstinacy of the op-
posing forces became more insistent. Congress, united by the land
cessions of the larger states in a common interested relieved from
the dangers and anxieties of invasion, at once returned to its former
pretensions. Spain, foiled in her assaults on Gibraltar, and maddened
at her misfortunes in the
-est Indies, clamored for compensation on
the Mississippi.
Congress was the first to act. During the preceding years
its pretensions had varied with the ideas of its members, from a claim
to most of Canada down to very restricted boundaries. In Lay when it
became apparent that the war would soon be over, on the suggestion of
Luzerne it began once more to formulate its claims for the considera-
1. The ambitions of the larger states had not escaped the jealousy oftheir smaller sisters, who had definite boundaries a.nd no expectations
of conquest. Virginia was the target of their criticism for her
claims not only to Kentucky but to the territory north of the Ohio,
and the small states had complained vigorously against carrying on'
a
war for her aggrandizement. (Luzerne to Vergennes, Jan. 4, 1781. ^tat
Unis, XV, 112, no. 8). Tom Paine wrote a pamphiet in his most caustic
style assailing the pretensions of this great state. (Copy enclosed
with above despatch). So strong did the opposition become that sever
al of the states agreed to abandon a part of their lands to be soldfor the benefit of the soldier. ^ Tew York and Connecticut made their
cessions without difficulty, but Virginia had already sold much of herland. Finally, however, pressed on all sides, she ceded all her
claims north of the ^hio to the Confederacy. These cessions gave a
new strength to the Confederacy in the vast extent of territory the
common property of the states and stopped much petty jealousy and ha-
+
~ed . ,;

—tion of the negotiators. Vergennes was insistent that the instruct-
ions of Congress should, be clear and precise 2 so a committee was ap-
pointed to confer with Luzerne in regard to the terms of the instruct
ions. This co' mi t tee decided without difficulty that the treaty of
177S with France should be the basis of their demands, but as this did
not stipulate the boundaries, it also undertook to determine them/
On June 6 it presented its report and the debate on the in-
structions then begun did not end until the 15th when Congress agreed
to instruct the envoys that: "as to the disputed boundaries ... .we re-
fer you to the instructions formerly given to Mr. Adams, dated 14th
August, 1779, and |8th October, 1780 from which you will easily per-
ceive the desires and expectations of Congress; but we think it unsafe
to tie you by absolute and peremptory directions You are to make
the most candid and confidential communications upon all subjects to
the ministers of our generous ally, the king of France; to undertake
nothing in the negotiations for peace ... .without their knowledge and
concurrence, and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and
5
opinion.
. .
.
"
The provisions regarding the boundaries were not agreed to
without much debate and discussion, but there seems to have been no
opposition to the clause requiring the envoys to act only with the
knowledge and concurrence of the king. Throughout the war Congress
had explained all intentions, even the most secret, to the French mta
ister. Al though he had often frankly opposed these he had never be-
Luzerne to .Congress, hay 26, 1781. Secret Journals, II, 412.
2. Vergennes to Luzerne, July 27, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVII, 20, no. 14?Carroll, Jones, Ji therspoon, Sullivan, Mathews,- Secret Journals.
II, 411. '
4. Luzerne to Vergennes, June 8, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVII, 145, no. 17.
Secret Journals, II, aap .
i

j
_________
confidence should continue. There was no reason to think that Prance
*as unfriendly to the United States, or that she had any aims opposed
to their interests. Luzerne had definitely stated only lately that
the king insisted on independence for the whole of their territories,
and berore the final instructions were, accepted he had informed them
that his master had refused to treat on the basis of uti possidetis. 1
t the same time France had very recently advanced large sums of mone;
nd had given promise of further aid.
On the question of the boundaries hung the debates and dis-
cussions of a month. Some wished to maintain the previous instruct-
ions with most. extended boundaries, and to give permission to the ne-
gotiators to yield as it became necessary, and at last, if they could
lot gain suitable terms, to. leave the settlement of this question till
after the peace.^ Luzerne, however, in harmony with the wishes of
Vergennes,^ opposed any extreme demands and reminded Congress how ab-
surd it was to de-and conquests with the enemy in possession of much
of their own territory. The old pretensions of the charters and proc-
lamation of 1763 were pled for but with no result, and finally Luzerne
suggested to the committee appointed to confer with him "that some
discretion be left to the envoys". Another suggestion was a line of
demarcation between the United States and the British possessions, and
this Luzerne approved, but the committee appeared set against it and
Secret Journals, II, 452.
2. Ibid, 42^; Luzerne to Vergennes, June 8, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVII,
145, no. 17. '
.
"As to the rules of limits of some states we do not dictate, but w?desire that the Americans should not enter into the negotiations with
.^defensible pretensions, their continent is too vast for their popu-lation, and they will be a long time without need of extending them-
selves. ,rhy then should they prefer to neace, a contingent fate whichis not necessary, nor will give them happiness?" Vergennes to Luzerne
"_e 28, 1782. Etats-Unis, XXI, 35, no.' 103.

refused even to present it: to Congress.."1 =====
The reports of Luzerne at this time reveal three interests
opposed to his policy: those of the large states like "Virginia and
Massachusetts", who had western claims which they were anxious to mai
tain; those who feared to have the British too near their frontiers;
and those who desired to prolong the war for profit. The first class
Luzerne thought he could win over, hut those who were eager to contin-
ue the war, he would not attempt to persuade, "any of the small state
ten belonged to the second class, .which out of hatred of Great Eritain
wished to keep her as far as possible from their borders, and to these
Luzerne devoted his greatest efforts. 1 They believed that those vast
unoccupied territories would soon fill up and felt it to the interests
of their country to keep the new states in the Confederacy. British
neighbors they regarded as dangerous, but Luzerne replied that, no
matter how far they extended their boundaries, they would still have
1 ']/"
neighbors. The resolutions as introduced on June 6 were in accord
Tith the ideas of luzerne, and were practically the same as finally
agreed upon, but they underwent many vicissitudes in their nassage.
hey failed first by the votes of Virginia, Connecticut, and ''assachu-
setts, with North Carolina divided and New York not voting. This
latter state would also have opposed the motion, for her delegates
vere "even less tractable than the Virginians on the extent of the
boundaries which they imagine fixing for Canada in the west."
3
There were, however, so many contrary ideas in Congress that
an agreement on definite instructions was impossible. Some were in-
sistent on the pretentious ultimatum of 1779, but most of the delegate
were willing to accept the Ohio river, while a few were inclined to
Luzerne to Vergennes, June S, 1731. Etate-Uhis, XVII, 145, no. 17.
2. Luzerne to Vergennes, June 11, 1731. Ibid, 147, no. 27.
Secret Journals, II, 423 et seq
.
I

lake the watershed separating the ea^t from the west. 1 Virginia
nost aggressive, and demanded first as an ultimatum the line running
from the mouth of the Miami to the headwaters of the Illinois, thence
down that river to the Mississippi, mien she received no support on
ihis, she framed as her ultimatum the Ohio with the territory north
2
leutral, and declared she would never recede beyond this. Many other
delegates supported this proposition but Luzerne was opposed to pre-
cise instructions and the motion failed. This was still before York-
town and so great was the discouragement in Congress that Luzerne be-
lieved that it would make any sacrifice for peace, even to accepting
the mountains as the western boundary, although he recognized that
such conditions would cause universal complaint, and arouse intense
hostility to France.'
Although the resolutions of Congress were agreeable to Lu-
zerne they did not meet the points at issue and they were not in har-
mony with the desires of Vergennes who wished definite instructions. 4
As circumstances would have it, there appeared little difficulty in
the final negotiations on the north western boundary while the owner-
ship of the territory to the south, which was so complacently assumed
by Congress and tacitly agreed to by Luzerne became at the very begin-
ning of the negotiations, the great point at issue. Vergennes had pro
fessed ignorance of the rights of Spain and the United States, and the
silence of Luzerne on this question is but another example to show the
wide rift that now separated the courts of Paris and Madrid.
Although there was much dissatisfaction with the instruction
agreed to in June, the efforts to change them met with no success. 5
1. Luzerne to Vergennes, June 11, 1731, Etats-Unis, XVII, 147, no .27.
2. Secret Journals II, 128 et seq.
5. Luzerne to Vergennes, June 15, 1781. Etats-Unis, XVII, 148, no. 3:3.
4. Vergennes to Luzerne, July 27, 1731. Etats-Unis, xvil, 20, no. 142
5, The opposition proposed to reopen the whole questions on the re-
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Kobert Uvm^stone, t^ secretary of foreign affairs, however, ex-
plained fully to the peace commissioners, the ambitions of the states
and urged them to seek in every way to extend the western boundary to
the Mississippi. 1 He felt strongly the danger of being surrounded by
Great Britain, and it was in accord with this advice that the commis-
sioners began their negotiations.
The discussions between Congress and Luzerne revealed no
enxiety, nor even knowledge of Spanish claims. In previous years the
Americans had been much disturbed by the pretentions of Spain, but
since the death of Liralles, no one had pressed these claims upon them
and they had apparently forgotten their existence.
JThe Spaniards, however, did not forget their former preten-
sions and their greed for land was no less^avaricious than before.
Eastern Louisiana was an object of special interest to them, for by
holding that province they could then control the whole basin of the
Gulf of Mexico without fear of any rival, and the mighty Mississippi
would be, beyond dispute, their own. Spain could then make the law
for the settlers in the upper Mississippi, by her control of their
commerce, or could force immigration into her territories by the grant
O
of special privileges.
In preparation for the negotiations Spain did not formulate
any demand for Eastern Louisiana, but asked merely for the conquests
promised her by the convention of 1779, with special emphasis on the
guarantee of Gibraltar. 15 In 'addition to these conditions, Aranda pre-
turn of the New York delegates. Luzerne to Vergennes, July 14, 1781.
Etats-Unis, XVII, 158, no. 106. On June 29 Virginia proposed that the
terms of the ultimatum of 1779 be a sine qua non of a treaty of com-
merce. Secret Journals, II, 458.
ivingstone to Franklin, Jan. 17, 1782. barton, Dip. Cor. V.
2. Anonymous - Mote on the new advantages which favor the commerce of
Louisiana. Transcript Largry - Documents, inedits sous Louisiane Bib-liotque Rationale. Konvelles Acquisitions francuises 9309,
3. Florida Blanca to Aranda, Aug. 25, 1782. Esp., 608, 62, no. 166.
"Aranda will doubtless tell you of the pretentions of this court. He
could make them in two words for they comprise all that was stipulated
of
r
thera.
inStrUCti °ns With the 8ame Provisions but I do not have a copy

sented a demand for the Kahama Islands, but this was preemptorily re-
fused by Vergennes who declared he would sustain no claim not promis-
ed in the convention. 1 Spain did not press this condition but reiter-
ated her determination to insist on the "con^r^tion^of her conquests
around the Gulf of Mexico, the expulsion of English from Honduras, and
the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca"! Rodney's victory in the
."est Indies made impossible the conquest of Jamaica, which had been
promised her, subject to the chances of war, but in spite of the de-
struction of the combined fleets beaeiging Gibraltar she still insist-
ed on its restitution, which had been guaranteed to her.
To Spain as to the United States, Vergennes had always sougl
to keep the very letter of his promises and although realizing the
weakness of his position he set loyalty to work to obtain the restitu-
tion of Gibraltar. The failure of the seige of this stronghold made
necessary the offer of some coripensation to Great Britain. Although
the Bourbon courts still hoped to maintain possession of both Gibral-
ar and the Floridas.' It is not necessary here to dwell upon the
efforts of France to keep her pledge for the recovery of the gate of
the Mediterranean. De Grasse had reported that in August Shelburne
had offered to take Lahon in exchange for Gibraltar and as a result,
Gerard de Rayrieval
,
Vergennes' secretary, was sent to London \o treat
on the suggestion. A new ministry had come to power and Shelburne now
isavowed the interview with De Grasse but began a series of discus-
sions with Rayneval on the conditions of peace. 5 Little was said on
the boundaries in America; though Shelburne implied that the west was
Vergennes to Montmorin, Sept. 7, 1782. Esp., 608, 68, no. 189.
2. Montmorin to Vergennes, Sept. 20, 1782. Esp., 608, 72, no. 244.
3. Montmorin to Vergennes, Sept. 22, 1782. Esp., 608, 75, no. 251.
4. Vergennes to Montmorin, Sept. 7, 1782. Esp., 608, 68, no. 189.
5. Doniol, V, 104.

not included within the limits of the colonies. Rayneval however re-
fused to commit himself, shelburne then let it be known that"the
Floridas, with a district up to the neighborhood of New Orleans, join
ed to the vast territories, which lie between the Mississippi and the
lakes, and the western frontiers of America, might form a proper equiv
alent for Gibraltar". 1 This idea did not please Vergennes for he fear
ed the rivalry of Spaniards and English on the Mississippi and it is
doubtful if Shelburne meant it seriously.
Although the mission of Rayneval was unsuccessful Vergennes
did not cease his efforts to keep his pledge to Spain, and offered to
compensate Great Britain out of the possessions of France. 2 News of
the signature of the preliminary articles of peace between the Britis
and .American negotiations, made Shelburne' s demands so high that Franc
felt she must renew the war to keep her honor with Spain, 3 and was pre
paring for another struggle when the British ministry and the Spanish
court unexpectedly came to terms.
Vergennes was equally determined to keep his obligations to
the United States, and in spite of his dislike of Adams, his friend-
ship for the new nation was earnest and sincere. In every way he had
pressed American interests at Madrid, 4and had always urged Congress
to vigorous and aggressive action. He had guaranteed independence to
the thirteen states, and had maintained the war at great hardship in
1. Vergennes to Montmorin, Oct. 6, 1732. Esp.', 609, 81, no. 22. TMsproposition however was submitted to Florida Blanca and urged by Mont-
morin to form a barrier against the Americans. Florida Blanca object-
ed to allowing the English a part (Pensacola) in the Gulf of Mexico,
and also refused to cede any territory around New Orleans. Montmorin
to Vergennes, Nov. 23, 1782. Esp., 609, 94, no. 129.
2. Doniol, V, 216.
3. Doniol, Histoire, V, 230.
4. "The future of America is of equal interest to Spain and to us".Vergennes to Montmorin, March 14, 1782. Esp., 606, 11, no. 159.
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order to redeem the honor of France. But he had refused to support
Spanish claims to the Bahamas, and he declared equally that he would
not support any extravagant pretensions on the part of Congress. 1
On the question of the western boundaries France was at last
compelled to declare herself through the zeal of Jay. He had been
called by Franklin to Paris where he arrived on June 23, under the im-
pression that he was to continue the negotiations in which he had not
succeeded at adrid. " Jay at once began active negotiations with A-
randa on the disposition of the Mississippi valley but the difference
between them soon became apparent. Vergennes did not presume to in-
terfere, although Rayneval expressed surprise at the extent of Jay's
demands. In spite of this, on September 4, Rayneval approached the
American envoy with a suggestion of compromise over the territories
south of the Ohio and two days later, at the request of Jay,' submit-
ted a memorial explaining the principles on which the two countries
ought to act. To the territory south of the Ohio, Rayneval f s opinion
was that neither had any title except that of conquest, for before the
1. If the American regime were better constituted; if there was more
unity and energy in the councils ... .they would be able to unite their
forces in a mass to attack the English and would end by expelling thenfrom the continent." Vergennes to Montmorin, March 14", 1782. Esp.
,
P06, 11, no. 159. "The American delegates have shown themselves at-
tached to the alliance and their fidelity to fulfill its conditions.
The king on his side will be no less exact to hold to the conditions
(of the treaty), but there is nothing in our treaty that obliges us to
prolong the war, to support the mabitious pretensions of the American!
to the fisheries or to extended limits." Vergennes to Luzerne, Nov.
27, 1782. Etats-Unis, XXII, 45, no. 160.
2. Doniol, Histoire, V, 108.
3. "The two parties will have much trouble in agreeing on the partiti<
of the territories to the east of the Mississippi and Ohio. We shall
keep silence the mostabsolute, until we are invited to take cognizant
of the discussion, and to express our opinion of it." Vergennes to
Luzerne, Aug. 12, 1782.
4. "I have the honor to send you, as you desire, my personal ideas of
the way to end your discussion of the boundaries with Spain." Rayne-
val to Jay, Sept. 6, 1732. Doniol, V, 159.
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treaty of 176", he argued, it was owned by France, and after Its ces-
sion to Great Britain, it was never incorporated with the colonies.
Neither country, he concluded, could claim a complete title by right
of conquest, and so he suggested a division by which the land south of
the Tennessee should bo under the suzerainty of S^ain, and that to the
north under the protection of the United States. On the navigation of
the Mississippi Rayneval expressed the hope that some arrangement
could be made by which the Americans could be given the right, subject
to proper regulation. As to the territory north of the Ohio, he held
by the same reasoning that it was a part of Canada, and as such a fit
object of negotiation between the Americans and British. 1
This memorial was not submitted as a demand or outline of
action, but merely as a legal opinion on the merits of the case. It
2
was an opinion, fortified by history and law, against which the Amer-
icans could urge only their charter rights. It did not assert any su-
perior claim of the Spaniards over the Americans, and insisted that
both must base their pretensions on right of conquest. In this memo-
rial Rayneval apportioned to each power the territory which it held or
had conquered, and tried to divide the unoccupied lands as equally as
3
as possible.
.
Gerard- de Rayneval, "Idea on the manner of determining and fixing
the boundaries between Spain and the United States on one side of the
Ohio and towards the Mississippi . " Copy sent to Jay Sept. 6. Etats-
Unis, XXII, no. 57, p. 200. "Liemoire concerning, the lands situated to
the east of the Mississippi to the frontiers of Canada". In margin,
"There is reason to believe that this memorial was prepared during the
month of Sept., 1732." Etats-Unis, XXII, no. 92, pp. 309-317.
In the French archives is another memoir entitled, "Typographical
observations on the interests of Spain in the present negotiations
relative to her possessions in North America." There is no name or
date but it was evidently prepared in 1782. It suggests that Canada
and Louisiana be restored to France if possible, and if not suggests
that ^astern Louisiana go to Spain. There is no evidence that it ever
received official sanction. Esp., *09, no. 213, p. 471 et seq
.
2. Rayneval to Jay, Sept. 6, 1732. Doniol, V, 159, n.
3. Spain held Fort Natchez and all posts on the west bank of the Miss-
lssippi from which she had made incursions into the disputed territo-
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Although Vergennes still held to his determination not to
interfere in the disputes between his allies/ he nevertheless held to
the belief that the territory west of the Alleghanies, was legally the
property of Oreat Britain, 2 subject always, however, to the fortunes
of war and diplomacy. He had guaranteed the independence of the thir-
teen colonies and this guarantee he was willing to maintain, but he
would not continue a war for conquests beyond those he had bound him-
self to acquire.' He realized that if peace should fail France must
continue the war under great difficulties, and to prevent such a dis-
aster, he stood firmly on the letter of his guarantee, both to Spain
and the United States.
The refusal of Vergennes to accept fully the American claims
was not due to unfriendliness to their pretensions, but to the desire
for peace. He realized the importance of the west to the United
States, and wished them to take what measures they could to preserve
ries, and thence based her claim to both banks of the river. She main
rained that since Fort ilatchez was the only post in the whole countryits possession gave her claim to it. T,7e must also consider that the'
Frenchman had no idea of the extent of the country.
1. "These notions are for you alone. Take care not to show yourself
informed because we do not wish interviews, at least for the present,
on the discussion between Messrs. Aranda and Jay." Vergennes to Lu-'
zerne, Oct. 14, 1792. Etats-Unis, XXII, 40, no'. 115.
2. "I do riot see by what title the Americans claim the lands which
border on Lake Ontario, or those lands belonging to the savages, or
^hose depending on Canada.
.. .but I know the extravagance of their pre
tensions. According to Congress the charters .... extend the American
domain from the ocean to the South Sea, and such is the system pro-
posed by :;r. Jay, for basis of the negotiations with Snain By a
confidential note to Mr,. Jay, however, he is almost convinced that the
boundaries of the United States to the south of the Ohio, are limited
to the mountains and following the watersheds, and that which is to
the north of this river, namely the lakes, belongs to Canada. The two
countries claim territories to which neither has any legal right."
Vergennes to T uzerne, Oct. 14, 17S2. Etats-Unis, XXII, 40, no. 115.
r'. "The king will be no less exact to hold to the conditions (of the
alliance) but there is nothing in our treaties that obliges us to pro
long the war to sustain the ambitious pretensions which the United
States forms.... on the extent of their boundaries. Vergennes to Lu-
zerne, Oct. 14, 1732. Etats-Unis, XXII, 40, no. 115.
1. "We think as the Americans on the importance of the English estab-
lishment at Oswego. This station at the same time that it imposes on

their interests there. He was anxiousJe*r Spain and the United states
-4o come to a settlement, but he exerted no pressure on either to ef-
fect his purpose. When the negotiations between Jay and Aranda ceasec
he offered no further suggestions for a settlement. With the assur-
ance that Prance would not be dragged into renewing the war, vergennes
gave free rein to the American envoys with the promise to aid them t
the extent of his powers, if they should require it/ and when with-
out consulting him they had won far more than he thought possible2 he
nevertheless aoplauded their dexterity/
Vergenn-s was not alone in regarding the difficulty of se-
curing all the west, as almost insurmountable. Shelburne had ridi-
culed the pretensions of Congress /and Virginia, the most aggressive
of the states, had insisted on no more than the 4hio as an ultimatum,
but Congress would not consent even to this. 5 Even after Yorktown,
some of the more aggressive members of Congress admitted that they
the savages, puts the English in a position to trouble the people ofthe province of Hew York. Congress should be able to make these re-flections an? to take measures accordingly." Vergennes to Luzerne,
^ct. 14, 1732. Etats-Unis, XXII, 40, no. 115.
.
"If the American commissioners are exact in their accounts thevdo not complain that we seek to influence or to inconvenience them intheir negotiations. I receive what they want to tell me, and theyknow that on occasion, T will render them all the good offices in mvpower but do not place myself in the way of knowing more than theyare disposed to tell me." Vergennes to Luzerne, Nov. 27, 17R^(in hishand).- Etats-Unis, XXII, 45, no. 160.
2. "In spite of all the cajoleries which the Fnglish ministry lavishes
on the Americans I do not indulge in the hope that they will show ther
'selves as agreeable either on the boundaries or the fisheries as theAmericans hope." Vergennes to Luzerne, Nov. 27, 1782. Ibid.
^•"I°^Wi11 GUrely applaud as I do the very extensive advantagesvhich the Americans have been able to receive by the peace." Ver-pnnes to
,
Dec. 19, 1732. Ibid, 45, no. 185. This was writtenjust at the time when Vergennes was offended at the exhibition of dis-trust and jealousy by Jay and Adams.
4. Rayneval to Vergennes,
-Doniol, Histoire, V, 133.
5. Secret Journals, II, 470.
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would be willing to leave all the disputed territories in the west to
the Indians under the joint protection of Great Britain, France,
Spain and the United states, 1 and several states signified their wil-
2
lingneso to accept the mountains as the western boundary.
• Military conditions also seemed to forbid the pretensions of
Congress to extensive limits. The British still held the posts on the
Jreat Lakes and continued to do so for many years. Parts of the
south, as well as the city of New York and other important posts, were
still in the hands of the enemy. Clearly there were no military
grounds on which Congress could claim all the west, and there was
I
nothing to offer in exchange.
His knowledge of the obstacles in the way and his belief
that they were insurmountable did not prevent Vergennes from standing
in every way ready to further the ends of the Americans as against the
British. Furthermore Vergennes did not tender his aid blindly but
with full knowledge of the American demands which he was to espouse.
He knew from the reports of Luzerne the full ambitions of Congress,
and the attitude of Jay and Adams had showed that the commissioners
4[would be no more conciliatory. Despatches of the time were full of
'American pretensions, and these were the same which he promised to ad-
Tance to the best of his ability. In spite of the unconcealed dis-
trust of Jay and Adams, and his own dislike of them Vergennes showed
:
1 . Luzerne to Vergennes, Sept. 12, 1782. Etats-Unis, XXII, 271, no. 68
2. LUZ?me to Vergennes, Sept. 28, 1782. Ibid, 275, no. 39.
3. "I shall come to their aid in time for I see that they will have
more than one difficulty, and those of the greatest to overcome if
they persist in their first intentions." Vergennes to Luzerne, Nov.
23,' 1787. Etats-Unis, XXII, 43, no. 160.
-4. Vergennes had respect for American diplomatic ability. "The Ameri-
cans are no less practised than the English", he wrote, "in the art of
irawing indefinite lines .and of making of them a title and a right."
:Tov. 23, 1782. Ibid.

Air.crli- throughout ;.. loyal friend of the be;--,t intere.:U; of the united
States. There is no trace of jealousy or meanness in his attitude anc
even when he found his counsels spurned and the pledges made to him
boldly broken, with only one burst of temper at the personal affront,
he expressed the liveliest pleasure at the success of American diplo-
1
macy and admiration for its effectiveness.
To Vergennes America owes a great debt of gratitude for the
preservation of its independence. In spite of the fact that he en-
tered the war for a selfish purpose, the years of common trials and
ffort s, the enthusiasm of the French people, and the personality of
the great Franklin, infused his cold heart with something like enthu-
siasm for the nation he had called into existence, and for whose pro-
tection he devoted the best efforts of many years. V
Te may give great
praise to the foreign heroes who fought and died in defence of Ameri-
can liberties, but among all the friends of the new republic, no one
can show a higher title of loyalty, not even the lovable and chival-
rous Lafayette, than the careworn and thoughtful statesman, Vergennes
l.."You will surely applaud as I do the very, extensive advantages
which the Americans have been able to acquire by the peace." Ver-
,
rennes to Luzerne, Dec. 19, 1782. Etats-Unis, XXII, 45, no. 132.
"You will notice that the English buy peace rather than make it. _
Their concessions in fact, as well in the matter of boundaries as m
that of the fisheries and the loyalists exceed all- that I could have
thought possible.- Vergennes to Rayneval,- McLaughlin, Confederation
and Constitution, 50. In order further to show his good will -to the
Americans he made them a new grant of six million livres. Doniol,
Kistoire, V, 269.

CHAPTER XI.
PEACE
.
Peace, the goal towards which Vergennes had so patiently
toiled, cane at last, but by negotiations unknown to him, and through
principles which he had regarded as exclusively his own. During the
early years of the war the French had often expressed astonishment at
British stupidity in alienating the colonies, Hut with the overthrow
of the I Torth ministry and the accession to power of Shelburne, first
as secretary of state for the colonies, then as prime minister, all
this was changed. Shelburne at once inaugurated a new policy, a pol-
icy of conciliation towards an independent republic. Instead of hu-
miliating America he bid high for her friendship, and carried off the
prize for which Vergennes had already paid so dearly.
With this plan in mind Shelburne had, early in the spring of
1782, sent Rachard Oswald, a Scotch merchant, to Paris to sound Prank
lin on the conditions which the Americans would ask for peace and to
suggest a treaty separate from the one with France. To the idea of a
separate treaty Franklin at once objected, but was ready enough to sug
?;est the terms which he regarded as suitable. 2 Oswald talked much of
conciliation and with this idea in mind Franklin declared that in
order to conciliate, Great Britain should cede Canada to the United
States, as an evidence of her good will.' This suggestion did not
neet any objection from Oswald who asked permission to submit it to
3renneth, and the American envoy consented. A few days later Oswald
Informed Franklin that he thought the "affairs of Canada would be set-
1. See ante, p.
2. Franklin, Journal, Writings (Smyth ed.), VIII, 46$.
. Ibid, 472.

tied to (your) satisfaction", but asked that it not be pressed until
near the end of the treaty."'"
The negotiations dragged slowly on until midsummer when
Franklin became more active and on July 10 outlined to Oswald a defin-
ite plan of a treaty, which made as a necessary article "a confinement
of the boundaries of Canada to what they were before the last act of
Parliament, I think in 1774, if not to a still more contracted state
2
on an ancient footing", and which advised the cession of all Canada.
Oswald submitted these conditions to Shelburne, who in the meantime
had become prime minister, and had left Townshend to direct negotia-
tions with the Americans. Townshend followed Sherburne's liberal pol-
icy and issued instructions to Oswald to promise Franklin the with-
drawal of British forces from the states and also a part of the "un-
granted lands to be annexed to each province in return for the restor-
ation of the loyalists".
In the meantime negotiations were going on rapidly in Paris,
and early in August, Franklin and Vergennes united in demanding a
4
"treaty that no one would break". Shortly after this the American
commissioner plead with Oswald to grant a permanent peace on such con-
ditions as not "to force them into the hands of other people". And
explained that in order to ensure such a peace the United States must
5
lave Canada. From the drift of the negotiations and the avowals of
Oswald the experienced American saw that the British ministry was will
ing to sacrifice much for peace and still more to win the friendship
of the United States. Oswald was complaining of the exorbitance of
1. Journal, >7ritings (Smyth ed.), VIII, 486.
2. Oswald to Shelburne, July 10, 1782. Foreign Office, France, 2a, pp.
142-44 .
3. Uated July 25, 1732. Foreign Office, France, 2a, pp. 87-92.
4. Oswald to Townshend, Aug. 7, 1782. Ibid, 141.
5. Oswald to Townshend, Aug. 15, 1732. Ibid, 152-161.

French demands and appealing to Franklin to check them but that wily
statesman pressed his advantage, so strongly that the British agent
2
was compelled to advice the acceptance of his demands.
The British government acted before receiving Oswald's com-
munication and on September 1 acceded to the full extent of Franklin's
ultimatum of July 10. By this it agreed to recognize first of all in-
dependence. The third article provided for the restriction of the
boundaries of Canada to what they were before 1774, the fourth grant-
ed the freedom of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, and another
clause added that: "His Majesty will also waive collection of debts
before 1775 and also claims of refugees for losses.'
Here was granted all that the Americans could hope to obtain
and more than was to be ultimately conceded them. It had been the aim
of the Shelburne ministry to detach the United States from France and
these conditions were well calculated to effect it. The genius of the
mighty Franklin had triumphed.
On September 5 Oswald wrote Franklin that he had received
definite information as to the views of the British ministry in re-
gard to the terms of the treaty and was then ready to begin formal
negotiations. 4 Franklin replied three days later, asking for a copy
of Oswald's instructions,? and it appeared that the terms would soon
be satisfactorily settled.
1. Oswald to Townshend, Aug. 15, 1782. Foreign Office, France, 2a, 177.
2. Oswald strongly urged the cession of that part of Canada added by
the act of 1774. ""If not granted, he wrote, this will cause much dif-
ficulty, especially on the western frontier, and a refusal would oc-
casion a particular grudge, as a deprivation of an extent of valuable
territory, the several provinces have always counted upon as thier ovrr
He advised also that a right to the fisheries be granted to avoid quar
rels with New England. Oswald to Townshend, Aug. 29, 1782. Foreign
Office, France, 2a, pp. 234.
4. Oswald to Franklin, Sept. 5. Wharton, Dip. Cor. V, 699.
5, Franklin to Oswald, Sept. 8. Wharton, Dip. Cor. V, 712.
y
. Tow:. .a to :..^la, Sept. 1, 1?;,. Foreign Office,
F
rance, 2a, 101.
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These instructions, however, were never submitted to Frank-
lin. Jay had arrived at Taris some time before and begun an aimless
negotiation with Aranda which led to nothing because the two could
not agree on the exchange of their commissions.^" Franklin had been
sick since June and was willing to entrust the burden of affairs to
his young associate who was only too glad to undertake the more con-
genial task. Jay was a far different man from Franklin. He was young
and comparatively inexperienced in the management of men, and he pos-
sessed neither the reputation nor the personality that gave such
weight to the words of his aged compatriot. Jay had come to Paris
disgusted with the Spaniards, but he soon came to dislike the French
more, and he ha.ted the British as a patriotic American should.
The attitude of Jay at once made it impossible to continue
the negotiations, for on reading the commission of Oswald he found
that it did not recognize the independence of the United States and
refused to treat until a new commission was framed with form more to
his liking. Franklin protested but in vain. Oswald was compelled to
write for a new commission and the negotiations were held up for sev-
eral weeks, and it was not until September 28 that the two were ready
2
to renew the discussion of terms of peace.
In the meantime Jay had found fresh causes of suspicion a-
gainst the French court. Vergennes had advised him to continue the
negotiations and to allow Oswald to act under his old commission, and
this had convinced him that "this court chooses to postpone an ac-
knowledgement of our independence by Britain, to the conclusion of a
general neace in order to keep us under their direction." The British
had transmitted to him a copy of an intercepted letter from Harbois
1. Jay to Livingston, Sept. 18. V/harton, Dip. Cor., V, 740.
2. Jay to Adams, Sept. 28. Ibid, 778.

which opposed /jnerican claims on the fisheries, 1 and the memorial or
—
Rayneval on the terms of settlement between Spain and the United
States had angered him. With these feelings any unforeseen move on
the part of the French court was sure to cause alarm. Jay at once be-
came suspicious of Rayneval T s mission to London, and decided to des-
patch an agent to Shelburne to counteract any intrigues of the French
secretary. Benjamin Vaughn, a friend of America, was selected for
this purpose and he was instructed to show the ministry that it was
"the obvious interest of Britain, immediately to cut the cords which
tied us to France", and to propose a settlement with Great Britain
with this understanding as a basis. ' Vaughn proceeded to London, had
several interviews with Shelburne and convinced hira that the United
States were willing to break away from France.
Oswald's new commission arrived on the 27th and he and Jay
at once drew up a proposed treaty on the basis of the instructions of
September 1. The first article provided for the boundaries asked by
Congress in 1778, and included, besides what was later assigned the
| United States, the Great Lakes and the territory south of Lake ITepis-
4
; sing. In this treaty as in all subsequent projects was a provision
1. Jay to Livingstone, Sept. IS, 1732. Ylharton, Dip. Cor., V, 740.
It is doubtful if this letter of Liarbois is authentic as the French
envoy always wrote in cipher.
2. Jay to Livingstone,- rharton, Dip. Cor., VI, 29.
5* Jay to Livingstone,- Ibid, 47.
4. "The said states are bounded north by a line drawn from the north-
west angle of Nova Scotia, along the highlands which divide those riv-
ers which empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those
which fall into the Atlantic , Ocean, to the northernmost head of the
Connecticut river, thence down along the middle of that river to the
45th degree of north latitude thence due west to the northernmost
side of the river St. Lawrence .... thence straight to the south end of
Lake Kepissing, and thence straight to the source of the Mississippi."
On the west the United States were to be bounded by the Mississippi
and on the south by the Floridas. Wharton, Dip. Cor., V, 80£ . For-
eign Office, France, 29, 205.

for the free navigation of the Mississippi.
Although Townshend had authorized these terms, he disavowed
the treaty. The reason is obvious. He had offered these concessions
in order to separate the United States from French influence,"
1
but the
mission of Vaughn showed him that this end was already accomplished.
Before this tine the British put forth as the chief aim of their poli-
cy, conciliation, and it was with this understanding that Franklin
and Oswald had carried on their negotiations and upon it Franklin had
based his demands. To Great Britain, however, conciliation did not
mean so much friendship to her as enmity to France, and when the Shel-
burne ministry perceived that the councils of their enemies were di-
vided they withdrew their bids for friendship.
Jay was deeply disappointed at the failure of his efforts.
He felt that he must strive against all Europe and even against his
fellow negotiator. "1 think we have no rational dependence except on
God and ourselves", he wrote, "nor can T yet be persuaded that Great
Britain has either wisdom, virtue or magnanimity enough to adopt a
2
perfect and liberal system of conciliation." His disappointment was
the keener, for the assurances of Oswald had convinced him that there
would be no objection to its provisions. To Oswald he showed the
greatest indignation and even resorted to threats of breaking uo the
negotiations.' Little did he realize that by his own rashness he had
thrown away the fruits of Franklin's diplomacy.
1. Shelburne wrote to Carleton and Digby, June 5, that independence
was offered "with the view of showing America that farther war was on-
ly in the' interest of France and Spain, and to detach her from France'.'
Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 178, p. 439.
2. Jay to Livingston, ITov . 17* Wharton, Dip. Cor., VI, 49.
3. "Jay replied that in case of refugees nothing could be done and
that if Great Britain broke off negotiations on that account, the Uni-
ted States would present claims against her for unnecessary destruct-
ion in war." Oswald to Townshend, Nov. 6, 1782. Foreign Office,
France, 29, 340.
-
.

21P -
However much Jay felt anger at the duplicity of Britain, he
gained no love for France."'" His suspicion and distrust of her policy
increased and soon after the arrival of Adams on. October 26, the two
resolved to keep secret from her all knowledge of their negotiations
and forced the aged and enfeebled Franklin to agree.
Henceforth the British conducted their negotiations on a
different basis. Hitherto, they had talked of conciliation, and even
of a federal union, but now they pushed their own material advantages.
Oswald had served well enough when conciliation was the end, and he
still remained at Paris where his frankness and sincerety were a val-
uable asset. To push the claims of empire, however, a different man
2
was necessary and Townshend sent the shrewd and determined Strachey
7>
who was to look after the boundary question, and the disposition of
the loyalists.
Strachey began his efforts with vigor. No longer were there
projects -of ceding Canada but there was a demand that the territory
north of the Ohio be given Great Britain where she might found a col-
4
ony for the loyalists. Neither of these conditions had been insisted
upon in the previous negotiations and to them Strachey now added a re-
•striction of the right to fish on the banks of Newfoundland . Of the
arguments to beat down the new demands of Great Britain we know little
but Adams and Jay were determined men, and resolved to agree to no
conditions which they regarded as in any sense a surrender. °n the
' 1. On Oct . 24 Jay~had an interview™with Rayneval on the terms of
peace, in which the latter suggested that the United States was asking
too much. This Jay regarded as a further confirmation of the ill will
l of France. Wharton, Dip. Cor. VI, 47.
!2. Of Starchey Adans wrote, "He is artful and insinuating. He pushes
and presses every point as far as it can' possibly go: he is the most
[eager, earnest, pointed spirit".
3. Townshend to Oswald, Oct. 2?, 1782 . Foreign Office, France, 2 a,
728.
'
-
—
•
^ Ln to [£yingsto
,L y;,-i, Wharton, Dip. Cor. VI 113.

quesLion of the northern boundaries the Americans offered the choice
1
of two lines. The first provided for a line running from the inter-
section of the forty-fifth parallel with the Connecticut river due
west to the Mississippi . The second provided for the line to run west
on the same parallel to the St. Lawrence river, thence through the
2
middle of the Great Lakes to the source of the Mississippi. Both
provided that in case Great Britain should keep Florida the southern
boundary should run through the mouth of the Yazoo due west to the
^ppalachicola, and both provided for the free navigation of the Miss-
issippi. Starchey had been borne down by the superior skill and de-
termination but he refused more than to transmit the proposed plans
to Townshend for his consideration. Neither of them were in accord
with his instructions but the Americans had pronounced this their ul-
timat urn
.
The provisions regarding the Floridas was the result of Jay'
efforts and grew out of his dislike for Spain and perhaps also a desir
to embarrass Vergennes. Jay had arrived at Paris with a feeling of
animosity towards Great Britain, but this had changed under the genial
frankness of Oswald and the suspicious conduct of his allies into a
feeling of friendship.^ During the early days of September while
Oswald was waiting for his new commission he often talked informally
to Jay of the Floridas, and expressed a desire that if the British
1. Adams to Livingstone. Wharton, Dip. Cor. V, 856.
2. Colonial Office, 5, 8, Nov. 8, 1782. Starchey' s report says the
northern boundary to choice one. was the same as in the preceeding
treaty. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 363.
3. Starchey to Townshend, Nov. 8, 1782. Colonial Office, 5, 8.
4. Until the middle of August Oswald believed that nothing could be
expected of Jay. Oswald to Townshend, Aug. 7. Foreign Office, 2 a,
125.
5. "Jay is nore friendly". Oswald to Townshend, Aug. 17. Foreign
Office, 2 a, 162.
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crown could keep them he should like to have their northern "boundary
pushed northward. Jay met the suggestion kindly and declared that
after the proclamation of 1763 another proclamation had moved the
boundary farther north.
With this the matter was allowed to drop but Jay "brought it
for.vard a^ain when he took up the negotiations with Oswald and suggest-
ed that the Fritish forces in New York be sent on a sudden expedition
to recover these provinces.^ He declared his opposition to leaving
in the hands of the Spaniards, authority over the Gulf of Mexico and
control over the western trade, and maintained that any agreement re-
garding this region would not be a violation of the treaty with Prance
,
Jay argued that the province, was rich in itself and would be of addi-
tional advantage to the British in giving them control of both outlets
to the I ississippi valley; the gulf and the St. Lawrence, by which
4
they could hold all the trade they had ever possessed. As a further
inducement he offered to give the British full right to navigate the
"ississippi . As a final appeal Jay urged that the retention of the
Ploridas would go far to win the friendship of the Americans. Jay
became every day more insistent and finally offered to write General
Washington to permit the peacable evacuation of New York, and Charles-
r
ton by the British troops, and Oswald was convinced that he could
3.. Oswald to Tovmshend, Sept. 11. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 232.
12. Oswald to Townshend, Oct. 2. Foreign Office, France, 2a, 271.
. "The employment of these troops (in America) against Spain would
not infringe on the American treaty with France, Jay says, for the
states are not bound to Spain". Oswald to Townshend, Oct. 2. Foreign
Office, France, 2 a, 271. "Jay again insists that for the common good
Florida shall not be left in the hands of the Spaniards". Ibid, 280.
4. Oswald to Townshend, Oct. 5. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 289.
n5. Although Great Britain did not keep the Floridas this concession
i
was maintained in the final treaty.
P,
.
Oswald to Townshend, Oct. 7. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 302.

carry the boundary of West Florida far to the northward. 1
Townshend did not take kindly to the efforts of Jay. He was
suspicious of the whole transaction but believed that capital might
be made out of it if France should learn of the offers. Oswald was
anxious for the arrangement and plead for it to the very last, that if
it would be of no other benefit it would at least please the Americans
Jay was afraid of the effect of his negotiations and when the provi-
sion regarding the Florida boundary was inserted he "scored it out",
bufadmitted it in addition at the bottom as a separate article" . 4
Jay himself, was not proud of his tactics, and although he dwelt with
pride on the early negotiations with Oswald in which he had no part,
he never took occasion to discuss either with his colleagues, or in
his letters to Congress the part he had taken in the Florida boundary
5
arrangement
.
In the later negotiations Franklin took little part and thei
success may be attributed to the vigor and determination of Jay and
Adams. The man who won for the United States the aid of France, and
[who had overreached the diplomacy of the British crown now was worn
with disease, was pushed out by his younger associates. He found his
advics overborne in their councils, and his suggestions disregarded,
but in order to preserve outward harmony, he still signed their dis-
patches and forbore any opposition. Although his shrewd mind must
1. Oswald to Townshend, Oct. 8. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 310.
2. Townshend to Oswald, Oct. 26. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 330.
3. Oswald to Townshend, Dec. 4. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 439.
4. Oswald to Starchey, Nov. 3. Foreign Office, France, 2 a, 388.
5. Jay to Livingstone, Nov. 17. YTharton, Dip. COr. VI, 11, et seq.
Adams thought that the West Florida project came from Oswald. Mr.
Oswald made very striking overtures to us: to agree to the evacuation
of Hew York....he told us the army was going against YIest Florida to
reconquer that from the Spaniards. Our answer was that we would agree
to no such things". Adams to Livingstone, Nov. 6. VJharton, Dip. Cor.
V, 856.
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have seen clearly the contempt with which Adams and Jay regarded him 1
,
he "bore the humiliation patiently, and at last with hearty good will
made their peace with the irritated Vergennes
.
The firmnesc of Jay and Adams was not due to any knowledge
of the conditions of the negotiations of their allies but to their own
personal convictions. Circumstances however were favorable to the
Americans. Spain was firm in her ultimatum for the restoration of Git
3
raltar. Sherburne was determined never to surrender it but if he re-
fused also the American treaty the allied powers would renew the war.
Under these conditions he chose to detach the United States from the
alliance, and acceded to their terms, at. the same time refusing to
Spain the restoration of Gibraltar. If Spain should wish to renew the
war Great Britain was ready.
The negotiations of Adams and Jay made impossible the ulti-
matum of Spain. Negotiations between Great Britain and the Bourbons
had not produced results but in November Prance had offered to sur-
render Guadeloupe and Dominica in return for the restitution of Gib-
raltar. This offer, Vergennes thought, would be accepted but when
Shelburne learned of the agreement with the American envoys he de-
clared that he must have more, and suggested St. Lucie in addition to
the other cessions. Rayneval, on behalf of Vergennes, refused and the
4
British minister declared for war.
Shelburne was anxious for peace however, and when he saw war
again impending he made a last effort for conciliation. TTe offered to
1. Adams wrote in his journal: "I told him (Franklin) without reserve
my opinion of the policy of this court, and of the principles, policy
and firmness with which Mr. -Jay had conducted the negotiation. .. .and
that I was determined to support Mr. Jay to the utmost of my power...
V
2. Adams to Livingstone, Nov. 6. Y/harton, Dip. Cor., V, 857
.
3. Correspondence of Fitzherbert, Oct. 7.- Foreign Office, France, 7,
797. Oct. 13.- Ibid, 793. Oct. 21.- Ibid, 799. Nov. 15.- Ibid, 799.
4. Doniol, Histoire, V, 228-231
.

cede Spain the Floridas and ' inorca provi dra s. (, e wou ui rurrtriidST !iur |
pretensions to Gibraltar, and Spain seeing her helplessness agreed to
the conditions.
1
Thus renewed war was averted and peace assured. The
problem of the west belonged no more to the Revolution, but peace did
not solve it. There still remained the question of the navigation of
the Mississippi, and there was to arise a series of disputes over the
boundaries of the Floridas. In spite of the snubs lie received from
Jay and Adams, in spite of their disregard of his counsels and their
secrecy in forming the treaty, Vergennes never suggested in his nego-
tiations with Great Britain any measure that would interfere with A-
merican desires. He had offered to help the Americans in their labors
and although this was not accepted, he still refused to allow Spain to
o
push her pretensions against them. If Great Britain had surrendered
the right to navigate the Mississippi, guaranteed to her by the treaty
of 1763, the United States would have had no recourse. If she had
fixed the boundaries of the Floridas in her treaty with Spain, Ameri-
can claims would have been weakened. Spain was anxious to obtain
these advantages, Great Britain had no interest in refusing them, and
to Vergennes alone must be given the thanks for thwarting Spanish am-
bitions
.
The preliminary articles of peace between the United States
and Great Britain were agreed to on November 30, 1782, and between
4
Sreat Britain and the Bourbon monarchies on January 20, and tne ques-
;
1. Doniol, Histoire, V, 228-251. :
2. "I am informed that this latter (John Adams )has reported m Amer-
ica that wf have sought England to contract the limits of the United
-tat^s As I have some grounds to believe that there are some adhe-
\
rents of them in America 1 think I ought to put you in condition
to refute them." Vergennes to Montmorin, Sept. 7, 1783. Etats-Unio,
I XXV, 52, no. 144.
I 7. In the records of negotiations in the French archives there is no
mention of the Mississippi or the Florida boundaries. Doniol, His-
toire, V, 229.
4. Affaires Etrangencs, Eapagne, 610, fol . 3, no. 22.

tion of the west passed out of the diplomacy of the American Revolu-
tion.
It was recognized at once that the treaty left a fruitful
cause of dispute between Spain and the United States over the naviga-
tion of the Mississippi and the boundaries of the Floridas. Florida
Blanca, however, expressed his willingness to accept the boundaries
agreed to by the British and Americans and at once began negotiations
1
concerning the Mississippi. Montmorin and Aranda recommended that
p
New Orleans be made a free port/" but this advice was too liberal for
the Spanish minister. Vergennes himself expressed similar views al-
though he realized their futility. At the same time he urged upon
4
the Americans moderation in their dealings with Spain and preserved
to the last his role of harmonizer.
In America news of the peace was received with much joy al-
though there were many who complained that they were given too re-
5
stricted boundaries. Spain raised no complaint, and Vergennes was
happy that in keeping his faith as an honest man, he had at last
wrought the humiliation of England, and glorified the prestige of
France
.
1. Llontmorin to Vergennes, Feb. 13, 173^. Espagne, 610, P, no. 67.
The great difficulty (between the United States and Spain) is truly
the navigation of the Mississippi." Vergennes to Montmorin, vrarch 1,
173?. ^spagne, 610, 3, no. 39V
2. Llontmorin to Vergennes, March 1, 173?. Ibid, 6, no. 110.
3. "Spain is not willing to adopt our sentiments on the navigation of
the Mississippi because of the fear of contraband." Vergennes to
Montmorin, April 1, 1783. Espagne, 610, 9, no. 149.
4. Vergennes to T.uzerne, Dec. 20, 1732. Etats-Unis, XXII, 46, no. 118.
5. Luzerne to Vergennes, Feb. 9, 1783. Etats-Unis, XXIII, 30^, no. 51
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